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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
BILLY GRAHAM, SOUTHERNER 
 
An influential religious personality such as Dr. Billy Graham is interesting to study 
because he serves as a kind of trading-post agent of this two-way traffic between 
religious faith and the world of changing codes, technology, politics, medical evolution, 
and social mobility.  Through him flows much of the interchange between religion, on 
one hand, and the complex of society and culture, on the other.  
 
Joe E. Barnhart1 
 
But I think we have seen rather overwhelmingly that what the South does become will 
not be in fulfillment of all those grand expectations that it would develop models for 
national emulation of new political alignments or new kinds of cities or new economic 
prodigies or new never-equaled racial harmony. 
 
Pat Watters2 
 
In June 2005, an elderly Billy Graham returned to New York City, a half-century 
after a mountain-top moment in his evangelistic career, a crusade that had stretched on 
for four months in that most un-Protestant and secular of American locales.  Stricken 
with prostate cancer and Parkinson’s disease, among other health problems, and reliant 
on a special lectern that allowed him to sit while preaching, the white-haired Graham 
held only three services during what was billed as his final domestic crusade.  Most of the 
230,000-plus total attendees likely knew what to expect from this lion in winter.  Many 
elements of his services had remained largely unchanged since the 1950s: the bass-
baritone of soloist George Beverley Shea, the volunteer choir and ushers drawn from area 
                                               
1
 Joe E. Barnhart, The Billy Graham Religion (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1972), 62.   
 
2
 Pat Watters, “The South and the Nation,” New South, Fall 1969, 28. 
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churches, the climactic and solemn moment of invitation, and—of course—the presence 
of celebrities and politicians on the crusade platform.  The highest-profile guests in 
Flushing Meadows were Hillary and Bill Clinton, who feted the evangelist.  (Graham, in 
turn, surprised many of his constituents by implying that Hillary Clinton was presidential 
material.)  Standing with Graham at the pulpit, Bill Clinton noted how his admiration for 
the evangelist derived from an integrated Graham service he had attended as a child in 
Little Rock, Arkansas.  Clinton viewed the evangelist as a fellow southerner.  In an 
interview with the New Yorker, Clinton expanded on the 1959 service: 
When he gave the call—amid all the civil-rights trouble, to see blacks and 
whites coming down the aisle together at the football stadium, which is the 
scene, of course, of our great football rivalries and all that meant to people 
in Arkansas—it was an amazing, amazing thing.  If you weren’t there, and 
if you’re not a southerner, and if you didn’t live through it, it’s hard to 
explain.  It made an enormous impression on me.  I was at that age where 
kids question everything, you know?  And all of a sudden I said, ‘This guy 
has got to be real, because he did this when he didn’t have to.’3 
 
 As journalists filed datelines that read like obituaries, the glow from Graham’s 
status as the grandfather of modern American evangelicalism made him seem removed 
from the ebbs and flows of history.  The New York crusade coverage was a commentary 
on both the grace of time and the thoroughly mainstream status of Graham’s brand of 
Christianity at the start of the twenty-first century.  During the decades following the 
Civil Rights Movement, Vietnam, and Watergate, Graham had softened his 
eschatological, jeremiadic themes and had impressed former critics by embracing nuclear 
disarmament and criticizing the Christian Right.  He had also benefited from an irenic 
demeanor that grew more convincing with age.  His refusal to cast stones in the culture 
                                               
 
3
 Peter J. Boyer, “The Big Tent: Billy Graham, Franklin Graham, and the Transformation of 
American Evangelicalism,” The New Yorker, 22 August 2005, 42-55 (Clinton quoted in 42, 44).  See also 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 24 June 2005; and New York Times, 27 June 2005. 
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wars, as numerous commentators observed, stood in refreshing relief from the rhetorical 
gauntlets thrown down by Pat Robertson, James Dobson, and even his own son and heir-
apparent, Franklin Graham.  Billy Graham, one writer noted, had “figured out how to 
triangulate American Protestant Christianity,” how to cultivate mainstream appeal 
without burning conservative bridges.4  He had come to represent the better half of an 
evangelicalism that, by 2005, again stood as the ascendant religious force in American 
society.  His more controversial days—1971, for example, when two Southern Baptist 
dissidents branded him a “court prophet” in the Nixon White House (and when few 
journalists described him as anything other than a Republican), or 1958, when a Deep 
South governor echoed the sentiments of many segregationists in castigating him as a 
southerner whose “endorsement of racial mixing has done much harm”—felt farther 
away than his first crusade in New York.5 
 Yet had Graham truly transcended the politics of his past—or even that of his 
present?  A mere three years before the 2005 New York crusade, Graham had sloughed 
off a final round of residue from the Nixon years: the release of a White House 
conversation in which the evangelist appeared to readily affirm the president’s anti-
Semitic ranting.  Graham had responded to the disclosure with swift, if somewhat 
puzzled, contrition, apologizing to Jewish leaders for words he could not remember 
uttering.6  He had long stressed that his flirtation with politics had ended.  Still, only two 
                                               
 
4
 Boyer, “Big Tent,” 44.  For other response to the New York crusade, see New York Times, 26 
June 2005 and 12 June 2005.   
 
5
 Will D. Campbell and James Y. Holloway, “An Open Letter to Dr. Billy Graham,” Katallagete, 
Winter 1971, inside cover-3.  Columbia (SC) State, 12 October 1958. 
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years earlier, on the cusp of the 2000 presidential election, he had offered effusive 
support for candidate George W. Bush, who credited Graham with sparking his journey 
toward born-again Christianity.7  A decade before this second Bush assumed office, 
Graham had spent a night in the White House with George H. W. and Barbara Bush 
watching television coverage of the start of the Persian Gulf War—a fact the elder Bush 
soon recounted at the National Prayer Breakfast.8  During an era when religion and 
politics consorted brashly and unapologetically (and when Graham no longer commanded 
sustained media coverage), these incidents drew only passing attention.  
 Clearly, the snapshot of Graham in New York City captured only the twilight of a 
remarkable career that dated back to the end of World War II.  Since the early 1950s, 
Graham has never relinquished his status as one of the most recognizable and respected 
of Americans, someone who has mingled comfortably with the powerful, while retaining 
the common touch.  As scholar Joe Barnhart recognized in the early 1970s, the evangelist 
functioned during his peak years of influence as a kind of conduit through which flowed 
much of the zeitgeist of the latter half of the twentieth century.  However, Graham was 
not, as Barnhart went on to contend, merely “an innocent tool of complex dynamics 
which he may little understand or appreciate.”9  Rather, the evangelist has functioned as a 
public actor in his own right.  In engaging political leaders and the pressing issues of his 
                                                                                                                                            
6
 White House conversation 662-4, 1 February 1972, National Archives and Records 
Administration, Nixon Presidential Materials.  See also New York Times, 4 April 2002, 17 March 2002, and 
12 June 2005. 
 
7
 Atlanta Constitution and Florida Times-Union, 6 November 2000.   
 
8
 Billy Graham, Just As I Am: The Autobiography of Billy Graham (New York: HarperCollins, 
1997), 584-587.  Jim McGrath, ed., Heartbeat: George Bush in His Own Words (New York: Scribner, 
2001), 134. 
 
9
 Barnhart, Graham Religion, 62-63. 
  
 
5 
times, he made important decisions that, while always weighed against his higher 
priorities as an evangelist, reflected his own values, his own notion of the social and 
spiritual good.  His power, that is, was simultaneously readily visible and more than what 
met the eye. 
 Nowhere was Graham’s public and private sway more evident than in his native 
region of the American South.  His national and international prominence has 
understandably obscured his southern origins and identity, as well as the keen ways in 
which he paralleled and, this work argues, influenced the course of the post-WWII and 
post-civil rights era South.10  Bill Clinton understood this influence, yet voiced only one 
facet of it on the crusade platform in New York.  During the three decades between 1950 
and 1980, the South experienced two significant, related shifts away from its status as a 
“Solid South”: the end of legalized Jim Crow and the end of Democratic Party 
dominance.11  That Graham had a hand in both trends says much about his influence and 
complexity.  This project seeks to reintroduce a familiar figure to the narrative of recent 
                                               
 
10
 The term “post-civil rights era” comes from political scientist Alexander P. Lamis, The Two-
Party South (New York: Oxford University Press [Oxford], 1984), vii.  As used in this project, the southern 
post-civil rights era refers to the period starting when federal civil rights legislation entered into nominal 
force and the politics of “massive resistance” had largely run its course (i.e., the late 1960s and early 
1970s).  This period has seen three striking trends: the growth of African-American involvement in 
Democratic Party politics, the rise of Republican Party influence in state congressional delegations and 
legislatures, and the electoral salience of gender-based issues not explicitly linked with race. 
 
11
 “Solid South” is employed both in its traditional sense (i.e., in reference to the historic power of 
the Democratic Party in the region) and in reference to the region’s network of Jim Crow laws and enforced 
racial mores.  The latter usage draws inspiration from the title of a classic volume of southern religious 
historiography: Samuel S. Hill, et al., Religion and the Solid South (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1972).  
On the former usage, see, for example, Dewey Grantham, The Life and Death of the Solid South: A 
Political History (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1988). 
As used here, the persistently contested term, “the South,” builds on the above understanding of 
the Solid South.  In broad terms, the South includes those states where both exhaustive Jim Crow laws and, 
in most cases, the segregationist wing of the Democratic Party were dominant until the post-civil rights era.  
This definition includes large portions of the “border” or “rim” states, such as Texas and Kentucky.  The 
“Upper South” includes Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and parts of the border/rim states.  
The “Deep South” generally refers to South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. 
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southern history and, in the process, elucidate the social and political transitions 
constitutive of the modern South.  Alternately a desegregating crusader in Alabama, 
regional booster in Atlanta, southern apologist in the national press, and southern 
strategist in the Nixon administration, Graham functioned as a type of regional leader—a 
product of his times and a player in them, a symbol and an actor.  His evangelical 
Christianity mediated the emergence of a post-civil rights era South simultaneously more 
open to desegregation and more amenable to Republican Party politics.   
 
Graham, the South, and Evangelicalism 
This project considers Graham’s important role in creating the modern South, 
focusing on his behavior and rhetoric regarding race and politics (along with religion, the 
most salient subjects for analyzing change in his home region) from 1950 to 1980.  
During these years, the North Carolina native and resident maintained a visible and 
controversial presence in a region witnessing the Civil Rights Movement and the 
beginning of political realignment.  His life can tell us much about the South during these 
decades—and about the evangelist.  Graham, who possesses a distinct drawl (particularly 
in casual conversations) and whose grandfathers both fought for the Confederacy, has 
made Montreat, North Carolina, his primary residence since 1945, and he has always 
embraced his identity as a southerner.  Like most southerners of his generation, the 
Charlotte-born evangelist grew up in a part of the country that was rife with segregation 
laws, overwhelmingly Democratic, and pervasively evangelical.  The pinnacle of his 
career, the first term of the Nixon administration, coincided with the fitful emergence of 
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what commentators began calling the Sunbelt South, a development that featured the end 
of the first two (although not the third) of these characteristics.   
Graham’s complex role regarding racial and political changes in his home region 
raises important questions about the nature of the post-civil rights era South.  From the 
mid-1950s through the mid-1960s, the evangelist came to support desegregation, 
discreetly cooperated with Martin Luther King, Jr., and advocated racial tolerance in such 
national publications as Life and Ebony.  At the same time, Graham remained a member 
of a Southern Baptist congregation led by the outspoken segregationist W. A. Criswell—
and, in the eyes of at least one right-wing Republican, he was a viable candidate for the 
1964 GOP presidential nomination.  Graham held his first intentionally desegregated 
southern crusade in 1953.  As he began holding desegregated services throughout the 
Upper South, he received public criticism from ardent segregationists, such as South 
Carolina Governor George Bell Timmerman.  The evangelist largely avoided the Deep 
South until the mid-1960s, when he visited Alabama, partly at the bidding of Lyndon 
Johnson, and held highly publicized rallies and crusades in the aftermath of racial 
violence in Birmingham and Selma. 
Graham’s relationship to electoral politics in the South was equally complicated.  
Beginning with Dwight Eisenhower and continuing through Lyndon Johnson and Richard 
Nixon, national politicians looked to Graham for regional leadership on civil rights 
matters, particularly among the evangelist’s presumed constituency of white southerners.  
The evangelist consulted with Eisenhower about the Little Rock desegregation crisis and, 
during the years considered here, met with a host of regional politicians, including 
Alabama Governor George Wallace.  Also, Graham supported the Office of Economic 
  
 
8 
Opportunity and recorded television spots promoting obedience to school integration and 
busing laws.  Yet he was more than just a consultant or figurehead.  Although nominally 
a registered Democrat throughout his adult life, Graham prominently paralleled—in 
certain respects, spoke for—those white southerners, many of them with moderate 
inclinations, who supported Eisenhower, backed Johnson, and then voted Republican 
again with Nixon.12  Through his relationship with Nixon, in particular, Graham 
functioned as a political strategist and abetted the president’s controversial, if not always 
successful, “southern strategy.” 
The simultaneous assistance of Graham to ending both the political and racial 
Solid South appears somewhat incongruous.  These parallel narratives each intersect with 
one of the perennial debates within southern historiography: continuity versus change.  
While more racially moderate and economically vibrant than before, the modern South 
has also perpetuated traditions of political conservatism and evangelical piety.  Applied 
to the newest New South, then, the seemingly ceaseless questions of continuity and 
change are not exhausted.  How much of a political and cultural watershed was the end of 
Jim Crow?  To what extent has race retained its electoral salience?  Has the GOP 
permanently supplanted a formerly entrenched Democratic Party?  These key questions 
have elicited a range of responses among scholars, extending from Cashian descriptions 
of the modern South as an antiunion bastion of low wages and political Whiggery to 
Woodwardian invocations of “forgotten alternatives” in the realms of race and politics.13  
                                               
 
12
 On this electoral demographic, see Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics 
in the Sunbelt South (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 229-241. 
 
13
 For the former, see W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York, Vintage, 1991 [1941]); 
James C. Cobb, The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development, 1936-2000, 
2nd edition (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 254-281; Cobb, “Does Mind No Longer Matter? 
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Political scientists have stressed the discontinuity of two-party competition in the 
region.14  Following the implications of historian Dan T. Carter, meanwhile, several 
scholars of southern religion and/or politics have observed a form of continuity masked 
as change: a shift from race to gender as the dominant trope of reactionary politics, often 
voiced with faith-infused language.15    
The example of Graham, as well as the type of evangelical faith he proffered and 
represented, can shed critical light on these issues.  On its face, religiosity would seem to 
comprise an element of southern continuity.  Yet its role in recent southern history is 
ambiguous enough to have sparked a lively scholarly debate about whether Christianity 
has served overall as a liberal, conservative, or moderate force among white southerners.  
Here, as well, questions abound.  Did the faith of white southerners largely abet the 
conservative status quo, as Samuel S. Hill, one of the deans of southern religious 
historiography, suggested back in the 1960s?  Or was it not such a roadblock to racial 
                                                                                                                                            
The South, the Nation, and The Mind of the South, 1941-1991,” Journal of Southern History 57.4 
(November 1991): 681-718; and Bruce J. Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, 
Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980 (Oxford, 1991).   
For the latter, see C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 3rd edition (Oxford, 
1974), 31; Numan V. Bartley, The New South, 1945-1980: The Story of the South’s Modernization (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press [LSU], 1995); and Pete Daniel, Lost Revolutions: The South in the 
1950s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press [UNC], 2000). 
 
14
 Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 1-39.  
 
15
 Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative 
Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 (LSU, 1996); and The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the 
New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics, 2nd edition (LSU, 2000).  For variations 
on the race-to-gender thesis, see Paul Harvey, Freedom’s Coming: Religious Culture and the Shaping of 
the South from the Civil War though the Civil Rights Era (UNC, 2005), 218-250; Marjorie Julian Spruill, 
“‘Women for God, Country, and Family,’: Religion, Politics, and Antifeminism in 1970s America” 
(unpublished paper in possession of author); and Glenn Feldman, “Introduction” and “The Status Quo 
Society, The Rope of Religion, and the New Racism,” in Politics and Religion in the White South, ed. 
Feldman (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), 1-10, 287-352.  See also Andrew Michael 
Manis, Southern Civil Religions in Conflict: Civil Rights and the Culture Wars, 2nd edition (Macon, GA: 
Mercer University Press, 2002). 
  
 
10 
change, as David Chappell has recently argued?  Lastly, how much did conservative 
southern Christianity change as it grew more politicized during the 1970s and 1980s?16   
This project views evangelical Christianity as ultimately synergistic with modern 
change in the South, in part because trends such as the rise of a highly organized 
Christian Right and the growth of televangelism (along with the familiar story of 
economic growth) are themselves products of that very modernity.  In other words, as 
most sociologists of religion now believe, modernization does not reflexively equate with 
secularization.17  Facets of this modernity (e.g., evangelical faith and New South 
boosterism) actually represent an evolving pattern of continuity in southern history.  
Other aspects (e.g., the absence of Jim Crow laws and the growth of the Republican 
Party) clearly indicate change.  Billy Graham’s style of evangelical faith helped to 
determine the course of these partial watersheds.  As many mainstream white southern 
Christians, including Graham, began distancing themselves during the immediate postwar 
                                               
 
16
 For an overview of debates about the political cultural influence of white southern Christianity, 
see Feldman, “Introduction,” 1-10.  Hill, Southern Churches in Crisis Revisited (Tuscaloosa, AL: The 
University of Alabama Press [Alabama], 1999).  David L. Chappell, A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion 
and the Death of Jim Crow (UNC, 2004).  For two studies noting the discontinuity of political activism 
within conservative southern Christianity, see Barry Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon: Southern Baptist 
Conservatives and American Culture (Alabama, 2002); and Daniel Kenneth Williams, “From the Pews to 
the Polls: The Formation of a Southern Christian Right” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Brown University, 2005). 
 
17
 On the decline of secularization theory, see R. Stephen Warner, “Work in Progress Toward a 
New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States,” American Journal of Sociology 
98.5 (March 1993): 1044-1093; and William H. Swatos, Jr., and Kevin J. Christiano, “Secularization 
Theory: The Course of a Concept,” Sociology of Religion 60.3 (Fall 1999): 209-228.  Modernization and 
modernity are used here very generally in a developmentalist sense (i.e., as the process or result of moving 
away from “traditional” social and/or economic structures and toward something identified as modern).  In 
the political and industrial history of the twentieth-century South, modernization entailed a language of 
progress and advancement—a certain comfort with change or, somewhat more complexly, a desire to 
mediate or control that change.  Regarding religion in the South, the point here is that evangelical 
Christianity was not a casualty of modernization.  On the political language of modernization, see Paul 
Luebke, Tar Heel Politics 2000 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).  On 
evangelicalism and modernity, see Martin E. Marty, “The Revival of Evangelicalism and Southern 
Religion,” in Varieties of Southern Evangelicalism, ed. David Edwin Harrell (Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 1981), 7-21. 
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years from Jim Crow apologetics, evangelical piety dulled as a weapon in the 
segregationist arsenal.  (In the case of many African Americans and civil rights activists, 
of course, it was already a weapon against Jim Crow.)  Departures from tacit or overt 
defenses of Jim Crow, however, scarcely indicated larger shifts toward theological or 
political liberalism—a reality the 1968 and 1972 Nixon campaigns only reinforced.  A 
key to delineating the socio-political space these white evangelicals occupied lies in 
understanding the nature of Graham’s social ethic, here termed evangelical universalism.  
This social ethic featured three coexistent (and not always complementary) tenets: that 
the individual soul is the primary theological and political unit in society; that relational 
solutions greatly surpass legislative ones in resolving social problems; and that Christians 
should, in most cases, acquiesce to ordained governmental authority.   
Any attempt to interpret how Graham affected both the religious and political 
space of the South also requires a step back to consider the influence of American 
evangelicalism on public life.  Evangelicalism has itself become a contested term, leading 
a prominent historian of American Christianity to wish it good riddance as a unit of 
analysis.18  Modern evangelicalism is, in part, an elastic construction generated and 
perpetuated by its proponents, detractors, and scholarly interrogators alike.  Yet it was 
also an avowed, internalized label for many figures considered here—including, of 
                                               
 
18
 D. G. Hart, Deconstructing Evangelicalism: Conservative Protestantism in the Age of Billy 
Graham (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004).  To be sure, Hart primarily wrote to an audience of 
born-again Christians, and the title of his book suggests that at least Graham qualifies as evangelical.  At 
the same time, Hart dedicated substantial space to debunking various scholarly uses of evangelicalism.  For 
criticism of the uses of evangelical in a southern context, see the contribution of Beth Barton Schweiger in 
“Forum: Southern Religion,” Religion and American Culture 8.2 (Summer 1998): 161-166; and Donald G. 
Mathews, “‘Christianizing the South’—Sketching a Synthesis,” in New Directions in American Religious 
History, ed. Hart and Harry S. Stout (Oxford, 1997), 102-107.  Their understandable complaint is that an 
exclusive focus on an unspecific, static evangelicalism lends such evangelicalism a hegemonic power that, 
in turn, belies themes of conflict, fluidity, and general diversity in the southern religious past. 
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course, for Graham.  Like “liberal” and “conservative,” “evangelical” has become such a 
pervasive modifier that, while often frustratingly vague, it has inextricably joined the 
pantheon of living American identities.  During the years considered here, evangelicalism 
stood apart from Protestant liberalism and most other forms of mainline 
denominationalism, as well as from Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy.  Moreover, 
evangelicalism remains a useful category for interpreting the type of cross-
denominational faith Graham and many others upheld—a piety too specific for the labels 
“Protestant” or “conservative,” yet obviously much too broad for “Baptist” or 
“Pentecostal.”19  The intention here is not to casually disregard important distinctions 
among the Reformed, Wesleyan, and free-church traditions—or, for that matter, between 
southern and northern ones.  The very nature of Graham’s ministry, however, has lent 
itself to a certain elision of such categories.  Evangelicalism (along with one of its modes 
of expression, revivalism) has worked most influentially on a large and small scale, as a 
sweeping social force and as a discrete movement within individual souls.20  
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Marsden’s description of evangelicalism as a highly informal “denomination” that can be defined in three 
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This study employs an expansive understanding of evangelicalism as operating 
simultaneously on theological, sociological, and attitudinal levels.  Evangelicalism holds 
to doctrinal orthodoxy and Biblicism, while emphasizing the born-again moment, a 
personal relationship with God, and the importance of sharing the good news of 
salvation.  It also features self-conscious, para-denominational networks of likeminded 
believers.  Finally, evangelicalism can be seen as an attitudinal posture with two 
tendencies.  It tends toward individuation and a pietistic emphasis on the normative 
correspondence between personal conversion and the subsequent transformation of 
character.  Also, during the years considered here, it evinced a habitual wariness toward 
non-religious social institutions, along with a more forthright skepticism about religious 
and political liberalism—stances rooted in ambivalence about the status of 
evangelicalism in American society.   
The above elements have applied to evangelicalism in both the South and the 
nation at large, even though the southern variety has tended to maintain distinctive 
institutions and communities of discourse.  In the South into the present century, 
evangelicalism has often functioned much more as a general faith.21  It has served as a 
kind of informal establishment or point of reference in keeping with the broader 
American tradition of church-state separation and denominational pluralism.  
Significantly, Graham bridged both the national and the more particularly southern 
varieties of evangelicalism. 
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Graham’s type of evangelicalism served as a conduit for socio-political change in 
the American South.  Historian Martin E. Marty has described evangelicalism as “the 
characteristic Protestant (and, eventually and by indirection, Christian) way of relating to 
modernity” in the United States.  One might also speak of its capacity to create modern 
change.  What historian Beth Barton Schweiger writes about the antebellum South 
applies equally to the times of Billy Graham: “The history of Protestant revivals in the 
South indicts any understanding that pits religion against modernity.”22   
To a somewhat surprising degree, the observations of Marty and Schweiger 
contradict tendencies within the historiography of southern religion.  More specifically, 
they cut against the work of Samuel Hill and his pathbreaking peers, who offered what 
might be termed the crisis motif of southern religious historiography, stressing the extent 
to which the white church in the South had not addressed the needs of southern society.23  
The crisis motif drew inspiration from the calls of theologians Dietrich Bonhoeffer and 
Reinhold Niebuhr (and, on a different level, H. Richard Niebuhr) for prophetic 
responsibility and relevance, but also reflected a long and commendable tradition, 
stretching back to C. Vann Woodward and even W. J. Cash, of southern historians using 
their scholarship to speak truth to their region.24  The purpose here is not to challenge the 
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substance of such prophetic engagement, and this is by no means the first work to 
perceive the limits of the crisis motif.25   
Still, the normative legacy of the crisis motif does threaten to distract scholars 
from the larger influences of evangelicalism on socio-political change in the modern 
South.  As historian Jane Dailey has suggested, Christianity that does not satisfy the 
moral standards of its scholars is, nevertheless, still Christianity.26  That is, a 
segregationist can be a Christian, if not a good one.  As originally put forth by Hill, the 
crisis motif rested on one inaccurate prediction: that the silence of the southern white 
church on social issues would eventually lead to its irrelevance in a changing region.  In 
truth, of course, evangelicalism has continued to prosper in the region, in part because its 
relevance for many southerners remains much more personal than consciously political, 
but also because many white evangelicals eventually found a middle ground—
unsatisfactory to civil rights activists and segregationists alike—on racial matters.  
Graham helped to create and broadcast this middle ground, which became the public face 
of much of the modern South. 
 The conception of evangelicalism embraced here has a number of methodological 
implications that, in turn, reflect the various facets of Graham’s career.  This project 
treats Graham, first and foremost, as an evangelist, but also, at times, as a politician, a 
spokesperson, and a regional leader.  Similarly, evangelicalism is seen, first and 
foremost, as a faith perspective and identity, but also as, at times, a posture with profound 
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socio-political implications—or, put more simply, as the expression of born-again 
Protestantism in the American public sphere.  This project explores the intersection of 
religion and political culture, seeking to avoid making either an epiphenomena of the 
other.27  Likewise, the intention here is not to reinforce what is sometimes an unfortunate 
division between histories of religion qua religion and histories of religion and politics.28  
If the latter have too often caricatured evangelicalism as reflexively other-worldly or as 
merely a cultural component of economic conservatism, many works on evangelicalism 
have employed a language of insularity, focusing on the minutiae of terminology and 
social networks.  This project aspires instead to model a dynamic middle ground between 
treating religious language with the sophistication it deserves and situating 
evangelicalism in relation to larger political cultural changes.  It offers a blending 
model—a kind of history in which the worlds of faith and politics at times intersect 
seamlessly, in which religious and secular actors and motivations overlap and blend, 
sometimes without clear distinctions between them.29  Hence, evangelical universalism 
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possessed a secular corollary, the politics of decency, which invoked “law and order” 
toward moderate ends. 
In the life of Graham, as for the South as a whole, such blending was often an 
everyday phenomenon.  This was true even though many southern evangelicals have 
historically tended to cast the seamlessness of the religious and political spheres as 
seemlessness, drawing from variations on the venerable Southern Presbyterian doctrine of 
the “spirituality of the church” (which emphasized the duty of the church to reinforce, 
rather than impede or challenge, the social order overseen by the state) or the Southern 
Baptist notion of “soul competency” (which stressed the primacy of the individual soul 
and conscience before God).  Both perspectives—or, later, their mid-twentieth century 
residue—were selectively employed to truncate the social responsibilities of the church.30  
Born into a strict Calvinist denomination (Associate Reformed Presbyterian), re-baptized 
as a Southern Baptist young adult, and later married into a prominent Southern 
Presbyterian family, Graham knew these traditions intimately.  Thus, while this work 
seeks to counter the tendency of political histories not to take religion seriously, it also 
adopts a respectful hermeneutic of suspicion toward the many figures in these pages who 
characterized their work as conversion-centered and, hence, wholly non-political.  In the 
blending model offered here, religion often resides at the forefront of socio-political 
change, all the more so because of its power as an enduring facet of the human 
experience that ultimately transcends conventional temporality. 
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A World—and a Regional—Historical Figure 
 Considering Graham in relation to all of the above trends entails treating him as a 
serious historical actor and, at times, as a powerful symbol.  As suggested earlier, his 
familiarity and seeming consistency can sometimes dull appreciation for his 
complexity—not as an intellectual or original thinker, but, like many politicians, as a 
public figure with a telling knack for locating the pulse of socio-political change.  
Certainly, someone who contributed more than any single person to the renaissance of 
evangelical Christianity in post-WWII America, who once addressed an audience of one-
million during a crusade service in South Korea, and who routinely met with the leaders 
of such nations as India, Ethiopia, and Israel scarcely requires justification as a subject of 
historical analysis.31  Yet even these high-profile achievements did not fully capture his 
roles as a political actor and, importantly for this work, as a regional leader.  Gaining 
insight into this side of Graham necessitates analyzing both his private and public 
dimensions, weighing the Graham of crusade services and press conferences against the 
Graham of private correspondence and backroom consultations.  These spheres, which 
sometimes (but by no means always) conflicted with each other, comprised parts of a 
whole.  In his public role, Graham was a great communicator, more consistent than 
charismatic, with an ability to think on his feet and a talent for staying on task.  In his 
private role, Graham was an energetic networker greatly attracted to politics (runner-up 
to evangelism as a career choice) and eager to seek out political leaders, whom he 
selectively attempted to influence, for whom he sometimes did bidding, and by whom he 
occasionally let himself be used.  This project emphasizes Graham as an independent 
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actor whose actions were also open to myriad interpretations and applications.  To 
reinforce the primacy of his position as an evangelist amid his other identities, Graham is 
frequently referred to as “the evangelist.” 
Even while this project seeks to illuminate important aspects of Graham’s life, it 
does not aspire to the status of formal biography.  Rather, it falls into a time-honored 
tradition, common to the historiography of both religion and politics, of documenting and 
interpreting aspects of a life for the purpose of gaining insights into a historical period.  
Such studies, as historian Timothy Tyson has contended, illuminate “the way in which 
human lives point to the larger story around them.”32  In the case of Graham, this project 
also considers the way in which he influenced the world around him, specifically his 
home region. 
The historiography on Graham is extensive, yet it has overlooked his role in the 
South to a surprising degree.  The earliest scholarly treatment of Graham, historian 
William McLoughlin’s 1960 biography, casts him as the somewhat atavistic flagship 
evangelist of a new Great Awakening.33  During the Nixon era, a generation of scholars 
offered informed polemics about an evangelist they viewed as an agent of civil religion 
and a spokesperson for Middle America.  Journalist Marshall Frady’s lyrical, provocative 
biography of the evangelist falls into this genre.34  Graham soon drew more attention 
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from academic historians, who ably treated him in relation to a number of broad trends, 
such as Cold War religiosity and the emergence of the mainstream “neo-evangelical” 
movement.35  William Martin’s excellent 1991 biography of Graham stands as the 
definitive work on the full career of the evangelist.36  A model of balanced, rich 
scholarship, it is a starting point for this project. 
Absent from the historiography is a comprehensive treatment of Graham’s 
influence on his native South, even though a committee of historians, journalists, and 
public intellectuals ranked him as the fourth most influential southerner of the twentieth 
century, behind Martin Luther King, Jr., William Faulkner, and Elvis Presley.37  While 
Martin’s biography documents many of the evangelist’s activities in the South, it focuses 
more on his progressive movement toward evangelical ecumenism.  In filling a critical 
void in the scholarship on Graham, this project also seeks to elucidate the relationship 
between evangelicalism and political culture in the post-WWII and post-civil rights era 
South, thus contributing to scholarship on southern political culture, American 
evangelicalism, and popular conservatism.  Historians of the South have understood 
Graham primarily in relation to two aspects of regional change: the postwar rise of 
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metropolitan, entrepreneurial evangelicalism, as well as the general exportation of 
southern culture to the nation.38  Both of these arguments have great merit, yet they 
address Graham as a symbol or anecdote, more than as an actor.  The aforementioned 
crisis motif of southern religious historiography has informed passing, yet influential, 
references to Graham and has likely contributed to the dearth of work on him as a 
southerner.  A good example is a quotation, originally cited by Frady, from a 1965 
comment by Graham on the role of the church in social issues, to the effect that “the 
church should not answer questions the people aren’t asking.”  An author using this 
remark to cast Graham as emblematic of a general white southern “flight from reality” 
remained unaware of one complicating factor.  The words came from the text of a sermon 
given in Dothan, Alabama, where Graham was holding a desegregated revival, much to 
the displeasure of the local White Citizens’ Council.39  Historian David Chappell’s 
important recent book, A Stone of Hope, suggests a pivotal opening for more work on 
Graham’s role in the South.  In a brief, provocative consideration of the evangelist, 
Chappell casts Graham as representative of white southern evangelicalism’s overall lack 
of willingness to actively defend the declining Jim Crow system.40  His work is a start 
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toward delineating the role of Graham and southern evangelicalism in creating the post-
civil rights era South.  This project continues that task. 
 
Overview 
The central story of this project concerns the birth of the post-civil rights era 
South—and Graham’s contribution thereto.  The six subsequent chapters trace this 
narrative in thematic and roughly chronological progression from 1950 to 1980, with an 
eighth chapter, “The New South of Billy Graham,” providing a conclusion.  Ultimately, 
Graham represents an illuminating window through which to consider the relationship 
between evangelical Christianity and socio-political change in the region.  As such, he 
suggests American evangelicalism’s particular relationship to evolving social and 
political currents—how revivalism and evangelical public theology, while embracing 
traditional forms of belief, can also sanction new expressions of those same values.  
These dynamics have resulted in a mercurial mixture of continuity and discontinuity that 
has made the post-civil rights era South an intriguing and challenging region to interpret.  
In his simultaneously influential and circumscribed roles as evangelist, peer of political 
leaders, and regional spokesperson, Graham was both a nexus for, and driver of, many 
developments central to the creation of the post-civil rights era South.  He supplied an 
acceptable path upon which white southern moderates could back away from Jim Crow, 
and his post-segregation rhetoric portended the emergence of “color blindness” within 
popular conservatism.  Through both his involvement in the Eisenhower and Nixon 
administrations and his deep social ties in the South, the evangelist also created space for 
                                                                                                                                            
Jr.  See Kenneth J. Heineman, God is a Conservative: Religion, Politics, and Morality in Contemporary 
America (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 46. 
  
 
23 
the decades-long process of political realignment.  In the end, Graham suggests the 
peculiarly evangelical nature of the South’s rapprochement with modernity.  
“‘No segregation at the altar’” outlines Graham’s emergence during the early to 
mid-1950s as a desegregationist, considering his first desegregated crusades and their 
regional-religious context.  Motivations for Graham’s evolution on racial matters 
included his exposure to theological spheres outside of southern fundamentalism, his 
Cold War internationalism, and his desire to evangelize within the black community.  
Graham cultivated public positions he continued to evince during the years considered: 
defensiveness of the South, denouncement of “extremists on both sides” of the civil rights 
debate, and prophesy of racial disharmony in the North.   
“Evangelical Universalism and the Politics of Decency” explores Graham’s 
emergence as a player in the South during the latter half of the 1950s.  As an evangelist, 
he could stand removed from both the politics of rage and the politics of protest.  
Through multiple venues—including the pages of Life magazine, rallies in Little Rock, 
and correspondence with President Dwight Eisenhower and journalist Ralph McGill—
Graham proffered a social ethic of evangelical universalism.  His politics of decency 
complemented Eisenhower’s approach to civil rights.   
“‘Another kind of march’” focuses on Graham’s most celebrated southern 
services—his 1964-1965 visits to Alabama, where he appealed to the rule of law, as well 
as the rule of grace.  The visits occurred after his much-mythologized (if still significant) 
relationship with Martin Luther King, Jr., had entered into an irreversible decline.  These 
years represented the high point of Graham’s regional influence.  With the 
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encouragement of President Lyndon Johnson, he facilitated the growth of a faith-
informed, post-segregation public language.   
“Billy Graham’s Southern Strategy” considers the complex (and, initially at least, 
mutually rewarding) friendship between Graham and Richard Nixon, analyzes the 
evangelist’s important role in the southern policies of the Nixon administration, and pays 
particular attention to the many moments when evangelistic activities intersected with 
political loyalties.  Willingly politicized during the Nixon years, Graham participated in 
the Republican southern strategy and implicated himself in a larger debate about the 
direction of the newest New South. 
“Crusading for the Sunbelt South” looks at two crusades in the early-1970s South, 
Birmingham and Atlanta, where Graham acted as a regional booster.  His crusades 
reflected and impelled the particular combination of faith and self-promotion that came to 
characterize the 1970s Sunbelt South, an imagined region of piety, modernity, and 
increasingly Republican politics.  Graham’s crusade boosters attempted, not always 
successfully, to demonstrate the region’s racial progress.  
“‘Before the Water Gate’” explores Graham’s evangelical explanations of 
Watergate and considers his relationship to the “new” social issues of the 1970s and the 
subsequent emergence of the Christian Right.  Following Watergate, Graham 
downgraded his involvement in politics, yet he never completely departed from that 
world.  He also paralleled a larger regional shift away from racial matters and toward a 
range of gender-based social issues.  While his relationship to the Christian Right was 
ambiguous, Graham suggested the paramount position of evangelicalism in the political 
culture of the post-civil rights era South.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
“NO SEGREGATION AT THE ALTAR” 
 
The audience may be segregated, but there is no segregation at the altar. 
 
Billy Graham1 
 
 Billy Graham entered the 1950s as a nationally known evangelist who was also an 
identifiable southerner and a Christian fundamentalist.  The following decade would see a 
struggle—sometimes public, often unstated—between his singular position as an 
evangelist and the other, seemingly more expendable, labels.  Graham clearly chose to 
retain his regional identity, and this decision eventually helped compel him to address the 
specifically southern problem he and his fellow moderates parsimoniously called the 
“race question” or the “race problem” (hesitant as they were to use the more prescriptive 
term, “civil rights”).  Graham’s southern identity was evident in many things—his 
theological sensibilities, his political and social relationships, and his zealous Cold War 
apocalypticism—but expressed itself most strikingly when civil rights re-emerged as a 
national issue in the early 1950s.  As an evangelist, Graham also situated his response to 
race within the larger context of his ministerial priorities, which in many respects 
transcended matters of region.  At some level, that is, he had to square racial customs 
with theology, his southern background with the implications of his brand of mass 
evangelism.  During the post-World War II years preceding the rise of “massive 
resistance” to desegregation—a time when even white Mississippi was not yet a 
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completely “closed society” on matters of race—Graham formulated views and rhetorical 
postures that would last him for decades.2  In his shifts toward desegregated crusades and 
in his selective, but increasingly public comments on the race problem, Graham helped to 
introduce new assumptions into his home region—a common-sense critique of strict 
segregationism that, while elusive in its political applications, further weakened the 
theological fortress of Jim Crow.  He did so, however, by using a familiar evangelical 
language buttressed by both his celebrity status and his recognizability as a southerner.  
Although Graham’s actions were more reactive than radical, and although he cultivated 
and retained close ties with southern politicians of all stripes, the evangelist contributed 
to the removal of an influential strand of conservative Protestantism from active 
resistance to the demise of Jim Crow. 
 During the years before southern white support for Jim Crow hardened in the face 
of the Brown decision and civil rights activism, Graham transitioned from a tacit 
segregationist to a tepid critic of Jim Crow policies and, finally, to a practitioner of 
desegregation.  The evangelist came to support desegregation during the 1950s—first, of 
his crusades and then, later in the decade, of the South and the nation as a whole.  The 
sources and motivations for his evolving stances on racial segregation ranged from the 
theological to the intellectual and political.  They included his exposure to theological 
spheres outside of southern fundamentalism, his desire to evangelize within the black 
community, and his burgeoning Cold War internationalism.  At the same time, Graham’s 
rhetoric on race retained a distinctly southern tone, which would inform his later service 
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as a regional leader and mediator.  He cultivated public positions reflective of his 
regional affiliation: defensiveness of the South, denouncement of “extremists on both 
sides” of the civil rights debate, and prophecy of racial disharmony in the North.  
Coexistent with these positions, however, was his keen acknowledgement and acceptance 
of the fact that the Jim Crow system was ultimately on borrowed time—theologically 
and, quite possibly, politically.  While not playing as visible a role in the South as he 
would in subsequent years, Graham during the early and mid-1950s contributed greatly to 
the weakening of theological segregationism, which entered the years of the post-Brown 
backlash embattled and on the defensive.  Graham represented the moderate 
evangelical—and southern—wing of the offensive against Jim Crow. 
 
The Making of a Racial Moderate3 
 By Graham’s own telling, the climax of his years-long struggle to reconcile a tacit 
acceptance of Jim Crow with a strident promotion of salvation for all came in March 
1953, when he decided at the start of a Chattanooga, Tennessee, crusade service to 
personally remove the ropes separating the black from the white sections of the 
audience.4  This was the first time Graham had not followed the dictates of the local 
crusade committee regarding segregated seating.  Despite a reversion to segregated 
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seating patterns in at least one subsequent crusade, the Chattanooga incident served as a 
key moment in Graham’s “racial conversion narrative,” to use literary scholar Fred 
Hobson’s term for self-styled narratives in which “products of and willing participants in 
a harsh, segregated society . . . confess racial wrongdoings and are ‘converted,’ in 
varying degrees, from racism to something approaching racial enlightenment.”5  The 
primary catalysts of this narrative—Graham’s involvement in the neo-evangelical 
movement, his desire to evangelize to African Americans, and his adamant Cold War 
politics—blended theological with political influences.   
Graham’s status as a religious celebrity who was also a southerner made his 
decision to address the race issue at some level less than surprising.  Less predictable, 
though, was his public position, at a reasonably early date, as a moderate 
desegregationist.  Like most white southerners of his generation, Graham had grown up 
as a de facto segregationist—in his own words, someone who “had adopted the attitudes 
of that region without much reflection.”  Later, he would reminisce with unintended 
condescension about his childhood admiration for Reese Brown, a black foreman on the 
Graham family dairy farm “with a tremendous capacity for working hard” and whose 
wife made “fabulous buttermilk biscuits.”6  These fond memories aside, little evidence 
exists to suggest that Graham’s celebrated 1934 response as a scrawny, playful teenager 
to the brimstone-laden altar call of Kentucky evangelist Mordecai Ham—a 
fundamentalist who faced allegations of anti-Semitism—comprised the origins of his 
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“awakening to the wrongs of racism and segregation.”7  Graham’s racial conversion was 
not coterminous with his walk down the sawdust trail.  In fact, his gradual awakening did 
not commence for another decade and-a-half, after he had attended such segregated 
institutions as Bob Jones College in Cleveland, Tennessee, where he lasted but one 
semester, and Florida Bible Institute, another unaccredited fundamentalist school from 
which he graduated in 1940.  While described in classically southern terms, his 
transformation may never have occurred without his exposure during the early 1940s to a 
moderate brand of northern fundamentalism then beginning the protracted, but conclusive 
process of refashioning itself as “evangelicalism.” 
Many southerners of Graham’s generation experienced racial conversions in the 
context of exposure to more racially moderate environments.8  While a city like New 
York or Austin might more naturally fit this bill, the world of Chicagoland 
fundamentalism provided such an impetus for Graham.  His enrollment at Wheaton 
(Illinois) College—then, as now, a leading institution of higher education within 
conservative, non-mainline Protestant circles—represented one of the few times the 
budding evangelist had crossed the Mason-Dixon line.  There, he remembered, “people 
looked at me curiously, as if my heavily accented drawl were a foreign language.”  His 
education at Wheaton, where he majored in anthropology, contributed to his eventual 
willingness to question his racial assumptions.  While Graham later struggled to explain 
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his decision to study a subject commonly associated with agnosticism, if not outright 
atheism, the content of his education suggested that at Wheaton he first gained awareness 
of the cultural relativity of race.9  In 1950, years before the public knew Graham as a 
racial desegregationist, the evangelist noted that in college he had “practically 
memorized” a textbook titled Up from the Ape and authored by the evolutionary 
anthropologist Earnest Albert Hooton.10  A Harvard professor, Hooton emphasized the 
highly relative nature of racial categories and was dismissive of quasi-eugenicists, calling 
them “ethnomaniacs.”  While not denying the significance of racial differences, physical 
and otherwise, Hooton argued that “a ‘pure race’ is little more than a philosophical 
abstraction and that the great cultural achievements of humanity have been produced, 
almost invariably, by racially mixed peoples.”  He specifically attacked the simplistic 
chauvinism of arguments concerning the inferiority of Negroes.11  Graham filtered such 
ideas through the lens of his true focus at Wheaton, evangelism.  While written from an 
explicitly secular perspective, Hooton’s book reinforced a universalistic understanding of 
humanity’s moral and spiritual potential, providing for Graham, in the words of a 
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biographer, “a reassuring affirmation that people in every culture are essentially alike and 
therefore equally open to a straightforward explanation” of Christian salvation.12 
  At Wheaton, Graham also met his future wife, Ruth Bell, a model of piety whose 
prayerful coyness attracted the aspiring husband.  Their marriage ultimately reinforced 
his southern identity.  Ruth’s father was L. Nelson Bell, a surgeon and longtime 
missionary in Nationalist China, but also a native Virginian, proud southerner, and 
influential lay leader in the conservative wing of the Presbyterian Church in the United 
States (a.k.a., the Southern Presbyterian church).  Bell, who served as “something like a 
second compensatory father to Graham,” heavily mediated the way Graham applied his 
theological perspectives on race to the social context of the South.13  During the latter 
half of the 1950s, in particular, Bell would function as a conservative brake on the 
evangelist’s opinions concerning racial policy.  At the same time, the well-connected Bell 
reinforced Graham’s ties to a host of southern religious leaders, thus strengthening the 
evangelist’s potential role as a regional actor.  Lastly, the Bells’ move to the Southern 
Presbyterian mountain retreat community of Montreat, North Carolina, led Billy and 
Ruth to follow them there in 1945.  Although Graham built his reputation as a national 
evangelist in the Midwest, especially through his partnership with Torrey Johnson—head 
of the Chicago-based organization, Youth for Christ (YFC) International—he remained a 
southerner in the eyes of much of the public, as well as in his own.14      
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 Graham’s racial development also paralleled his theological and temperamental 
transition from fundamentalism to neo-evangelicalism.  Despite the sudden fame that 
followed his landmark 1949 Los Angeles crusade (during which newspapers baron 
William Randolph Hearst famously instructed his outlets to continue to “puff” Graham), 
the evangelist still moved comfortably within separatist fundamentalist circles at the start 
of the 1950s.15  He continued receiving numerous accolades from fundamentalist leaders, 
including an honorary doctorate in 1948 from his abortive alma mater, Bob Jones 
University (by then based in Greenville, South Carolina), where he spoke on several 
occasions.16  From the influential fundamentalist Baptist minister William Bell Riley, a 
Kentucky native based in Minneapolis, Graham received a more burdensome mantle: the 
presidency of Riley’s Northwestern Schools, which the evangelist reluctantly accepted in 
1947.17  Despite maintaining a home in North Carolina, Graham occupied the college 
presidency—in name, much more than in body or even spirit—until 1952, by which time 
he had begun to depart from his fundamentalist peers on, among other issues, race.  In 
doing so, the evangelist would face criticism from the many southern, as well as northern, 
fundamentalists who either advocated a strict, two-kingdom separation between saving 
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souls and reforming societies or, like Bob Jones, Sr., also avowedly supported the 
institution of segregation.18    
 The line between militant fundamentalists of Jones’ stripe and more culturally 
engaged neo-evangelicals had not yet hardened in the early 1950s.  During the previous 
decade, an influential group of moderate fundamentalists associated with the National 
Association of Evangelicals (NAE) and hailing mostly from Reformed backgrounds had 
begun embracing the label “evangelical,” the source of its modern American usage.  By 
the time their differences with fundamentalists had solidified, Graham had long since 
sided with the neo-evangelicals, who tended to prioritize evangelism over defenses of the 
pure faith.  Graham more than any other figure came to embody the neo-evangelical 
posture: a greater willingness to witness to secular society and, by doing so, to offer a 
relevant conservative alternative to the overt or latent liberalism of mainline 
Protestantism.  In addition to the Great Commission, neo-evangelicals responded to an 
overarching concern for, in the words of NAE founder Harold Ockenga, “the rescue of 
western civilization by a . . . revival of evangelical Christianity.”  The publication 
Christianity Today, founded in 1956 with vital assistance from Graham, reflected this 
mission.19  Graham himself sermonized in the late 1940s against sectarian proponents of 
“so-called ‘ultra-Fundamentalism’ whose object is not to fight the world, the flesh and 
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the devil, but to fight other Christians whose interpretation is not like theirs.”20  In a 
southern context, departing from the doctrinal dogmatism of fundamentalists potentially 
meant departing from their racial assumptions, as well.21  Ecumenical inclusiveness thus 
held implications for racial inclusiveness. 
 Graham’s education and inclusive style of conservative theology may have 
portended his subsequent racial views.  Those views, however, did not exit the halls of 
his conscience without external promptings originating from two sources: his need to 
nurture his public image and his desire to evangelize within the black community.  By the 
early 1950s, his constituency had widened beyond the realm of fundamentalism, 
extending further even than the burgeoning neo-evangelical community with which he 
identified.  “To maintain credibility as a religious leader,” one scholar has rightly argued, 
“[Graham] had to modify his culturally-conditioned views on race.”  As early as 1950, 
the evangelist received criticism in New England for tolerating segregation down South.22  
Criticism came from within Dixie, as well.  A letter to the editor of the Atlanta 
Constitution, a liberal paper by regional standards, chided the evangelist for holding 
segregated meetings during his 1950 crusade in that city and wondered, “Is he implying 
that God Almighty has room for segregation and discrimination in His work?”  A 
columnist for the same paper continued on this theme, asking, “Will you preach, Sir, on 
the sins of violent sectionalism and hatred, with brother pitted against brother? . . .  And 
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will you, in all humility, state your position on the greatest thorn in the brow of Southern 
clergymen . . . the puzzles of race, white supremacy and segregation?”23   
In Atlanta and elsewhere, Graham faced criticism from African-American leaders.  
Black attendance was extremely low at the Atlanta crusade, even though Graham recalled 
that black churches were among the congregations to officially invite him to the city.  
There, he came under fire from prominent African-American ministers, as well as the 
South’s leading black newspaper, the Daily World, for offering to hold a special service 
exclusively for blacks.24  Morehouse University President Benjamin Mays, a foremost 
theological critic of Jim Crow and an early mentor to Martin Luther King, Jr., chastised 
the evangelist publicly and in print during the crusade.25  Similar tensions with black 
leaders were evident in other southern cities, including New Orleans, where in 1954 a 
prominent Congregational minister took out advertisements urging blacks to shun the 
Graham services.  (He later learned that the crusade would, in fact, be desegregated.)  
Outside of the South, at least one black newspaper reported that Graham had held 
segregated services during his 1953 Dallas crusade.  His immediate response to this 
negative publicity—sermonizing, from the relatively safer confines of Detroit, “that there 
is no [racial] difference in the sight of God”—revealed his caution, but also his sensitivity 
to criticism.26  Despite tolerating segregated seating patterns, Graham clearly viewed 
African Americans as a part of his broader constituency, although not the core of it. 
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 The Cold War represented a final influence on Graham’s development on racial 
matters.  One historian has cast him as the quintessential Cold War revivalist who, from 
the very beginning of postwar tensions with the Soviet Union, linked the destiny of the 
United States and its leaders to the mission of his evangelism.27  When Graham 
advocated “Christ For This Crisis” (the motto of his 1947 revival in Charlotte), the crisis 
he spoke of entailed the specter of communism, in addition to moral degeneration.  His 
sermon titles (e.g., “The End of the World” and “Will God Spare America?”) reflected an 
apocalyptic interpretation of the times.28  Graham’s Cold War bellicosity resided well to 
the right of the emerging liberal anticommunist consensus.  In 1950, for example, he 
castigated the reds who “stole China” and predicted that communists would bomb the 
United States within two or three years—“and not five years.”29  Considering his 
identities both as an evangelist and a southerner, these views held complex implications 
for his stance on domestic matters, especially racial ones.  Legal historian Mary Dudziak 
has explained how the first two decades of conflict between the United States and the 
Soviet Union simultaneously expanded and limited the national discourse on civil rights, 
making “civil rights reform . . . in part a product of the Cold War.”  While Dudziak 
stressed the State Department’s desire to advance America’s image as the leader of the 
free world, historian Jeff Woods has described the growth of a specifically “southern red 
scare” in which segregationist politicians and activists readily merged rabid domestic 
anticommunism with their pre-existing opposition to altering the racial status quo.  In 
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keeping with Dudziak’s narrative, Graham viewed the Cold War through an international 
lens, even while he communicated with many southerners who, as Woods documents, 
clearly (or conveniently) viewed civil rights activism as a tool of communist 
subversives.30  In the late 1940s, Graham’s travels to Europe only reinforced his hawkish 
Cold War sentiments.31  Subsequent international travels, however, made the evangelist 
increasingly conscious of how racism damaged the image of America.  Like many 
foreign missionaries within his Southern Baptist denomination, his international 
evangelistic work led him to reconsider the domestic racial status quo.32  By the latter 
half of the decade, Graham routinely linked anticommunism with a critique of 
segregation.  The nation, he declared in 1957, resided “in a fish bowl with the whole 
world looking in,” and “our racial tensions are causing some of the people of the world to 
turn away from us.”33 
 
In Public and Private Spheres 
 In October 1953, Graham wrote a telling letter to Atlanta Constitution editor 
Ralph McGill, who had asked the evangelist to clarify his views on racial segregation 
after reading an interview Graham had given to the Michigan Chronicle.  The renowned, 
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future Pulitzer Prize-winning editor was in the midst of his own conversion, reflective of 
the broader swath of southern liberals, from tolerance of separate-but-equal segregation 
to acceptance of, and eventually support for, its legal demise.  As a critic of the role of 
southern Christianity in abetting racial injustices, McGill likely wrote to Graham with 
some skepticism.  (Within a year, the editor would praise Graham in print as an effective 
evangelist and an asset to anticommunist efforts overseas.)  In a reply written from 
Detroit, the evangelist critiqued racism through a theological lens and then proceeded to 
qualify the application of his conclusions in light of the peculiar social chemistry of the 
South.  “In my study of the Bible,” Graham wrote, “I can find no verses or chapters to 
support segregation.”  He affirmed that “Jesus Christ belongs neither to the colored nor 
the white races” and repeated a sentiment he had already voiced in Detroit: “[I]n race 
relations the church has been lagging far behind in certain areas and allowing the sports 
world and political world to get ahead of it.”  Graham’s chariot of justice slowed at the 
Mason-Dixon line, however.  The South, he wrote to his fellow southerner McGill,  
presents a problem particularly all its own that many times our Northern 
friends do not understand.  It is going to take a long process of education 
rather than legislation to ultimately bring about better relations between 
the races.  We have extremists in both races who cause 90% of the trouble.  
In many parts of the South it is my observation that the race situation is 
better than in many parts of the North.  For example, the sharp divisions 
between races, and racial tensions, are very strong here in Detroit.  Non-
segregation thus cannot be forced or legislated.  There must be a process 
of education and faith in Christ.34 
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Most of these sentiments—a color-blind Christology, defense of his home region, 
embrace of the South’s relational culture, and denouncement of “extremists”—would 
remain with the evangelist for at least the next quarter of a century.  The remaining 
view—a moralistic, but chronologically noncommittal gradualism regarding the ultimate 
abolition of Jim Crow—would wane, without vanishing altogether, during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s as Graham grew more appreciative of the need for civil rights legislation.   
 The tone of Graham’s private letter would have surprised many of his white 
supporters in the South.  Indeed, his behavior in public regarding the race question was 
much more ambiguous than his correspondence with McGill suggested.  At the time 
Graham wrote to McGill, the evangelist was several months removed from his first 
desegregated crusade in the region.  While he occasionally addressed racial matters when 
speaking in the South during the early years of his ministry, his comments tended to be 
limited in nature.  During the 1950 Columbia crusade, for example, he flatly declared that 
“[r]evival will also solve the race question by causing both races to be fair toward each 
other.”35   Graham team member Grady Wilson explicitly embraced the residual nature of 
this formula.  “What’s the point of attacking a cause when you’re after sinners?” Wilson 
rhetorically asked an interviewer that same year.  “If a man’s a sinner and he’s a member 
of the Ku Klux Klan, we’re not going to lose the chance of saving him by attacking the 
organization he belongs to.”36  Such statements hardly fulfilled Graham’s professed 
desire for the church to catch up with the secular world in the area of race relations. 
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 The tension between public and private spheres was particularly evident in 
Graham’s many southern crusades.  Despite the northern headquarters of the YFC and his 
own Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (BGEA, incorporated in 1950 in 
Minneapolis, a location attributable to his position with Northwestern Schools), the 
growing, urban South provided a strong base for many early rallies and crusades, 
beginning with Charlotte (1947) and including Shreveport (1951) and Houston (1952).  
During the 1950s, in fact, a significant majority of Graham’s domestic crusades, as well 
as a substantial portion of his guest sermons and one-day rallies, took place in southern 
cities.37  His influence was most palpable in the South, where the press “promoted him on 
an epic scale.”38  Atlanta and Chattanooga were among the few cities to construct special 
tabernacles in which to hold crusade services.39  Graham’s 1950 address to a joint session 
of the Georgia legislature inspired the state Senate to pass a prohibition law (which the 
other chamber quickly let die).40  Clearly, Graham held cachet within his home region.  
 Still, during the evangelist’s first six years of holding solo revivals, 1947 through 
1952, he allowed segregated seating arrangements in his southern crusades.  At the 1951 
Greensboro crusade, recalled BGEA staffer Willis Haymaker, blacks sat in “special 
sections of seats reserved for them as was customary in all Billy Graham crusades [in the 
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South] at that time.”41  The racial separation, presumably, did not extend to the area 
around the crusade platform where respondents gathered during the altar call.  In Atlanta 
one year earlier, city police chief Herbert Jenkins recalled segregated meetings, with 
exemptions for a few black ministers whom Graham knew.  In a file of high-resolution 
BGEA photographs from the Atlanta crusades (generally, a more trustworthy source for 
crowd shots than southern newspapers, which tended to conceal the presence of blacks), 
the only African Americans shown are two maintenance workers at the crusade stadium.  
An even more substantial BGEA file of shots from the Columbia crusade, held earlier in 
1950, reveals similar results, despite the official Graham biographer’s claim that the 
audience for the final service contained “solid blocks . . . of Negroes.”42 
 Jim Crow was thus an expected part of Graham’s 1952 crusade in Jackson, 
Mississippi, capital of the most southern state on earth.  The generally glowing coverage 
from Jackson’s two daily newspapers—one of which ran a “Billy Graham Boxscore” 
listing the decision tally from the previous service—captured the routine thrust of his 
social commentary during that presidential election year.  For example, the evangelist 
lamented the recent firing of “our star quarterback” General Douglas MacArthur (a 
favorite within the anti-Communist right) and, in a comment easily interpretable as an 
endorsement of Dwight Eisenhower for the presidency, urged citizens to vote in the 
upcoming elections for candidates who possessed moral integrity.  “Christians Must Be 
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Devoted To Their Cause To Combat Communists,” alliterated a headline recounting a 
Graham sermon.43 
Then, in the final days of the crusade, a less typical headline appeared in the 
Jackson Daily News: “Billy Graham Hits State Liquor System, Scores Segregation in 
Church.”  In an interview with United Press International (UPI) given in Jackson, 
Graham stated a number of the themes he would also emphasize to Ralph McGill.  
“There is no scriptural basis for segregation,” the evangelist declared, even while he 
admitted following local racial customs in his services.  “The audience may be 
segregated,” he added, “but there is no segregation at the altar.”  Likewise, there should 
be none “in the church.”  Those who come forward during his services, he stressed, 
“stand as individuals.  And it touches my heart when I see white stand shoulder in 
shoulder with black at the cross.”44 
 Graham’s comments on segregation, which represented his first definitive public 
statement about Jim Crow given in a southern setting, were sandwiched between 
treatments of his less surprising condemnations of obscene book sales and Mississippi’s 
tax on illegal liquor sales.  The following day, likely after Graham had received a 
concerned phone call from Mississippi Governor Hugh White, an article in the Jackson 
Clarion-Ledger emphasized the evangelist’s opposition to legalized liquor and then 
added the following clarification from him concerning “another subject”:  
I feel that I have been misinterpreted on racial segregation.  We follow the 
existing social customs in whatever part of the country in which we 
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minister.  As far as I have been able to find in my study of the Bible, it has 
nothing to say about segregation or non-segregation. 
 
Graham emphasized that he “came to Jackson to preach only the Bible, and not to enter 
into local issues,” a statement that rested uncomfortably within an article detailing his 
prohibitionist pronouncements.  Nevertheless, Graham passed along an account of his 
initial critique of segregation to the head of the Detroit Council of Churches—two days 
after he had retracted those same remarks.  Neither of the ultra-segregationist Jackson 
papers further explored the matter of the UPI interview.  Following the crusade, the Daily 
News returned to a more comfortable Cold War theme, arguing that Graham’s efforts 
“might not only prove to be our best, but our only real defense against communism.”45  
The Jackson crusade, then, did not indicate a change in policy for Graham, but rather 
featured a wobbly expression of anti-segregationist sentiments that had yet to congeal.46 
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By the following year, Graham had concluded that, at least as far as his crusades 
were concerned, the Bible’s lack of specific statements about the South’s other peculiar 
institution did not represent a tacit endorsement of the Jim Crow status quo.  In his 1953 
crusade in Chattanooga, Graham took a more forthright stand against segregation in 
religious settings.47  Before the start of the crusade, he personally removed the ropes 
separating the black and white sections of the audience.  “Either these ropes stay down,” 
Graham recalled telling two ushers, “or you can go on and have the revival without 
me.”48  The desegregated nature of the crusade went unreported in Chattanooga’s major 
dailies, which gave more attention to his proficiency on the golf course, although the 
evangelist later claimed that his action “caused the head usher to resign in anger right on 
the spot (and raised some other hackles).”49  A photograph attributed to the Chattanooga 
crusade and later used in a BGEA promotional booklet shows white and black audience 
members sitting together.  In taking such a dramatic step, however, Graham made sure to 
hedge its ramifications.  He predicted to the ushers that blacks in the audience would 
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probably continue to sit among themselves.  According to a Graham biographer, the 
evangelist was correct; moreover, the black attendance was disappointingly low.50  
In holding his first intentionally desegregated crusade in 1953, Graham was 
slightly ahead of his time in comparison with his fellow white evangelists in the South.  
By the end of the decade, independent mass revivalists in the region had begun 
conducting integrated services; earlier in the decade, their services had largely been 
biracial, yet segregated.51  Biracial worship, while uncommon in the post-Civil War 
South, was not an unprecedented experience even during the height of Jim Crow.  
Graham himself recalled attending a black church service in Florida during his Bible 
school days in the late 1930s.52  As historical phenomena, racially-separated churches 
preceded the formalization of Jim Crow and hence differed from legalized segregation 
per se.53  Church attendance at all-white congregations, however, had become intertwined 
with the rules, rituals, and power structures of formalized Jim Crow decades before the 
Chattanooga crusade.  Still, unlike Holiness revivalism or Pentecostal glossolalia, two 
facilitators of the southern religious “racial interchange” historian Paul Harvey has 
documented, Graham crusades did not occur in anything approaching a countercultural or 
liminal environment.54  They were public events—and preternaturally mainstream ones, 
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at that.  At the same time, they did not conform exclusively to the conservational function 
Emile Durkheim influentially assigned to religion.55  While Graham crusades usually 
reflected community norms, they sometimes helped to change them, as well. 
Although the Chattanooga crusade became the symbolic starting point for 
Graham’s departure from Jim Crow, Haymaker more accurately described 1954 as the 
year when the BGEA began to officially declare a no-segregation policy.56  During the 
first Graham crusade in the South following Chattanooga, also held in 1953, the BGEA 
reluctantly acquiesced to the Dallas crusade committee’s request for segregated seating.57  
The evangelist had come to oppose segregation in his services, yet did not move to 
formalize that position until after the 1954 Brown decision.  As sentiments hardened in 
the years following Brown, Graham intentionally avoided the segregationist bastions of 
the Deep South, turning down most invitations to come there during the mid- and late-
1950s, while conducting desegregated crusades in such Upper South cities as Nashville 
(1954), Richmond (1956), and Louisville (1956), as well as one Deep South city, New 
Orleans (1954).58  With a few exceptions, only one of which was high-profile, he would 
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not return to holding services in the Deep South until the particularly tense civil rights 
years of 1964 and 1965. 
One such Upper South visit, the 1954 Nashville crusade, revealed that the 
BGEA’s policy on desegregation remained in a formative stage.  In July 1954, two 
months after the Brown decision against public school segregation, Graham wrote to 
Southern Baptist pastor James M. Gregg of Nashville recommending that “Negroes be 
allowed to sit anywhere they like . . . and that nothing be said one way or the other about 
it.”  Graham also recommended having a black pastor lead prayer at the crusade once a 
week.  He did not link these requests with Christian morality, but rather stressed the 
increasingly “world-wide” nature of his ministry: 
The Nashville crusade will be written up quite extensively in the British 
press, and of course our work in England would suffer tremendously if 
they thought we were having a segregated meeting.  They have no 
conception of the problem and would blame me for anything that would 
happen. . . .  I have been in prayer on this point almost more than any 
other point concerning our Nashville and New Orleans meetings.  So 
much is at stake.  I personally think the less said the better.59 
 
Graham’s reasoning likely held particular salience because Tennessee Governor Frank 
Clement, an intimate of the evangelist, had solicited funds among state elites on behalf of 
the BGEA’s efforts in Britain.60  The evangelist went on to predict that few blacks would 
attend the crusade, anyway.  Gregg recalled that African-American attendees at the 
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crusade tended to sit among themselves, while another crusade leader remembered more 
mixed seating.61  During one sermon in Nashville, Graham did offer an 
uncharacteristically direct denouncement of white racialism, although not segregationism 
per se: “We have become proud as a race—we have been proud and thought we were 
better than any other race, any other people.  Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to 
stumble into hell because of our pride.”  These words represented a theological 
restatement of Hooton’s warning in Up from the Ape against racial presumptiveness.  
Despite this forceful, if politically ambiguous, declaration, the crusade received glowing 
coverage in the segregationist pages of the Nashville Banner, which published every 
sermon delivered during the four weeks of services.62 
 With the Nashville crusade, as well as the New Orleans crusade held later in 
1954, desegregation of services became a requirement for crusade hosts.  In the 
subsequent years of the mid-1950s, Graham grew slightly more direct in his description 
of this policy.  “Naturally,” he wrote to Richmond minister James Appleby in 1955, “I 
am assuming that the meeting in Richmond would be non-segregated.”  In Richmond, the 
Graham team also began addressing criticisms that it included black ministers in the 
crusade planning process only as an “after thought” (as one New Orleans minister saw it), 
if at all.  Haymaker later sought assurances from Appleby that tensions did not exist 
among the ministers of Richmond, whose integrated Ministers’ Association was headed 
by John M. Ellison, president of the historically black Virginia Union College.63  During 
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the crusade, Graham delivered a well-attended convocation address at Virginia Union, 
where he said the race problem lay at “the heart of man.”  In his Richmond services, 
critics noted, he failed to address racial matters.  Such gestures, or lack thereof, did not 
strike the segregationist Richmond Times-Dispatch as particularly radical.  While not 
specifically addressing Graham’s racial views, a Times-Dispatch columnist favorably 
contrasted public figures of his stripe with those “ultra-liberals” who promoted such 
agendas as “compulsory integration.”  The even more staunchly segregationist Richmond 
News Leader offered similarly favorable coverage, noting Graham’s intention to visit the 
Museum of the Confederacy while in town.64 
 In light of the political sensibilities of the two Richmond newspapers, their editors 
conceivably may not have chosen to highlight other cases during the crusades where the 
race issue did surface.  Some readers of the papers may not even have known about the 
desegregation policy.  Such self-censorship was much less likely, however, during the 
1956 crusade in Louisville, where the Louisville Courier-Journal, edited and published 
by Mark Ethridge, stood as one of the leading white liberal voices in the greater South.  
The Louisville crusade also took place just as Graham published an article in Life 
magazine, titled “Billy Graham Makes Plea for an End to Intolerance,” in which he 
dismissed biblical arguments supporting racial segregation and hierarchy, and called for 
the church to speak out in favor of racial tolerance.65   
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The Louisville crusade thus offered a good indication of how certain residents of 
a Jim Crow city perceived an evangelist who was beginning to be identified with the 
cause of desegregation.  As early as March 1955, Graham had begun to attract criticism 
from the more hardline elements of the segregationist right, one member of which 
accused the evangelist of selectively quoting scripture on racial equality.66  The 
Louisville crusade revealed that his comments about race relations did not resonate as 
clearly as his altar calls; neither were they delivered as resolutely.  After the Courier-
Journal reported on the Life article and announced that Graham crusades were now 
desegregated, a member of the local Citizens’ Council called the Graham team to request 
a meeting with the evangelist.  “We think we can convince him to change his views on 
this integration,” the caller said.  That avowed segregationists still thought of Graham as 
a possible ally was attributable both to the halting, episodic nature of his public 
statements on race and to the desire of Jim Crow partisans not to “lose” a renowned 
figure they may have assumed was either in their camp or at least not an enemy.  Graham 
did not accept the offer, and neither did his subsequent comments on Jim Crow parallel 
the confident tone of his Life article.  When a caller on a local television show asked the 
evangelist a question about segregation, he replied by re-affirming the primacy of the 
conversion moment.  “I believe the heart of the problem of race is in loving our 
neighbor,” he declared.  “But man must love God before he can love his neighbor.”  As 
for the crusade itself, the Courier-Journal’s religion editor expressed surprise that the 
“completely desegregated” services had attracted so few black attendees.  Graham had 
earlier observed a decline in black attendance contemporaneous with the desegregation 
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policy.  In Louisville, this occurred in spite of a thoroughly integrated crusade steering 
committee.67  In actuality, though, low black attendance had been a reality at many 
Graham crusades even before the change in seating policy. 
By the latter half of the 1950s, desegregation was a declared and increasingly 
understood policy for all Graham crusades and rallies.  According to the evangelist, this 
desegregation extended to the hotel restaurants where he met with local ministers.68  His 
comments and behavior during his desegregated southern crusades, however, suggested 
an unwillingness to moralize the race issue beyond the level of individual decency, the 
level of Christian neighborliness.  The question of legalized Jim Crow stood outside of 
the sphere over which Graham consciously exerted influence—the quasi-congregational 
environment of the crusade service—and, hence, still remained classifiable as a separate 
“political” question.  In the post-Brown years, he appears to have viewed his 
desegregated crusades as violations only of local customs, not of local laws.69  For 
Graham, desegregation had expanded from the altar call into the seats; the proper 
Christian understanding of its status outside the stadium or sanctuary was less certain.  
Even within the BGEA’s own purview, the Graham team clearly felt uncomfortable using 
language that might imply any agenda other than evangelism.  “If the question [of mixed 
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seating] should arise,” Haymaker wrote to the concerned chair of a one-day Tallahassee 
rally, “we suggest you use the term ‘[n]on-segregated’; we like it much better than using 
the word ‘integrated.’  You can simply say that all people are invited to come and will be 
welcome in the meeting.”70  When Graham traveled to such civil rights flash points as 
Little Rock and Montgomery, this dually passive and politic attention to language, 
combined with a constant re-assertion of his evangelistic priorities, would retain an 
audience that an established civil rights crusader would have long since lost.   
Graham’s desegregated services of the mid-1950s represent notable 
accomplishments within the closed (and still closing) societies of the South, yet they 
hardly qualify as landmark events in the civil rights struggle.  A black newspaper in New 
Orleans described the opening crusade service there as “the first time in recent times that 
Negroes have been permitted to attend a huge public Protestant gathering, or otherwise . . 
. without restrictions.”71  Still, few locations for early desegregated crusades—with New 
Orleans as a possible exception, even though that demographically distinctive southern 
city did possess a certain biracial Catholic tradition—had a reputation for intractable 
segregationism akin to that of Birmingham or Jackson.  “Our concern since God laid the 
matter [of racial prejudice] on our hearts some years ago,” Graham said in 1957, “has not 
been so much to talk as to act, to set an example which might open new paths and stir the 
consciences of many.”72  In the comparatively moderate settings of Nashville and 
Louisville during the immediate post-Brown years, though, actions did not necessarily 
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speak louder than words.  There, the line separating leadership through unannounced 
policies from a kind of moral quietism was thin, indeed.  In those cities, Graham would 
have exerted greater influence had he declared his policy more openly. 
The evangelist had already used somewhat stronger language, similar to his letter 
to McGill, during his many appearances at ecclesiastical and denominational gatherings 
throughout the South and the nation.  In 1952, Graham told members of the NAE that the 
“Church is on the tail end—to our shame!—of progress along racial li[n]es in America 
today.  The Church should be leading instead of following.”73  In an address delivered at 
the annual meeting of the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) that same year, he 
advocated opening denominational colleges to academically qualified blacks.74  If the 
Louisville Citizens’ Council did not trust the staying power of Graham’s racial positions, 
others clearly did.  For example, the liberal Protestant magazine Christian Century 
published an editorial, titled “Sewanee Says No, Billy Graham Yes,” favorably 
contrasting his criticism of segregation at the 1952 Jackson crusade (for which “many 
think he will pay dearly”) with resistance at the University of the South to the 
desegregation of its Episcopal seminary.75  The years preceding the Brown decision did 
see the nominal desegregation of three SBC seminaries, as well as several other leading 
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seminaries in the region.  Following the Brown decision, the SBC passed a resolution 
endorsing the ruling.76   
In the aftermath of the Brown decision and the formalization of Graham’s own 
policy of holding desegregated services, the evangelist gradually grew more vocal on the 
subject of race.  In a March 1955 interview on the television show Meet the Press, 
Graham questioned whether segregation measured up to the standards of either 
Christianity or the American nation.77  The timing of the comments, given a few days 
before he left for a crusade in Scotland, allowed the evangelist to avoid direct criticism at 
home, while enhancing his image abroad.  Within the South, he remained less strident in 
tone.  At a 1956 SBC gathering in Kansas City, Graham praised the pro-Brown resolution 
as a “courageous stand” and argued that the SBC should lead in the area of race relations, 
just as the denomination had always led in matters of evangelism.  The Oklahoma City 
Black Dispatch ran a brief article touting these remarks in anticipation of the Graham 
crusade there.  However, the evangelist chose not to use the more prophetic language of a 
draft in which he warned that, should his denomination fail on the race issue, “we may 
eventually find our spiritual power waning and our thrilling statistics only hollow 
echoes.”  He also supported a decision at the convention, which took place just two 
months after the signing of the Southern Manifesto by segregationist congressmen, to 
table further discussion of racial matters.  Still, his comments and actions inspired one 
historian to argue that the evangelist “influenced Baptists by example.”78   
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An Early Affinity for Politics 
By the mid-1950s, then, Graham had staked out a moderate desegregationist 
position centered on evangelistic priorities and a belief that defenders of Jim Crow could 
not look to the Bible for recourse.  In doing so, he had commenced the process of 
assuming authority not just as a renowned evangelist, but also as a southerner with 
particular knowledge about the region’s populace, black and white.  His public comments 
received notice, even if they remained quite malleable in the minds of interpreters.  
However, he was not yet the regional leader he would become later in the 1950s and into 
the following decade.  His most significant southern relationships remained largely 
private in nature and often did not reflect his emerging views on race.  They did, 
moreover, indicate a disconnect between Graham as racial commentator and Graham as 
political intimate. 
Even while Graham moved away from theological fundamentalism and latent 
segregationism, he maintained close ties with many southern conservatives—politicians, 
such as South Carolinians James Byrnes and Strom Thurmond, but also religious leaders, 
such as W. A. Criswell, pastor of the mammoth First Baptist Church in Dallas, Texas.  
While Criswell later became known as a leading ministerial proponent of Jim Crow, 
before the Brown decision he was simply viewed as a rising star within the SBC.  His 
downtown church had mushroomed into the largest Southern Baptist congregation in the 
world.  Graham and Criswell’s relationship dated at least as far back as 1948, when 
Graham held meetings at First Baptist, and the two dined together two years later during 
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a Graham revival in Charlotte.  In 1953, in the midst of his Dallas crusade, Graham 
publicly requested membership at First Baptist.  The evangelist explained his decision by 
noting that Criswell’s church would not place the same demands on his time as would a 
congregation closer to home.  (In reality, Graham could have said the same of his former 
church, Curtis Baptist in Augusta, Georgia.)  Taking membership at First Baptist 
represented a savvy move for Graham, who confessed admiration for swaggering Texans 
and who often wore a cowboy hat during the early 1950s.79  The membership of First 
Baptist later included oil baron H.L. Hunt, an eccentric multimillionaire and rabid right-
wing activist who became a fan of the BGEA, especially team member Grady Wilson.  
Graham’s connections in the state stretched beyond First Baptist and extended deep into 
the pockets of, to name a few major supporters, defense and energy magnate Russell 
Maguire (a right-winger of Texas-sized proportions), industrialist and evangelical 
philanthropist R. G. LeTourneau, and most significantly, Dallas-area oilman Sid 
Richardson, who introduced the evangelist to two rising politicians, John Connally and 
Lyndon Johnson.  The titles of the BGEA’s first two feature films, Mr. Texas and 
Oiltown, U.S.A., drew from the well of this Lone Star prospecting.80 
 Many times throughout his career Graham would admit a deep interest in, and 
attraction to, the world of politics.  Were it not for his calling to the ministry, Graham 
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declared in 1950, he might have chosen a career in public service.81  In practice, the 
evangelist never kept these vocations as far apart as his membership in a denomination 
long friendly toward the Establishment Clause might have suggested.  As Graham grew 
in national stature, he befriended a wide range of political movers and shakers from both 
parties.  His early connections, though, ran deepest among southern Democrats, including 
Tennessee Governor Frank Clement, Mississippi Senator John Stennis, South Carolina 
Representative Mendel Rivers, Virginia Senator A. Willis Robertson, and Alabama 
Representative Frank Boykin.  Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, a Texan, permitted 
Graham to hold the final service of his 1952 Washington, DC, crusade on the steps of the 
Capitol Building.82  “I had more friends in the Democratic Party than I did in the 
Republican Party,” Graham recalled; “being a southerner, I knew most of them.”83  He 
regularly consulted with these and other political figures who ran the ideological gamut 
from pious moderates to staunch segregationists.  Stennis, with whom Graham traveled to 
the 1952 Democratic Party convention, clearly fell into the latter camp, as did two other 
friends of the evangelist, Strom Thurmond and James Byrnes.84  Supporting the 
evangelist even as his racial positions became better known, one historian has argued, 
“was a chance that segregationist politicians took, for it was more dangerous to oppose 
such a popular figure than it was to fudge the hard line of resistance [to desegregation].”85  
Supporting Graham was hardly a political risk, however, during the years before the 
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evangelist was publicly identified with desegregationism.  His self-described electoral 
philosophy actually paralleled that of the many ambivalent southern Democrats who had 
grown increasingly comfortable with the thought of supporting Republican presidential 
candidates: “Though a registered Democrat (a sort of birthright in the part of the South 
where I came from), I always voted for the man and not the party.”86  
 During the early 1950s, Graham’s links with politicians who would soon stoke the 
political flames of massive resistance were tighter than his relationships with southern 
political moderates.  These connections were prominently on display during his 1950 
crusade in Columbia, South Carolina, where the Graham team first employed the term 
“crusade” (rather than “campaign”).87  In addition to staying in Governor Strom 
Thurmond’s mansion, Graham inspired an outbreak of civil religion in the state capital.  
Thurmond, less than two years removed from his presidential run as a Dixiecrat and more 
than a decade away from his trend-setting switch to the Republican Party, officially 
declared the last day of the crusade “South Carolina Revival Day” and signed a 
proclamation calling the crusade the “greatest religious gathering ever held in South 
Carolina—if not the South.”  Thurmond and his bitter political rival, U.S. Senator Olin 
Johnson, posed around a Bible with Graham.  In Columbia, the evangelist addressed the 
state general assembly and also met and befriended conservative Time magazine 
publisher Henry Luce, an encounter historian Numan Bartley has termed “an important 
event in the marriage of southern fundamentalism and northern anticommunism.”  While 
in the state, Graham found time to spend a weekend at the Spartanburg home of James 
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Byrnes, a former Secretary of State under Franklin Roosevelt who went on to carry the 
segregationist banner as governor of South Carolina during the early 1950s.88  At the 
time, when Graham rarely spoke about race in public, he gave few initial indications of a 
willingness to step on the toes of the southern political establishment. 
 During the same year as the Columbia crusade, in fact, Graham received overtures 
about potentially joining that establishment.  Several Democratic Party officials from 
North Carolina approached Graham about running to oust the state’s sitting senator, a 
campaign that would have pitted him against former University of North Carolina 
President Frank Porter Graham, a childhood neighbor and friend of the evangelist’s 
father.  Byrnes likely had a hand in the offer.89  Although Graham did not seriously 
consider running, the possible 1950 campaign offers insight into his perceived political 
usefulness.  An evangelical writer described the opposition among Tar Heel 
conservatives to Frank Porter Graham, a leading and well-respected southern liberal who 
held “radical ideas on race, religion, and politics” out of step with the region’s traditions.  
Consequentially, certain North Carolinians had discussed running Billy Graham against 
the sitting senator.90  (Senator Graham would go on to lose a primary run-off that featured 
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overt race-baiting.)  One year later, in 1951, Louisville lawyer James T. Robertson (who 
represented evangelist Mordecai Ham) wrote to David Lawrence, the conservative editor 
of US News & World Report, proposing the evangelist’s service on behalf of an 
ideologically parallel cause, an effort to nominate conservative Minnesota Congressman 
Walter Judd, a Republican, for the presidency, with Byrnes as his running mate.91  
Graham did not join the unsuccessful effort, although either he or one of his team 
members was undoubtedly aware of the offer to do so.  Later, the right-wing, anti-Semitic 
American Mercury, controlled by Russell Maguire, suggested Graham as an ideal 
presidential nominee; the magazine’s other recommendations included Strom Thurmond 
and Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland.92  In 1957, an Eisenhower-supporting 
Democrat from Oklahoma organized a quixotic and short-lived “Graham-for-President 
club” movement.93  As the aforementioned editorial in the Richmond Times-Dispatch 
indicated, Graham’s moderate comments on race often lacked discernable coordinates on 
the political spectrum.  Throughout the mid-1950s, observers clearly assumed his politics 
leaned well to the right.  His strong support for President Eisenhower suggested a 
somewhat more complex dynamic, however.   
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A Theological Defeat for Jim Crow 
 The lack of synergy between Graham’s relationships with southern politicians and 
his statements and actions in the area of race relations raises questions about his overall 
influence within the region during the pre- and early Brown years.  During this time, his 
emerging racial positions ruffled few feathers and did not threaten his existing friendships 
with strongly segregationist politicians.  In this brief period of relative flexibility in 
southern relations, Graham’s embrace of desegregated seating was rarely received as a 
slap in the face of regional mores.  It can be counted as among the many, largely 
unpublicized forms of desegregation that occurred in the years immediately preceding 
and following Brown.  At the same time, Graham’s evolution on race eliminated his 
candidacy as a potential ally of segregationists.  While by no means an activist and while 
rarely incautious, Graham began criticizing segregation in religious settings and attacking 
the use of Christianity in support of Jim Crow a decade and a half before many of his 
southern peers publicly arrived at such positions.  Criswell, for example, did not formally 
endorse desegregated church services until 1968.94  Like Criswell, Graham commanded 
appeal among grassroots white southerners well-removed from the more racially liberal 
spheres of denominational publishing houses and policy committees.  This appeal gave 
the evangelist tangible influence in the region or, at the very least, contributed to 
deference to his desegregationist policies.  Graham was not simply a role model, then; he 
could effect the desegregation of major public gatherings in the late Jim Crow South.    
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 Graham’s early shift toward racial moderation challenges how historians have 
viewed the religious status of segregationism during the civil rights era.  Writing in the 
aftermath of scholar Samuel Hill’s criticism of white southern Christianity—what one 
historian has called the “cultural captivity thesis”—interpreters of southern religion have 
considered to what extent white southern Christianity offered the implicit sanctification 
of Jim Crow that Hill had perceived.  Hill himself did not stress the overt doctrinalization 
of segregation within southern evangelicalism, but rather the removal of faith from the 
realm of social questions.95  Historians Paul Harvey and Bill Leonard have each 
identified a more specific theologized racism, thus adding greater nuance to the Hill 
thesis.  Leonard, who focused largely on fundamentalist independent Baptists, found a 
“theology for racism” that viewed civil rights activism “as a violation of fundamentalist 
dogma and biblical norms.”  Harvey, whose work addresses southern lay figures (but also 
a few SBC ministers), argues that his actors evinced a “segregationist folk theology.”  As 
both Leonard and Harvey have recognized, their subjects did not argue for segregation as 
a theological positive good so much as they constructed a religious worldview that 
permitted and encouraged the existence of a racial hierarchy.  In that sense, their findings 
are in keeping with Hill’s larger understanding of white southern Christianity.96   
Historian David Chappell has attempted to turn the culture-faith thesis on its head.  
“The historically significant thing about white religion in the 1950-60s is not its failure to 
join the civil rights movement,” Chappell argues.  “The significant thing . . . is that it 
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failed in any meaningful way to join the anti-civil rights movement.”  Because the “white 
religious leaders of the South did not care deeply enough about segregation to make its 
defense the most important thing in their lives,” Chappell continues, segregationists 
turned their ammunition on the mixing of faith and politics, arguing that pastors 
overstepped their bounds when they discussed racial matters.97   
More recently, historian Jane Dailey has contested Chappell’s description of an 
atrophied southern religious segregationism.  She rightly suggests that historians often 
have employed an overly normative standard when evaluating the faith dynamics of late 
Jim Crow, defining out of religion those views contradicting the seemingly more 
authentic (read: prophetic) faith of Martin Luther King, Jr., and others.  Adopting a 
broader, somewhat more operational conception of religion than does Chappell, Dailey 
stresses the religious nature of Jim Crow’s elephant in the room: sexuality.  “It was 
through sex,” she writes, “that racial segregation in the South moved from being a local 
social practice to a part of the divine plan for the world.”  For Dailey, segregation 
addressed manifold matters of ultimate concern.98 
 In light of Dailey’s arguments, Graham’s desegregated crusades could attain a 
certain cosmological significance in the area of race relations.  To the extent it existed, 
though, this significance was undoubtedly more incidental than intentional.  The spatial 
arrangement of a desegregated crusade did not enflame white anxieties about interracial 
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intimacy in the same manner as, say, the integration of a public high school.  Graham 
attempted to recuse himself from the explicitly political questions of Jim Crow in a 
manner paralleling the Hill thesis.  However, only a proponent of Graham’s own social 
theology would describe his crusades as wholly lacking political import.  His role in the 
South appears more notable when considered in terms of Chappell’s topic of interest, the 
theological authority possessed by either avowed segregationists or, in the case of 
Graham and his team, moderate desegregationists.  Here, the most striking trend 
concerned the overall theological poverty of religious defenders of Jim Crow as they 
slouched away from the New Testament’s Bethlehem, birthplace of a Christ who mingled 
with the outcasts of his society, and back toward such exegetical compensations as the 
Old Testament’s Hamitic curse, a favorite proof text of nineteenth-century defenders of 
the discredited institution of slavery.99  Graham’s evasive contention during his Jackson 
crusade that the Bible says nothing about segregation represented a classic example of his 
instinctive tendency to compromise in the face of public pressure; but the evangelist only 
momentarily arrested his movement toward desegregationism.  Graham did not contend 
that the Bible endorsed segregation.  His subsequent behavior and actions confirmed the 
fact that segregationism faced theological defeat well before it faced political demise.   
Graham, a religiously conservative southern evangelical, suggests the fairly early 
timing of this loss.  “When southern ministers of Rev. Graham’s influence begin to speak 
out against the evils of segregation,” predicted a black North Carolina newspaper in 
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1955, “it[’]s a sure sign that the day of its departure is near at hand.”100  Such a forecast 
represented wishful thinking about both the end of Jim Crow and the role of white 
southern ministers in bringing about its closure.  Still, Graham’s words had clearly 
attracted notice.  By no means did the evangelist create or drive the argument that 
segregation lacked a theological defense; generations of black theologians had already 
tilled that ground.101  However, his accessible critique of segregation in Christian practice 
lent the theological defeat of Jim Crow a quality of common sense, even as the exact 
relationship of his arguments to political and grassroots efforts for racial change remained 
ambiguous.  “The church should voluntarily be doing what the courts are doing by 
compulsion,” Graham told a national magazine six months after the Brown decision.102   
Race had not trumped evangelism on Graham’s priority list.  Yet race was an 
issue he could scarcely—and, increasingly, chose not to—avoid.  His moderate style and 
his friendship with numerous southern leaders gave him unusual access to a range of 
regional actors.  This status made him attractive as a potential consultant, advisor, or 
mediator for someone such as President Dwight Eisenhower.  By the latter half of the 
1950s, Graham grew more willing to accept a summons to regional leadership.       
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CHAPTER III 
 
EVANGELICAL UNIVERSALISM AND  
THE POLITICS OF DECENCY 
 
Christ was not so much a reformer as he was a transformer. 
 
Billy Graham1 
 
We must respect the law, but keep in mind that it is powerless to change the human heart. 
 
Billy Graham2 
 
 The brand of regional leadership Graham adopted required that he convincingly 
differentiate himself from leading figures on the southern right.  One such person was W. 
A. Criswell, pastor of First Baptist Church in Dallas, where Graham kept membership.  In 
February 1956, the firebrand Criswell delivered a well-publicized and subsequently 
infamous address to a joint session of the South Carolina legislature in which he endorsed 
segregation in both society and the church.  Elsewhere in Columbia, Criswell castigated 
integrationists as “a bunch of infidels, dying from the neck up.”  Pressed for a response to 
this rhetorical gauntlet, Graham averred that Criswell and he had “never seen eye to eye 
on the race question.  My views have been expressed many times and are well known.”3 
In truth, Graham’s views were only beginning to enter public consciousness 
during a time when the Montgomery bus boycott and the school integration crisis 
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grabbed the headlines.  These developments cast a spotlight on his identity as a 
southerner.  National politicians, such as President Dwight Eisenhower, and national 
publications, such as Christian Century, looked to the evangelist to exert regional 
leadership concerning desegregation and race relations, as did a number of persons inside 
the South.  As the decade continued, Graham stopped merely responding to the events 
happening around him and started carving out his own space and agenda.  By the close of 
1957, he had positioned himself in the discursive middle ground between the 
segregationist right and the integrationist left—that is, between his pastor, Criswell, and 
another Baptist and southerner, Martin Luther King, Jr.  In national venues, but less 
commonly from the crusade pulpit, Graham criticized legalized Jim Crow, condemned 
racial violence, and continued to attack biblical justifications for segregation.  These 
positions cost him support in the white South.  Following his comments about Criswell, 
the evangelist reportedly received several calls from First Baptist congregants demanding 
that he relinquish his membership.4  At the same time, Graham remained publicly 
skeptical of legislative or judicial solutions to the civil rights crisis, preferring instead to 
stress the evangelical themes of “neighbor-love” and the transformation of society 
through individual conversions.  Even though his stature in both the South and the nation 
gave him great leeway to express his views, he typically strove to avoid offending all but 
the most intransigent defenders of Jim Crow.  
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 During the latter half of the 1950s, Graham emerged as a regional leader.  This 
shift was reflected in his many public and private actions regarding the South: publishing 
articles about race relations in national publications; consulting with southern church 
leaders and national politicians on racial matters; and, finally, holding rallies in two 
violence-torn cities.  In engaging his region, Graham functioned not only in his self-
described role as an evangelist, but also as a type of politician, subject to the tendencies 
of elected political leaders: vacillation between grandstanding and caution amid attempts 
to balance seemingly contradictory constituencies.  On a more literal level, Graham’s 
activities in the South were intimately—at times, inextricably—connected with his 
service as an advisor to, and supporter of, Dwight Eisenhower.  Their relationship sheds 
critical light on the origins of the evangelist’s seemingly obvious, yet persistently elusive, 
leanings toward the Republican Party.  His projected persona appeared to transcend 
partisanship even as his comments routinely buttressed the policy agenda and southern 
ambitions of Eisenhower.  As an evangelist, Graham could stand removed from the fray 
of both the politics of rage and the politics of protest.  Instead, he endorsed and advocated 
a moderate politics of decency rooted in an evangelical social perspective that straddled 
and selectively engaged the polarized racial discourse of the period.  Here, as in so many 
areas of his career, the spheres of religion and politics blended almost beyond distinction. 
 
Evangelical Universalism 
 Beginning in 1955 and continuing into the early 1960s, Graham used national 
media outlets to communicate his views concerning race relations and civil rights.  
Although Graham had discussed segregation in 1955 appearances on Meet the Press and 
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before the National Press Club, his first widely disseminated foray into racial issues came 
with an October 1956 article printed in Life magazine, a publication operated by Graham 
supporter Henry Luce.5  Originally drafted by a Life writer and based on interviews with 
the evangelist, the essay partially fulfilled Graham’s promise to Eisenhower that he 
would provide leadership in promoting racial tolerance and moderation.6  The evangelist 
published the article with some reluctance.7  The “vast majority of the ministers in the 
South,” he wrote of both black and white clerics, were “not extremists on either side” of 
the race issue.  They supported desegregation of such services as public transportation, 
hotels, and restaurants, while remaining skeptical of the current feasibility of school 
integration in the Deep South.  Observing a decline in race relations since the Brown 
decision, most ministers who had talked with the evangelist “confessed that the church is 
doing far too little about it.”  In the article, Graham announced his policy of holding 
“nonsegregated” services and systematically dismantled two common biblical proof texts 
for segregation: the Hamitic curse and the Old Testament commandment that Israelites 
separate themselves from other peoples.  Noah, not God, had cursed a son of Ham (and 
he had done so after awakening from a drunken slumber).  Ham’s descendents, the 
evangelist confidently contended, were white Canaanites, not black Africans.  The social 
separatism of the Israelites was based on religious, not racial, principles.  Moreover, he 
added, Jesus specifically countered the racialism of his own people by praising gentiles 
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and moving among the outcast Samaritans.  For the present times, Graham’s prescription 
for improved race relations required “more than justice: the principle of the Golden Rule, 
the spirit of neighbor-love, and the experience of redemptive love and forgiveness.”8 
This prioritization of relational love and personal redemption over mere legal 
remedies suggests the article’s slippery prescriptions, as well as its underlying 
conservative assumptions.  Draft references to Graham crusades as “fully ‘integrated’” 
(rather than “nonsegregated”) and to segregation as “both UnAmerican and UnChristian” 
(labels he had used regarding segregation on at least two previous occasions) did not 
appear in the printed version, while politically ambiguous anecdotes survived the final 
edit.9  After attacking biblical defenses of Jim Crow, for example, Graham noted that 
black attendance at his desegregated services had not approached that of his segregated 
1952 crusade in Jackson.  Negroes, he declared, balked at legalized segregation, but often 
preferred to mingle among themselves.  In another telling anecdote, Graham told of an 
idealistic, integrationist minister who became a racial moderate after moving to the 
South.  While seeming to endorse basic legal remedies to Jim Crow, Graham voiced a 
modest version of the strongly held position of his father-in-law, Nelson Bell, that some 
voluntary forms of segregation were permissible.  The evangelist also defended his native 
South.  “Prejudice is not just a sectional problem,” he wrote, labeling criticism of the 
South “[o]ne of the most popular indoor sports of some northerners these days.”  He 
ended with a story suggesting a distinctly regional model for improved race relations:   
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[S]hortly after the close of the Civil War, a Negro entered a fashionable 
church in Richmond, Va., on Sunday morning while communion was 
being served.  He walked down the aisle and knelt at the altar.  A rustle of 
shock and anger swept through the congregation.  Sensing the situation, a 
distinguished layman immediately stood up, stepped forward to the altar 
and knelt beside his colored brother.  Captured by his spirit, the 
congregation followed this magnanimous example. 
The layman who set the example was Robert E. Lee.10 
 
 Despite the mixed message inherent in invoking a Confederate hero on behalf of 
racial tolerance, Graham did call for the church to take a greater role in fostering 
improved race relations.  He did so, however, in explicitly evangelical terms, linking 
social progress with personal salvation.  “The church, if it aims to be the true church,” he 
wrote, “dares not segregate the message of good racial relations from the message of 
regeneration, for . . . man as sinner is prone to desert God and neighbor alike.”  The most 
lasting advances in race relations would thus derive from individual conversions to 
Christ’s message of salvation and love.  “Any man who has a genuine conversion 
experience will find his racial attitudes greatly changed,” the evangelist concluded.11 
 Graham published three subsequent articles—in Ebony, U.S. News & World 
Report, and Reader’s Digest, respectively—which alternately reflected and amplified his 
contribution to Life.  The Ebony piece—published in September 1957 with the kicker, 
“Southern-born evangelist declares war on bigotry”—contained a more strident tone than 
the Life article.  The difference was attributable both to the magazine’s primary 
readership, upwardly-mobile blacks, and to the timing of the article, the aftermath of the 
New York City crusade, where the Graham team had made special efforts to appeal to 
                                               
 
10
 Graham, “Plea,” 144, 140, 143, 138, 146, 151.  Historian Alan T. Nolan described the accuracy 
of this popular story about Lee as “highly unlikely.”  See Nolan, Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee 
and Civil War History (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press [UNC], 1991), 207. 
 
11
 Graham, “Plea,” 144, 146. 
  
 
72 
African Americans.  In the article, which reflected comments the evangelist had made in 
New York, he promised a revival “to wipe away racial discrimination” and supremacist 
sentiments.  More importantly, for the first time to a national audience, Graham overtly 
came out in favor of anti-segregation legislation.  He did not clarify exactly what such 
laws would entail, however, and quickly added that, absent Christian love, they would 
result in “nothing but cold war.”12   
 Graham also emphasized the literal Cold War in his Ebony piece—a theme he 
revisited in articles published in the much more racially conservative venues of U.S. 
News & World Report and Reader’s Digest.  “Race prejudice,” Graham apocalyptically 
wrote in Ebony, “is a cancer eating at the heart and core of American life and, therefore, 
threatening to eclipse the dawn of peace and justice for all humanity.”13  As a fervent 
cold warrior who lent his visage and voice to at least one United States Information 
Agency propaganda reel in the late 1950s, Graham ardently supported efforts to enhance 
the reputation of America overseas.14  His 1960 tour of Africa—during which he held 
desegregated meetings in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, while refusing to visit 
apartheid South Africa until he could do the same—inspired the contributions to U.S. 
News & World Report and Reader’s Digest.15  The Africa tour only reinforced his 
                                               
 
12
 Graham, “No Color Line in Heaven,” Ebony, September 1957, 99, 100, 102.  According to one 
scholar, Graham first endorsed anti-segregation legislation in an address given during the New York City 
crusade at a Baptist church in Brooklyn.  See Jerry Berl Hopkins, “Billy Graham and the Race Problem, 
1949-1969” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1986), 79.  “I am convinced that we need 
legislation in the country,” Graham was quoted as saying.  See Amsterdam News, 20 July 1957, in BGCA, 
CN 360, R26. 
 
13
 Graham, “No Color Line,” 102. 
 
14
 “INTERVIEW WITH BILLY GRAHAM,” undated [1957 or 1958] film, Records of the United 
States Information Agency records (USIA), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), video 
copy of USIA film 306.2143. 
 
  
 
73 
description of America’s racial hypocrisy as “one of its greatest black eyes” in a largely 
non-white world.16  Likewise, Graham wrote in those articles, the “embarrassment” of 
racism threatened to “weaken us to the point where communism will gain the ultimate 
victory.”  He called for Christians to “banish Jim Crow from their midst” and again 
endorsed basic legal remedies, yet he also warned of excessive “belligerence” among 
both black and white integrationists.  While “convinced that ‘Jim Crow’ must go,” he 
declared that society “cannot make two races love each other and accept each other at the 
point of bayonets.”17  Although the evangelist embraced the end of Jim Crow on both 
moral and political grounds, he only endorsed remedies that he believed would not result 
in the kind of tensions present in Little Rock and elsewhere.  Such friction-free solutions 
were, of course, difficult to identify. 
 Graham’s public commentaries on racial matters lacked intellectual depth and 
exposed the evangelist to charges of inconsistency.  A glaring dearth of symmetry existed 
between his passionate calls for ending personal prejudice among Christians and his 
significantly less enthusiastic support for dismantling the actual legal structures of Jim 
Crow.  Like a candidate running for office, Graham avoided committing himself to all but 
the most general of prescriptions for combating racist practices.  Unlike most politicians, 
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however, Graham claimed spiritual and moral authority as a minister of God; he 
implicitly asked to be held to a higher standard than other public figures.  Despite his 
tepidness and inconsistency, though, he proffered to his audiences something more than, 
as one scholar has charged, a simple belief that “religion, like politics, had a duty to 
uphold the status quo.”18   
 In explaining his positions on racial and other socio-political matters, Graham 
evinced an evangelical social ethic centered on the individual soul and will, and 
predicated on the universal commonality of divinely created humans.  This social ethic, 
here called evangelical universalism, viewed the individual soul as the primary 
theological and political unit in society, prioritized relational over legislative solutions to 
social problems, and tended to acquiesce to the ultimately inscrutable realm of ordained 
authority.  According to this ethic (which should not be confused with the inclusive 
soteriology, or doctrine of salvation, also called “universalism”), the most effective forms 
of social change emanated from the conversion of individual souls.  The theological 
content and socio-political biases of evangelical universalism distinguished it from the 
“liberal universalism” which pervaded the political culture of post-World War II reform 
movements.19  The differences between evangelical and liberal universalism, while quite 
evident at the start of the civil rights era, grew even sharper at the close of the period, 
when southern boosters attempted to cast the region as having surmounted its racial 
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problems.  In the context of the American South during the latter half of the 1950s and 
the first half of the 1960s, Graham invoked the values of evangelical universalism to 
offer a theologically grounded, common sense critique of both racism and racialism.  He 
also drew from the ethic to defend his region and to question the value of legislative or 
other operational routes to social change.   
 The universalism of Graham and many of his evangelical peers derived not from 
an optimistic reading of human nature, but rather from a theological recognition of the 
common condition of individual souls: created, sinful, and requiring salvation.  In a 1966 
address to an international gathering of evangelicals in Berlin, Graham chided himself 
and his peers for not always emphasizing the “[b]iblical unity of the human race.  All 
men are one in the humanity created by God himself.  All men are one in the common 
need of divine redemption, and all are offered salvation in Jesus Christ.”  By themselves, 
these were hardly radical words; Christians of most persuasions nominally professed 
some version of these principles.  As is readily apparent to students of Christianity in the 
white South, moreover, the “inclusionary impulses of evangelical Christianity” (to use 
the words of historian Derek Chang) have often coexisted comfortably with racial 
hierarchies.  In other words, spiritual and social equality could be, and often were, as 
separated as public schools or church sanctuaries were segregated.  Spurred by 
motivations both religious and secular, though, Graham by the mid-1950s had begun 
drawing connections between the two types of equality.  Later referring to humanity as 
“one race,” the evangelist spoke for his Berlin audience in rejecting “the notion that men 
are unequal because of distinction of race or color.  In the name of Scripture and Jesus 
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Christ we condemn racialism wherever it appears.”20  The frontiers of evangelism for 
Graham had always extended beyond both the physical and spiritual walls of the church; 
increasingly, the implications of his evangelical universalism did so, as well.     
 Those implications, however, gained expression largely in individuated terms—
more specifically, in the language of individual souls.  Graham wrote in the pages of the 
conservative magazine American Mercury: “Society is made up of individuals.  So long 
as you have a man in society who hates and lies and steals and is deceitful, you have the 
possibility of racial intolerance; you have the possibility of war; you have the possibility 
of economic injustice.”21  He viewed larger social problems as manifestations of core 
individual ones.  “Our international problems and racial tensions,” he stated in 1963, “are 
only reflections of individual problems and tensions.”22  A year later he told a group of 
media executives that, before altering social structures, “we must change man first.  Our 
great problem today is not social. . . . Our problem is man himself.  We’ve got to change 
man.”23  The solution had to begin with individual souls.  “Society cannot repent 
corporately,” Graham argued in another American Mercury article.24  For the evangelist, 
then, only the individual will—effectively, the intellectual corollary of the soul—could 
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stimulate change in one’s life and, by secondary extension, in society as a whole.  In 
Graham’s theology, as a student of the evangelist has written, “[t]he human will 
represents an autonomous ego.”25  Acceptance of Christ, of course, represented the 
ultimate willful decision for Graham, a choice from which all lasting social change 
derived.  His avowed model for revival-driven social change was eighteenth-century 
Wesleyanism, which he claimed had contributed generations of reformers to Great 
Britain.26  “Our hope,” the evangelist declared in his Berlin address, “is . . . that social 
reform in areas where it’s needed can be done by men who have been converted and who 
believe the Gospel.”  Such work comprised the realm of “social concern,” a term Graham 
and his evangelical peers employed in reference to those Christian activities in the public, 
or “social,” sphere outside of evangelism.  The pervasiveness of the term demonstrates 
how white American evangelicals tended to place social activism in a mental category 
separate from, and secondary to, traditional missionary efforts.27 
 The born-again moment, described by theologian Carl F. H. Henry and other 
evangelicals as “regeneration,” thus comprised the most legitimate (or perhaps the only 
wholly legitimate) starting point for transforming a fallen society.  That transformation 
would occur on a soul-by-soul and then a relational basis.  The emphasis on individual 
salvation as a trigger for social change is an oft-cited characteristic of evangelical social 
engagement.  Henry contrasted the “transformation of society” with educational and 
legislative efforts aimed at “preserving what is worth preserving in the present social 
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order.”  Henry and his generation of evangelicals tended to associate the state—and, by 
extension, the law—with coercive power.  Transformation through regeneration, by 
contrast, “rests upon spiritual power,” as “[e]vangelism and revival remain the original 
wellsprings of evangelical humanitarianism and social awakening.”28  Regeneration first 
entailed the divine forgiveness of the individual sins.  Its social component likewise 
would commence voluntarily at the level of everyday human relations, what Graham and 
others called “neighbor-love”—a concept they kept distinct from magisterial justice. 
At its extreme, this stress on individual regeneration could effect a type of socio-
political passivism.  It could lead to a pietistic version of Martin Luther’s two-kingdom 
theology, permitting evangelicals to tacitly bless the political status quo while cultivating 
their own evangelistic gardens.  Similarly, many of Graham’s ideas resembled the non-
statist nineteenth-century reform strategy of “moral suasion,” as well as the social 
theology of antebellum American evangelist Charles Finney, who cautiously weighed his 
opposition to slavery against his emphasis on conversion.29  Graham and his generation 
of post-World War II neo-evangelicals, though, sought to restore evangelical Christianity 
to its earlier status as moral guardian of the United States and to broaden that status to 
western civilization as a whole.  They viewed themselves as departing from the separatist 
dogmatism and social irrelevance of post-Scopes fundamentalism.  In practice, then, most 
postwar evangelicals hoped their values would permeate the realm of state leadership, 
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irrespective of their beliefs concerning the limits of that sphere for transforming society.  
Their influence on temporal authority would commence, appropriately, at the level of 
individual conversions.  As historian D. G. Hart has argued, a paramount conviction of 
evangelical political activism has been the belief that “being born again results in holy 
instincts about the way societies should be ordered and governments run.”30  When this 
principle is applied to Christian statesmen, the personal becomes political in a peculiarly 
evangelical way; godly character yields godly governance. 
 Another, equally important factor preventing postwar evangelicals from 
embracing either quietism or separatism was their profound respect not only for pious 
governmental leadership, but also for ordained authority and the rule of law.  This final 
element of evangelical universalism often resided uncomfortably with the regenerational 
theory of social change.  Despite Graham’s inability to avoid partisanship, he routinely 
argued that believing Christians should support their elected leaders as agents of God’s 
will, irrespective of party or platform.  “The devout man,” Henry likewise wrote, “must 
respect law, and he is spiritually inclined to obey the positive law of the State” and not 
“to condition [his] support of the State upon its promotion of Christian religious 
principles.”  While the state’s mission remained ultimately negative (i.e., preservational) 
vis-à-vis the regenerative, transformational effects of individual conversions, government 
did possess a legitimate role to play in upholding and implementing justice.  This 
acknowledgment sometimes necessitated theological hair-splitting among socially-
concerned evangelicals attempting to distinguish between spiritual and temporal 
                                               
 
30
 D. G. Hart, That Old-Time Religion in Modern America: Evangelical Protestantism in the 
Twentieth Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 146.  The discussion of evangelical social ethics in this 
chapter and elsewhere is greatly indebted to Dennis P. Hollinger, Individualism and Social Ethics: An 
Evangelical Syncretism (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1982), 40, 111-112 and passim.   
  
 
80 
responsibilities, between individual souls bound for eternity and individual bodies 
presently occupying a fallen world.31  In practice, it was difficult to voice one’s 
eschatology without also blessing the political status quo.  “From a Christian point of 
view,” Graham declared in late 1967, “I’m very optimistic about the situation in the 
world.  From [the] point of view of a member of the human race, I’m very pessimistic.”32  
Many evangelicals clearly desired to strengthen their influence over national policy even 
while their theological inclinations led them to acquiesce to the legitimate powers that be 
and to assume a period of social decline would precede the triumphant Second Coming.  
When political leaders professed a Christianity of the appropriate variety, of course, the 
dilemma seemed less complicated.  Indeed, Graham went so far as to state that qualified 
Christians had a responsibility to run for office.33 
 Applied to civil rights and to the broader postwar South, Graham’s evangelical 
universalism held conflicting implications.  The evangelist upheld the earthly, as well as 
the spiritual, equality of all human beings, irrespective of color.  In doing so, though, he 
prioritized evangelism to individual sinners over explicit crusades for social justice, 
implying that the former would render the latter unnecessary.  For Graham and other 
evangelicals, a tension existed between justice and regeneration, between their belief in a 
universal moral law (as well as the need for the state to preserve and, in certain cases, 
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effect moral order) and their stress on voluntarism (e.g., individual acts of neighborly 
love) suggested by their foregrounding of individual wills.  In the political culture of 
postwar America as a whole, this latter impulse often assumed a certain libertarian 
quality that complemented the anti-New Deal rhetoric of property rights and individual 
choice pervasive among political conservatives.  In specific context of the postwar 
American South, however, the universal values of Graham’s evangelicalism led him to 
challenge the Jim Crow status quo.  Moreover, as will be seen, his respect for the rule of 
law informed how he responded to racial violence in Little Rock and elsewhere.  Graham 
believed in a universal moral template and he believed that a democratic America held a 
special place in protecting and expanding that morality around the world.  The tension 
between these values and his emphasis on individual choice remained as dynamic as it 
was unacknowledged.  Conversely, in the overwhelmingly Christian South from which 
Graham hailed, the line between the spiritual and the social realms remained as invisible 
as it was articulated. 
 
The Politics of Decency 
 The ambiguous political implications of evangelical universalism were evident in 
Graham’s role as a mediator on behalf of his home region.  If the evangelist was not 
always a consistent theological actor, neither was he consistently a theological actor.  
Almost congenitally geared to speak to his times, his motivations for engaging socio-
political matters were never exclusively religious in nature.  As much as he sought to 
narrowly confine his role to the contest for souls, his actions and statements, both in 
private and in public, routinely addressed society as well as spirituality.  Graham was a 
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southerner and a cold warrior, in addition to being an evangelist.  His racial views 
resembled those whom one scholar has termed the South’s “middle-of-the-road liberals,” 
regional leaders like Ralph McGill and Greenville (MS) Delta Times-Democrat editor 
Hodding Carter who “advocated an orderly, locally controlled process of racial change 
keyed to community conditions and economic growth.”  As resistance to the Brown 
decision gained increasing visibility during 1956 and 1957, their gradualist sentiments 
grew in credibility, leading to a momentary “vogue of moderation.”34  Another helpful 
point of comparison comes from historian William Chafe, who in his classic study of 
Greensboro, North Carolina, identified a postwar southern “progressive mystique” 
consisting of latent paternalism, aversion to conflict, and an overarching “commitment to 
civility.”35  Graham’s concerns about extremists on both sides, expressed in Life and 
elsewhere, reflected a “dilemma of extremes” among southern moderates.36  Like the 
moderates and the image-obsessed progressives of Greensboro, the evangelist 
asymmetrically equated militant segregationists and strident civil rights activists, while 
worrying that integrationist legislation or aggressive enforcement of Supreme Court 
decisions would adversely alter the precarious balance of southern race relations.  Like 
them, as well, he spoke much more forthrightly and specifically when criticizing acts of 
racist violence than when offering constructive proposals for racial progress.  These 
positions and characteristics also paralleled those of Dwight Eisenhower, with whom 
Graham stayed in regular contact throughout the president’s two terms.  Their 
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relationship said much about Graham’s application of evangelical universalism.  It also 
revealed him to be a Republican at heart, if not in name. 
 The relationship between the evangelist and the war hero took root during the run-
up to Eisenhower’s successful bid for the 1952 Republican presidential nomination.  
Biographer William Martin has suggested that Graham played an important (and 
assigned) role in encouraging Eisenhower to enter the race.  This role was primarily the 
work of Sid Richardson, a Texas oil baron close to both the general and the evangelist.  
In the fall of 1951, Richardson passed along to Eisenhower a letter, authored by Graham, 
in which the evangelist hoped that Richardson would convince Eisenhower to seek the 
presidency.  In a quick response to Graham, Eisenhower (who was then commander of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Europe) politely balked at assuming a 
partisan political identity while still in his post.  At the behest of Richardson, Graham 
responded to Eisenhower with a flurry of theologically-tinged hyperbole, a characteristic 
of his subsequent correspondence with political leaders.  “Upon this decision could well 
rest the destiny of the Western World,” the evangelist wrote of Eisenhower’s possible 
run.  Graham asked for a meeting with the general in order “to share with you some of 
the information I have picked up” from “your many friends” in the United States.  With 
assistance from Richardson, they rendezvoused in France during March 1952.37   
After Eisenhower took destiny by the reins and entered the race, Graham’s public 
statements routinely echoed the GOP theme of cleaning up a corrupt Washington, DC.  
As he would attempt to do in subsequent presidential campaigns, he carefully avoided 
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officially endorsing his preferred candidate.  However, his public appeals on behalf of 
Eisenhower were scarcely more subtle than his altar calls.  By frequently alluding in 
press conferences to the importance of personal character when choosing elected 
officials, Graham played to a perceived strength of Eisenhower, who ran on stature more 
than platform.  Even before the Richardson letter, Graham had declared during his 1952 
Greensboro crusade that the “Christian people of America are going to vote as a bloc for 
the man with the strongest moral and spiritual platform, regardless of his views on other 
matters.”38  Eisenhower, for his part, was keenly aware of the usefulness of the 
evangelist, whom the candidate personally sought out for advice on injecting a religious 
tone into campaign speeches.39  Privately, Eisenhower proposed that Graham and other 
sympathetic pastors be informally organized to support the campaign.40  The president 
made a similar recommendation during his reelection campaign in 1956, by which time 
he had already received a promise from Graham to “do all in my power during the 
coming campaign to gain friends and supporters for your cause.”41 
 The 1952 campaign represented Graham’s inaugural contribution to the postwar 
emergence of the Republican Party in southern presidential politics.  His support for 
Eisenhower, while by no means uncommon among national evangelists, paralleled larger 
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developments in the South.42  Political scientists Earl Black and Merle Black have 
described Eisenhower as “the human triggering mechanism for the first Republican 
breakthrough in the South” during 1952, a year when the candidate departed from GOP 
tradition and actively sought votes from the region’s many conservative Democrats.  In 
1952, Eisenhower won the peripheral southern states of Tennessee, Virginia, Texas, and 
Florida, and according to Black and Black, captured half of all southern white votes.  
(Graham team member Grady Wilson claimed to have done his part to aid the general’s 
cause in North Carolina, but lamented “those thick-headed Tarheels [who] would vote 
Democratic straight down the line even if the Devil himself were running.”)  The “partial 
realignment” of southern whites toward Republican presidential candidates had 
commenced.  In both 1952 and the reelection vote of 1956, Eisenhower received 
particularly strong support from affluent white residents of large and small southern 
metropolitan areas, the very types of growing southern cities—the Greensboros and the 
Charlottes—that Graham frequented throughout the decade.43 
Even while Graham all but endorsed Eisenhower, he remained a registered 
Democrat.  Unlike during the subsequent Nixon presidency, however, he did not publicly 
declare this nominal status.  As a friend and occasional confidant of numerous southern 
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politicians who were supportive of Eisenhower, Graham served as a friendly, informal 
conduit between these Democrats and a Republican Party now seeking votes in Dixie.  
Eisenhower remained aware of Graham’s influence in the South (and, likely, his 
friendship with Sid Richardson), while Graham was conscious of the president’s status in 
the white South.  Indeed, the correspondence between Graham and Eisenhower revealed 
the evangelist as someone who, at least in the area of political strategy, thought like a 
national Republican during the 1950s.  In 1954, Graham heard his friend, Republican 
Congressman Walter Judd of Minnesota, speak at a Lincoln Day Dinner in Asheville, an 
area of North Carolina with a traditional GOP presence.  In a letter to Eisenhower, 
Graham recalled telling Judd afterward that, if only his address could be delivered on 
national television, “we wouldn’t have to worry about Congress remaining GOP 
controlled this fall” (emphasis mine).44   
Eisenhower was particularly alert to Graham’s potential service in the area of 
southern race relations.  His view received support from Representative Frank Boykin, a 
Democrat from Alabama, who wrote the president in March 1956 proposing just such a 
role for the evangelist, who was then visiting the capital.  Significantly, Boykin saw 
Graham as a mediator, rather than a prophet—an agent of gradualism, rather than of 
reform.  The race question, Boykin wrote in his insatiably social manner, was important  
because, in my judgment, the Communists are taking advantage of it.  I 
believe our own Billy Graham could do more on this than any other 
human in this nation; I mean to quiet it down and to go easy and in a 
Godlike way, instead of trying to cram it down the throats of our people all 
in one day, which some of our enemies are trying to do.  I thought maybe 
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if you and Billy talked, you could talk about this real, real good (emphasis 
mine).45  
 
Clearly, the segregationist congressman from southern Alabama viewed Graham as a 
shaper of inevitable changes, not as a driver of them. 
Eisenhower met with Graham on March 20, the day after Boykin sent his letter.  
Although the evangelist had just returned from a visit to India and East Asia, his fifty-
minute conversation with the president centered on what role he might play in the 
American South.  According to White House notes, Graham asserted that the strong 
reaction against the Brown decision “had set back the cause of integration, but he thinks it 
is bound to come eventually.”  The moral issues at stake were obvious, Graham told 
Eisenhower, but were complicated by the social traditions of the South.  In his upcoming 
services in the region, the evangelist agreed to echo the president’s recent call for 
“moderation” and “decency” regarding the transition toward integration.46  In affirming 
and possibly even compounding the gradualist leanings of Eisenhower, Graham offered 
words of advice similar to those the president received from moderate-to-liberal 
southerners, such as Ralph McGill.47 
The content of the Graham-Eisenhower correspondence revealed their basic 
agreement regarding matters of race relations.  They were avowed gradualists wary of 
extremists and skeptical of efforts to legislate racial morality.  While the Eisenhower 
administration officially accepted the Brown decision, the president tacitly criticized the 
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Supreme Court and refused to enforce implementation of the ruling.48  As he told Graham 
in a subsequent letter, he did back the desegregation of southern graduate schools—a 
position that paralleled the evangelist’s support for open admission in Southern Baptist 
colleges.  Moreover, Eisenhower thought white ministers in the South should publicly 
support greater representation of blacks in local governments and school boards.  Graham 
called these suggestions “excellent.”49  They were in keeping with the type of adult-
centered desegregation that had occurred in the years leading up to Brown.  As with the 
open-seating policy in Graham crusades, these alterations of Jim Crow had not 
necessarily required legislative or judicial actions.  Both Graham and Eisenhower 
publicly endorsed this type of prescriptive gradualism, implicitly contrasting it with the 
“extremism” of enforcing Brown in the Deep South.  
 Graham’s correspondence with Eisenhower following their March 20 meeting 
swayed almost unconsciously between moral concerns and political analysis.  Affirming 
the belief of the president that “the Church must take a place of spiritual leadership in this 
crucial matter,” Graham pledged to organize a meeting of southern denominational 
leaders to discuss Eisenhower’s recommendations for enhancing race relations.  The 
evangelist further committed to “do all in my power to urge Southern ministers to call 
upon the people for moderation, charity, compassion and progress toward compliance 
with the Supreme Court decision.”  Although the proposed gathering never occurred, he 
did meet privately with a range of denominational leaders, black and white, “encouraging 
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them to take a stronger stand in calling for desegregation and yet demonstrating charity 
and, above all, patience.”  Two moderate southern governors, Luther Hodges of North 
Carolina and Frank Clement of Tennessee, received similar advice from Graham.50  Later 
in 1956, the evangelist and Vice President Richard Nixon attended Southern 
Presbyterian, Baptist, and Methodist denominational gatherings in North Carolina.  These 
discussions and meetings increased Graham’s optimism, while also affirming his 
gradualism.  “I believe the Lord is helping us,” he wrote to Eisenhower, “and if the 
Supreme Court will go slowly and the extremists on both sides will quiet down, we can 
have peaceful social readjustment over the next ten-year period.”51    
 The presence of Nixon at the southern religious meetings suggested the political 
considerations hovering closely over Graham’s regional leadership.  In the same 1956 
letter in which the evangelist promised to meet with southern Christian leaders, he urged 
the president to wait until after the re-election campaign to enact specific policies on 
desegregation.  “I hope particularly before November you are able to stay out of this 
bitter racial situation that is developing,” the evangelist wrote.  Meanwhile, he advised, 
“it might be well to let the Democratic Party bear the brunt of the debate.”  Two months 
later, Graham expressed concern that the GOP’s efforts to attract northern black voters 
might hinder its southern ambitions: 
I am somewhat disturbed by rumors that Republican strategy will be to go 
all out in winning the Negro vote in the North regardless of the South’s 
feelings.  Again[,] I would like to caution you about getting involved in 
this particular problem.  At the moment, to an amazing degree, you have 
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the confidence of white and Negro leaders.  I would hate to see it 
jeopardized by even those in the Republican Party with a political ax to 
grind. 
    
Eisenhower took notice of the recommendation, although his campaign garnered many 
African-American votes, including that of Martin Luther King, Jr.52 
 One year after the 1956 election, in which Eisenhower increased his success in the 
South, the president sought advice from the evangelist during the most pressing racial 
crisis of his two terms, the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock, 
Arkansas.  Eisenhower consulted Graham about the possible use of federal troops, and 
Nixon twice contacted the evangelist during the crisis.  Graham agreed that Eisenhower 
had no choice but to employ the troops.53  Amid the tensions, the evangelist 
communicated with Little Rock ministers and offered to hold services in the strife-torn 
city, but only upon request.  As part of his Hour of Decision radio program, he distributed 
to stations throughout Arkansas a sermon encouraging love across the color line.  Oveta 
Culp Hobby, a Texan and former member of the Eisenhower cabinet, had suggested the 
gesture.  In other statements, Graham called for Christians in Little Rock to “obey the 
law” and averred that “all thinking southerners” were disturbed by the events there.54 
 With Little Rock, Graham began to involve himself with specific racial crises in 
the South.  Basic Christian racial decency and obedience to the law emerged as the two 
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dominant themes of these interventions.  The same month of the violence in Little Rock, 
the evangelist sent a brief card of support to Dorothy Counts, an African-American 
student who had faced severe harassment upon enrolling at a previously segregated high 
school in Graham’s hometown of Charlotte.  The curiously impersonal note 
characteristically juxtaposed faith and Cold War nationalism, separating them only by 
sentences:    
Dear Miss Counts,  
Democracy demands that you hold fast and carry on.  The world of 
tomorrow is looking for leaders and you have been chosen.  Those 
cowardly whites against you will never prosper because they are un-
American and unfit to lead.  Be of good faith.  God is not dead.  He will 
see you through.  This is your one great chance to prove to Russia that 
democracy still prevails.  Billy Graham, D. D.55 
 
In September 1958, a year after sending the note to Counts, Graham returned to Charlotte 
for a crusade. 
The evangelist’s involvement in the social ferment of the South was not 
completely voluntary, however.  As southern segregationists absorbed his articles in Life 
and Ebony, and as his policy of holding desegregated crusades became better known, 
Graham met resistance from defenders of Jim Crow who now viewed him as an explicit 
opponent of their cause.  Segregationist agitator John Kasper, for example, protested 
Graham’s appearance in Charlotte and referred to the evangelist as a “[N]egro lover.”56  
Meanwhile, the BGEA had scheduled a one-day rally to be held on the statehouse lawn in 
nearby Columbia, South Carolina.  This was to be the evangelist’s first desegregated 
service in a Deep South city since his seating policy had become public knowledge.  In 
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Columbia, the leading newspaper linked the lack of segregation at the Charlotte meetings 
with the low black turnout, estimated at between 1 and 3 percent of the total audience.  
The statehouse rally quickly drew protest from South Carolina Governor George Bell 
Timmerman, a blustering segregationist who argued that permitting the service would 
represent an endorsement of the evangelist’s integrationist position.  Timmerman 
implicitly characterized Graham as a traitor to the region.  “As a widely known evangelist 
and native southerner, his endorsement of racial mixing has done much harm, and his 
presence here on State House property will be misinterpreted as approval of that 
endorsement,” declared the governor.57  His statement reflected the fact that newspapers 
in the Deep South had started reporting on Graham’s racial views, especially those voiced 
during the 1957 New York City crusade.58  In Charlotte, the evangelist continued on this 
theme, branding the bombing of schools and religious buildings by segregationists as 
“symptomatic of the type of thing that brought Hitler to power.”59  Timmerman soon 
moved to block the rally.  Legally, he hung his hat on the separation of church and state, 
an argument typical of segregationists seeking to counter ministerial critics of Jim Crow.  
Besides, he claimed, the evangelist had likely chosen the statehouse location for 
“propaganda purposes.”  The governor neglected to add that Graham had spoken at the 
statehouse eight years earlier—or that, at the governor’s own invitation, W. A. Criswell 
had delivered his 1955 harangue against integration in the same building.60   
                                               
 
57
 Columbia (SC) State, 7 and 12 October 1958. 
 
58
 See Birmingham News, 12 May 1957; Jackson (MS) State Times, 23 June 1957; and Magee 
(MS) Courier, 4 July 1957; all in BGCA, CN 360, R26.   
 
59
 Atlanta Constitution (AP), 16 October 1958, in BGCA, CN 360, R26. 
 
60
 Columbia (SC) State, 23 October 1958.  Towns, Social Conscience, 226. 
  
 
93 
Rather than challenging Timmerman, the BGEA shifted the rally to Fort Jackson, 
a nearby military base outside of state jurisdiction.  The desegregated Sunday gathering 
drew an estimated crowd of 60,000, and platform guests included former Governor James 
Byrnes, a friend of Graham and an avowed segregationist.  The evangelist avoided 
personally attacking Timmerman, but alluded at a press conference to people who “have 
become so unbalanced by this whole issue of segregation and integration that it has 
become their only gospel.”  As if to compensate for even this backhanded form of 
criticism, Graham praised South Carolina’s “warm friendship between the races” in his 
national radio broadcast that evening.  “It is most unfortunate,” he added, “that much of 
the world judges this part of the country by a small, minute, extremist minority and 
sometimes forget[s] that some of the finest Christian people in the entire nation live in 
this state.”61  That “extremist minority” had, of course, somehow elected Timmerman as 
governor.  In Columbia, Graham clearly cast himself as a voice of evangelical decency 
rather than as a prophet of racial justice.  This distinction became more apparent as the 
Civil Rights Movement gained momentum and as its supporters increasingly recognized 
that Graham sought to publicize the South’s moderate Christian whites at least as much 
as he aspired to promote racial tolerance. 
Graham’s role in the South grew even more visible when, two months after the 
Fort Jackson rally, he held his first desegregated service in a southern city that had 
experienced racial violence.  President Eisenhower was not the only public figure asking 
the evangelist to play a more active role in his home region.  In 1956, for example, an 
Oregon editorial board urged Graham to return from his travels abroad and “try and 
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convert the Negro baiting Alabama legislators.”62  While Graham had never ceased 
crusading in parts of the South and soon made race a major theme of several addresses in 
the region, he exhibited little desire to push the matter of holding services in the Deep 
South, a tendency the Columbia rally likely reinforced.63  While not occurring in the 
Deep South, his visits to Clinton, Tennessee, and Little Rock, Arkansas, for the first time 
directly linked his evangelistic services with the region’s racial troubles.  These post-
crisis visits, which ultimately numbered four in total, sharpened the contrast between his 
evangelistic priorities and the concerns of civil rights activists.64  Intervening in the South 
by way of rallies and crusades allowed Graham to define himself, above all and exclusive 
to all, as an evangelist.  In other words, he could safely fold his racial message into his 
revival sermons and, when pressed, explicitly prioritize the conversion of souls over the 
transformation of racial sentiments.  
The first such intervention took place in the small East Tennessee city of Clinton, 
where in October 1958 segregationists had bombed the local high school.  The school had 
already experienced rioting during its integration two years earlier.  Along with Little 
Rock and Mansfield, Texas, which had seen similar strife, Clinton had come to symbolize 
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the violent emergence of grassroots massive resistance to the Brown decision.65  Two 
months after the bombing, Graham accepted a challenge from nationally-syndicated 
newspaper columnist Drew Pearson and moderate Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver, 
and held a one-dally rally in a gymnasium near the bombed-out high school.  The 
evangelist also worked with an organization created by Pearson to raise funds to rebuild 
the high school, although he declined the columnist’s invitation to chair the group.66  The 
Clinton gathering was simultaneously a community rally and a church service.  Before 
Graham’s sermon, Pearson and area leaders recounted the bombing story and outlined 
their fundraising efforts.  Pearson praised the local school board for its “unflinching 
determination to go ahead and rebuild the school as a symbol of law and order.”67   
In his Clinton message, Graham voiced his social theology in all of its political 
ambiguity.  A racially-mixed crowd of 5,000 turned out to hear a sermon drawn from the 
Good Samaritan story and Christ’s commandment to love thy neighbor.  Christians, 
Graham emphasized in a recapitulation of his warning to Timmerman, “must not allow 
integration or segregation to become our gospel.”  Either position, he added, “minus God 
equals chaos.”  Reflecting his evangelical focus on the spirit-filled will, Graham argued 
that “[l]ove and understanding cannot be forced by bayonets. . . . We must respect the 
law, but keep in mind that it is powerless to change the human heart.”  His stress on the 
conversion moment and his dismissal of purely political solutions hardly represented a 
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rousing call to extend neighborly love beyond the sphere of daily interaction.  What truly 
distinguished the Clinton rally from the many other services Graham held that year, 
though, were the circumstances behind his appearance in this traumatized southern town.  
His decision to affirm Clinton in its response to segregationist violence carried a distinct 
socio-political message, encapsulated in a Knoxville News-Sentinel headline the 
following morning: “Evangelist Calls for Love, Law and Order” (emphasis mine).  While 
Graham later recalled opposition from the local White Citizens’ Council to his visit, he 
spoke at the time of his desire to demonstrate that most of Clinton’s residents were 
Christians and good citizens.68 
 The following year, the evangelist visited Little Rock, well after his initial pledge 
to travel there if invited by area ministers.  Although a small group of pastors had 
requested Graham’s presence the year before, all of the segregationist and most of the 
integrationist ministers in Little Rock had objected to the idea.69  Moreover, Little Rock 
congressman and Southern Baptist Convention President Brooks Hays, a racial moderate 
whose political future hung in the balance, cautioned the evangelist against visiting so 
soon after the violence at Central High School.  (After Hays lost his 1958 reelection bid, 
Graham addressed a banquet given in his honor.)70  Graham’s trip to Little Rock finally 
occurred in September 1959, when he held two rallies in the city’s downtown football 
stadium.  Continued tensions over integration likely contributed to his decision to forgo 
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earlier plans for a multi-week crusade in August.  The chair of the rally committee was 
influential Southern Baptist minister and racial moderate W. O. Vaught, whom Graham 
had introduced and praised at the Charlotte crusade for his work during the Little Rock 
crisis.  As in Clinton, Graham attempted to clarify his role as an evangelist and only that, 
but could not escape the political implications of his visit.  The desegregated nature of the 
rallies had been well-publicized, and questions remained about how much security 
segregationist Governor Orval Faubus and the Little Rock police force would provide for 
the services.  These concerns were pressing because the Little Rock Citizens Council had 
launched its own crusade against the evangelist.  According to Citizens Council chaplain 
Wesley Pruden, something of a celebrity among the massive resistance set, the group 
distributed 40,000 fliers attacking the integrationist agenda of both Graham and the 
ministers who had invited him.  In making the case for Graham (and, by implication, the 
case against Faubus), the liberal Arkansas Gazette emphasized the evangelist’s southern 
identity: “Billy Graham has preached the gospel on every continent and in the isles across 
the sea, but his heart, as he has said, has remained in his native South.”  The editorial 
reflected what two sociologists called the “exaggerated southerner technique,” a strategy 
moderate and liberal southern ministers employed to accentuate their regional 
credentials.71  Graham himself utilized this strategy on numerous occasions.  
 Even though Graham downplayed the racial aspect of the Little Rock rallies, he 
did not avoid racially-related comments altogether.  “I have said many times,” Graham 
reiterated in a press conference, “that nobody can cite the Bible as a defense for 
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segregation.”  The two services drew a combined crowd of around 50,000 and featured 
no racial incidents, although fear of violence likely depressed the overall attendance.  A 
glowing report written for the BGEA emphasized that the rally united people “not as 
integrationists or segregationists, but as Christians.”  In one of his sermons, Graham 
urged the audience to “obey constitutional authority as long as it doesn’t interfere with 
the worship of God.”  Addressing the generic sinner, Graham implied that regenerated 
hearts should lead to renewed social consciences, as well: “When a moral issue comes up 
you don’t really stand up for what you know is right.  You’re spiritually dead.”72 
 More striking than Graham’s occasional comments on race were the ways in 
which his visit served the interests of city boosters seeking to revive the image of Little 
Rock.  That image had been further tarnished only days before the rally, when 
segregationists dynamited the city’s school board headquarters.  The bombings occurred 
just as public schools were re-opening following a year of forced closure by Faubus.73  In 
the case of one recognizable Little Rock citizen and Graham supporter, Jimmy Karam, 
the rallies helped to resuscitate his own status.  To label Karam mercurial would be to 
give him too much credit.  A Little Rock clothier, friend of Faubus, and former associate 
of the Urban League whom bystanders had identified as a supervisor of the 1957 violence 
at Central High School, Karam was rough-edged and opportunistic, yet desperate to 
revise his well-earned reputation as a thug.  Only months before his antics at Central 
High School, a thoroughly non-religious Karam had attended Graham’s 1957 New York 
crusade, which he claimed had exerted no effect on him.  By early 1959, however, Karam 
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had come under the influence of W. O. Vaught, pastor of the most prominent Baptist 
church in Little Rock, who guided him into the faith.  Karam became a prominent 
sponsor of the Graham visit and continued to support the evangelist in subsequent 
decades.  During the Little Rock rallies, the evangelist and the convert visited four of the 
bombing suspects in jail.  Karam’s story made the pages of Time magazine, as did the 
fact that, while he recanted his role as a segregationist rabble rouser, he declined to state 
whether he personally still supported Jim Crow.74  The Little Rock rallies, alas, did not 
net even an ambiguous racial conversion from Faubus, who professed to admire Graham 
and who had also attended the New York crusade (likely with Karam).  During the one 
Little Rock service Faubus attended, he arrived late and was momentarily forced to sit on 
the stadium’s concrete stairs.  A photograph in the strongly anti-Faubus Arkansas Gazette 
shows him searching for a seat while a young black male, sporting sunglasses, sits 
comfortably in front of the pacing governor.  According to one report, Graham and 
Karam paid a discreet visit to the gubernatorial mansion that day.75 
 To Little Rock boosters, most of whom opposed Faubus, the socio-political 
meaning of the rallies centered on “law and order,” a term the editorial page of the 
Arkansas Gazette had readily invoked when arguing for obedience to court desegregation 
orders.  The paper’s more conservative counterpart, the Arkansas Democrat, invoked the 
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same slogan in a political cartoon published the week of the rallies.  The cartoon showed 
three banners flying over downtown Little Rock; one announced the Graham rallies, 
another announced a contemporaneous meeting of the Shriners, and the final flag 
declared the “Triumph of Law and Order.”76  As historians of the Little Rock crisis have 
shown, what ultimately swayed many business and civic leaders to support school 
desegregation was opposition to segregationist mob violence and its debilitating effects 
on the image of the city.  Their solution was to embrace law and order.77  No less 
malleable than any other civic virtue, the slogan there stood for moderation: obedience to 
constitutional authority, but not support for any specific reform or protest agenda.  In the 
context of Little Rock and Clinton, law and order became a rallying cry for the very type 
of decency Graham affirmed when he called for good citizenship and racial tolerance, 
casting those values as fruits of the conversion moment.  In doing so, he tapped into a 
national, as well as regional, discourse of moderation.  Two years earlier, Life magazine 
had described Arkansas Gazette editor Harry Ashmore as part of a “fifth column of 
decency” and opened an editorial praising Eisenhower’s decision to employ federal 
troops with the premature declaration, “Law and Order have returned to Little Rock.”78  
The rallies themselves, since they occurred without incident in spite of vociferous 
opposition from segregationist activists, offered evidence that Little Rock had achieved a 
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degree of law and order.  Graham appeared more than aware that his visits buttressed the 
interests of those moderates who, as he declared elsewhere, would assuredly triumph if 
only other southerners would cease resorting to “flag waving, inflammatory statements 
and above all, violence.”  The politics of decency might also triumph if more people 
knew of its existence.  “The newspapers of America and the world have carried stories of 
violence and trouble on the front pages about Little Rock,” Graham declared during the 
altar call of the final service.  “I would like to challenge them to carry this story.”79   
 As both the Columbia and Little Rock rallies revealed, Graham’s actions and 
statements in support of improved race relations and desegregation garnered growing 
criticism from hardline segregationists.  Governor Timmerman, however, remained 
exceptional as an elected official willing to castigate him on record.  Most of the public 
reaction against the evangelist came from grassroots organizations, including the Ku 
Klux Klan, from whom Graham claimed to receive “incredibly obscene letters.”  By 
1957, Klan leaders had added Graham to their attention-grubbing list of targets, labeling 
him a “nigger lover” and (following a freak injury he suffered as the result of an 
aggressive farm animal) declaring, “God bless the ram that butted him down the hill.”80  
A smaller amount of opposition came from nominally more respectable white 
southerners, mostly from the Deep South.  Independent or non-mainline fundamentalist 
groups in the South, such as the Carolina Baptist Fellowship and supporters of Bob Jones 
University, represented one such source of criticism.81  They chafed at Graham’s 
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increasing willingness to cooperate in his crusades with non-evangelical groups, but also 
objected to his positions on race.  Like Timmerman, these and other critics attacked 
Graham for “betray[ing]” his “homeland” by entering into “racial politics” at the expense 
of his spiritual duties.  “A lot of the good people of the Deep South have been heading for 
Heaven for a long time, and they are going to get there whether or not [Graham] likes it,” 
editorialized the Selma (AL) Times-Journal.  “Billy Lost South When He Jumped To 
Politics,” read the title of another hostile editorial.82 
Yet clearly Graham had not lost the whole of the white South.  Even outspoken 
segregationists remained split in their responses to the evangelist.  While many 
fundamentalists, in addition to professional segregationists like John Kasper, felt few 
restraints in dismissing Graham or challenging him to debates, other Jim Crow partisans 
approached him with relative humility.  The evangelist “is personally a fine young man,” 
wrote a Charlotte resident to Nelson Bell, despite being “misled on the negro question.”  
Another North Carolina critic wrote to Graham (in a letter copied to each southern 
governor) not “in a spirit of antagonism, but in the hope it will be taken as constructive 
criticism, not to be finding fault with the ministry, but to plead with [desegregationist 
ministers] before it is too late.”  If only Graham knew of Martin Luther King’s ties to the 
allegedly communist Southern Conference Educational Fund, wrote one professed 
admirer of the evangelist, he would surely denounce the civil rights leader.  Perhaps these 
correspondents did not view the evangelist as a race mixer at heart; at the very least, they 
were nonplussed that a southerner who shared so many of their theological leanings could 
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differ with them on this issue.  A South Carolina newspaper, for example, branded 
Graham “one of the strongest advocates for total integration,” while acknowledging his 
otherwise “wonderful work” as an evangelist.83  Most importantly, though, such hedged 
criticisms testified to the social and spiritual clout Graham possessed, even though he 
remained hesitant to employ this leverage in a forceful manner.  Even critics of his racial 
views often felt compelled to pay respects to this overwhelmingly popular minister of 
God.  Many other segregationists never felt compelled to criticize him at all.  
 Nelson Bell responded on behalf of his son-in-law to many of these segregationist 
critics.  Some of the charges coming from foes of Graham bordered on the absurd (e.g., 
that the evangelist was “preaching black supremacy”) and could easily be countered.  
Other correspondents simply requested clarification of his opinions on racial matters.   In 
answering these letters, Bell sometimes exceeded his apparent task of defending Graham, 
to the point where he misrepresented or exaggerated his son-in-law’s positions and 
injected his own.  As a racial conservative and a public defender of “voluntary 
segregation,” Bell possessed many ties with segregationist activists.  His biases surfaced 
in his letters, as Bell wrote to one Tennessean that blacks “must earn social recognition” 
and declared himself “dead against” Martin Luther King, Jr., “and the cause for which he 
stands.”  In a 1958 letter, dated well after Graham’s piece in Ebony, Bell declared that 
“Billy does not believe in integration any more than you and I do.”  When insisting on 
Graham’s opposition to “forced integration,” Bell never once acknowledged his son-in-
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law’s public support for moderate anti-Jim Crow legislation and obedience to judicial 
rulings on civil rights.84  While Graham could not be mistaken for a civil rights activist, 
he placed much ideological and theological, if not always spatial, distance between 
himself and his southern segregationist peers during the latter half of the 1950s. 
 
The Parameters of Decency 
Graham’s overall lack of willingness to discuss racial matters in terms other than 
general principles certainly left him open to such misinterpretations.  His emphasis on 
salvation as the starting point for all meaningful social change—a major theme of 
evangelical universalism—led him to focus primarily on the macro picture of 
Christianizing society and the micro picture of neighborly love, all the while eschewing 
the messier middle space of protests and legislation, the very stuff from which political 
change usually derives.  His perspective also allowed him to cite his evangelistic 
priorities when refusing to directly identify his crusades with the “social issue” of racial 
justice.  Pleas for Graham to speak more voluminously about racial issues or to intervene 
more actively in the South continued to come not only from white intellectuals, such as 
Reinhold Niebuhr and leading southern liberal James McBride Dabbs, but also from 
African-American clergymen and newspaper editorialists, many of whom responded 
favorably to Graham’s initial criticisms of desegregation.  The evangelist, wrote one 
black newspaper in 1955, “may lose a few of his friends in his own dear Southland 
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because of his stand on segregation but he won’t lose his soul.”  Two years later, a group 
of black ministers from Raleigh-Durham asked Graham to come “back to our state to tear 
down . . . every vestige of segregation and discrimination born of our prejudices”—a 
request he did not take up.85  In correspondence that same year, Martin Luther King, Jr., 
similarly urged the evangelist to “see your way clear to conduct an evangelistic crusade 
in one of the hard-core states in the deep south,” where the “impact of such a crusade 
would be immeasurably great.”86  With the exception of two rallies held on federal 
property and a few appearances in northern Florida, however, Graham largely avoided 
that part of the South until his 1964 visit to Birmingham. 
The letter from King arrived soon after the civil rights leader had delivered an 
invocation at Graham’s heavily publicized 1957 New York City crusade.  The early 
contact between Graham and King revealed both the potential and the limits of 
evangelical universalism.  Around the time of the 1955-1956 Montgomery bus boycott, 
they commenced what evolved into a mostly cordial and, at times, consultative 
relationship.  As they grew closer, King asked the evangelist to call him “Mike,” a birth 
name used mostly by black intimates.  As scholar Edward L. Moore has shown, their 
common southern background and status as Baptist ministers provided them with an 
important bond.  Moreover, at least by 1957, they stood as the leading spokespersons for 
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their respective presumed causes: evangelism and civil rights.  During a time when King 
still sought recognition from moderate whites (including Nixon) and when Graham had 
promised the president he would consult with southern ministers about the race issue, 
their paths inevitably intersected.87  Eisenhower may even have recommended that 
Graham contact King.88  The evangelist spoke highly of King from an early date, 
declaring in an April 1957 interview in the New York Times Magazine that the civil rights 
leader was “setting an example of Christian love” in the area of race relations.  King soon 
accepted an invitation to give an invocation during the New York crusade.  In an eloquent 
prayer, he called for liberation from “the dungeons of hate” and “the paralysis of 
crippling fear” in order to create a “brotherhood that transcends race or color.”89   
Afterwards, King added Graham to the list of southern white moderates and 
liberals with whom he corresponded.  With intentionally flattering prose, King praised 
the evangelist for applying the message of the gospel to race, since Graham “above any 
other preacher in America can open the eyes of many persons on this question.”  
Graham’s southern background, the civil rights leader suggested, gave his message 
“additional weight.”  The following summer, however, King wrote with concern about 
reported plans for Price Daniel, a segregationist and evangelical Christian running for 
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reelection as governor of Texas, to introduce Graham at an evangelistic rally in San 
Antonio.  The event was to occur one day before the state Democratic primary.  Either 
disassociate yourself from Daniel, King urged Graham, or at least “make crystal clear 
your position on this burning moral issue.”  Support for a segregationist would severely 
hamper Graham’s influence among blacks, he added.  In a hasty and sharp reply to King, 
BGEA associate Grady Wilson disavowed any political motivation on Graham’s part.  
“Even though we do not see eye to eye with [Daniel] on every issue,” Wilson snapped, 
“we still love him in Christ, and frankly, I think that should be your position not only as a 
Christian but as a minister of the gospel of our risen Lord.”  Wilson then added that 
Graham had gladly invited King to New York City despite the “scores” of critical letters 
he had consequentially received.90  For Graham (who almost certainly would have 
responded to King more cordially) and for Wilson, evangelistic priorities trumped matters 
of social concern, and Daniel’s segregationist politics did not by definition undermine his 
Christian loyalties.  Daniel’s status as an elected official only strengthened their opinion.  
The service proceeded as planned in San Antonio, where God told a non-segregated 
crowd of 30,000 that God judges individuals by their hearts, not their skin colors.  Daniel 
went on to victory; he may even have benefited from the public complaints about the San 
Antonio service by U. S. Representative Adam Clayton Powell, who had also contacted 
the evangelist.91  The relationship between King and Graham vacillated between mostly 
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private warmth and occasional public frostiness into the 1960s, when the ideological and 
theological differences between them widened even further. 
Graham’s encounters with liberal Protestants were likewise less tense than they 
would become a decade later.  Here, the much-publicized criticism he received from 
renowned theologian Reinhold Niebuhr served as an exception proving the rule.  On the 
cusp of the 1957 New York City crusade, Niebuhr, a professor at Union Theological 
Seminary and a leading liberal anticommunist, dismissed Graham’s social ethic as 
“pietistic individualism” and “moralism,” irresponsible atavisms in light of the 
complexities of the nuclear age.  The “evangelical perfectionism” inherent in Graham’s 
style of revivalism (i.e., his focus on the conversion moment as a source for personal 
regeneration) represented a simplistic and potentially escapist response to the challenges 
of the twentieth century, argued Niebuhr.  Thinking exclusively in terms of saving souls 
ignored the gravity of “collective evil.”92  Graham reacted politely to this criticism, yet 
yielded no theological ground to Niebuhr.93 
Niebuhr, however, grew significantly more charitable toward Graham when the 
topic turned to race, going no further than to urge the evangelist to address the matter 
more extensively in his sermons.  At the time their views on desegregation were closer 
than either would have likely admitted.  Despite their many theological differences (not 
to mention their political, cultural and stylistic ones), they responded with striking 
similarity to the Brown decision, favoring gradual implementation of desegregation 
rooted in respect for the rule of law.  Niebuhr, who took pride in his realist gravitas, was 
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only slightly less skeptical of legislative solutions than the evangelist.  Their gradualist 
positions derived from differing emphases on the individual: for Graham, a stress on 
individual conversions and human relationships over policy prescriptions; for Niebuhr, a 
profound caution regarding the ability of individuals to avoid social evils larger than 
themselves.  Niebuhr’s significantly more incisive pessimism about group and individual 
behavior ironically led him to a place similar to Graham’s often reflexive optimism about 
human regeneration.  They both worried about the adverse effects of legally coerced 
justice, and their perspectives tended toward caution when confronted with the mobs 
surrounding Central High School.94  They shared their concerns with many other white 
intellectuals and Protestant leaders.95   
Graham’s relationship with King, who saw Graham as a potential ally of sorts, 
and with Niebuhr, who thought the evangelist warranted a pointed critique more than a 
wholesale dismissal, suggested the particular theological, social, and ideological space 
the evangelist occupied during the latter half of the 1950s: an alternately interventionist 
and hamstrung position of moderation.  Their interest in Graham also indicated the 
heightened expectations surrounding his emergence as a regional leader.  A range of 
figures—including a segregationist congressman, in Boykin, and an emerging civil rights 
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leader, in King—clearly thought the evangelist could play an important role as a racial 
mediator in the region.  Graham, in other words, had options; he could engage the race 
issue on his own terms.  To the pleasure of Eisenhower and to the disappointment of 
others, the type of role he chose in the South reflected his evangelical social ethic, as well 
as his political leanings.  While his gradualist views resembled the opinions of many 
white moderates, his social location gave him distinctive leverage.  As an evangelist 
safely removed from the worlds of filibusters and picket lines, yet possessing clear access 
to their organizers, Graham could selectively intervene in his home region, taking into 
account his evangelistic priorities, his personal politics, and his wariness of risking public 
criticism.  His chosen leadership role during the latter half of the 1950s shaped the 
remainder of his engagements with both the Civil Rights Movement and the larger 
political trajectory of the South.   
Graham’s rarefied position, however, did not lack some socio-political punch.  
Boykin, King, and others were wise to seek his services.  His stature and basic message 
of racial decency made him capable of unique service to the region, especially to regional 
boosters.  During Eisenhower’s second term, as the vogue of racial moderation 
compounded with each Clinton and Little Rock, Graham was particularly well-positioned 
to lend legitimacy to the forces of civil, if ill-defined, caution.  His desegregated meetings 
served as foils for, and alternatives to, the likes of Faubus and Timmerman, while 
simultaneously circumventing the thorny details of school desegregation that had 
spawned massive resistance in the first place.  Graham’s appeals to evangelical 
universalism and its secular corollary, the politics of decency, carved out critical space to 
the left of ardent segregationists and to the right of civil rights backers, and more 
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ambiguously, assisted efforts to rehabilitate the South’s image.  In Clinton and Little 
Rock, Graham appealed to neighbor-love, as well as law and order—messages sadly 
missing from so much of the public discourse of the white South.  At the same time, he 
defended his region with striking consistency, suggesting that racist demagogues did not 
speak for the true South, which he intended to showcase in his rallies.  For the time being, 
the moderate white South could assert itself merely by proving what it was not: the mob 
in Little Rock or the bombers in Clinton.  Likewise, Graham could easily condemn 
extremists on the right while responding hardly at all to the supposed radicals on the 
other end of the political spectrum.  He could describe himself as a foe of Jim Crow and 
as a friend of racial tolerance, an opponent of racial violence and a supporter of obeying 
the law—and leave it at that.   
This moment of moderation began to fade during the first half of the 1960s, when 
civil rights activism, rather than resistance to school desegregation, grabbed the 
headlines.  The divisive issue of civil disobedience moved to the forefront, requiring 
national and southern figures alike to take clearer positions on the relationship between 
the law, justice, and—for Graham—faith.  With Graham’s answers, the existing 
discordance between appeals to evangelical universalism and exhortations to the beloved 
community, between the lyrics of “Just as I Am” and those of “We Shall Overcome,” 
grew more strained.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
“ANOTHER KIND OF MARCH” 
 
During the past week there have been racial incidents in many areas of the United States.  
People are marching for what they believe to be their rights.  However, here in 
Montgomery, Alabama, we have witnessed another kind of march.  In my opinion this 
march in Montgomery is even more significant, more constructive, and more 
revolutionary than the other marches we have read about in other parts of the country. 
 
Billy Graham1 
 
I have been holding demonstrations for fifteen years, but in a stadium where it is legal. 
 
Billy Graham2 
 
Billy Graham’s racial moderation had made him useful, in differing ways, to both 
President Eisenhower and Martin Luther King, Jr., during the latter half of the 1950s.  
When the Civil Rights Movement reached a climax during the mid-1960s, Lyndon 
Johnson similarly viewed the evangelist as an ideal racial mediator in the South.  To King 
and other civil rights leaders, though, Graham’s reputation by then had begun a decline 
from which the evangelist would never fully recover.  In the summer of 1960, Graham 
and King flew together from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to attend 
the annual meeting of the Baptist World Alliance.  At some point, the two ministers 
discussed their respective high-profile roles as evangelist and activist.  In Graham’s 
telling, they had already agreed to bless each other’s unique sphere of influence—one 
                                               
1
 AP statement, undated [June 1965], Billy Graham Center Archives (BGCA), CN 506, Box 8, 
Folder 7 (8-7). 
 
2
 Birmingham News, 26 April 1965. 
  113 
marching in the streets, the other preaching in the stadiums—and, at Rio, King told his 
fellow Baptists that the evangelist’s endeavors in the South had made his own efforts 
easier.  Their work, Graham has conveniently asserted ever since, was complementary.3   
The evangelist’s interpretation would have come across as somewhat less startling 
in the context of 1960, when school desegregation remained stalled and the Eisenhower 
administration lacked an executive agent officially in charge of civil rights matters.  Even 
as the sit-in revolution began spreading throughout the South that year, Graham and King 
arguably held more in common than not on racial matters, especially in the context of 
their home region.  The remaining election year brought their different stations into 
greater relief, however.  King, about whom the evangelist had never uttered a public 
word of criticism, was already identified with boycotts and other non-violent forms of 
protest, but not yet with the significantly more controversial tactic of civil disobedience.  
Later that summer, he participated in his first sit-in, setting off a chain of judicial 
retribution that led to a stint in a rural Georgia prison and intervention by Robert 
Kennedy on his behalf.4  Graham, trying desperately and only somewhat successfully to 
avoid a public endorsement of Richard Nixon, sequestered himself in Europe for the 
remainder of the summer.  During the first three years of the 1960s, the evangelist kept a 
comparatively low domestic profile and largely avoided the South, expanding into South 
America the appeal he had already cultivated in Europe, Asia, and Africa.  At home, he 
addressed the constitutional status of school prayer as much as any other matter.   
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As civil rights activists began to adopt more direct strategies and subsequently 
encountered violence that made Clinton and Little Rock pale in comparison, though, 
Graham shifted his attention back to the race problem.  His arguments paralleled those he 
had made during the school desegregation crisis of the late 1950s, only now he more 
specifically targeted civil rights activists for censure.  He publicly questioned the 
prudence of their tactics, ominously alluded to subversive elements within the Civil 
Rights Movement, and routinely called for King and others to eschew protests in favor of 
dialogue and the legislative process (even though he elsewhere doubted the effectiveness 
of civil rights laws).  Focusing his energy on the White House and away from the streets, 
Graham tacitly aligned himself with the civil rights agenda of President Lyndon Johnson, 
who in turn influenced the course of his regional leadership.  When the evangelist 
returned to the Deep South following the passage of landmark civil rights legislation in 
1964, he revised the meaning of his own desegregated services, describing them as lawful 
alternatives not only to racial violence, as was the case in Clinton and Little Rock, but 
also to civil rights demonstrations, as seen in Birmingham and Selma. 
The mid-1960s represented the high point of Graham’s regional influence, when 
he facilitated the growth of a faith-informed, post-segregation public language and paved 
ground for a racially moderate Sunbelt South.  As the strategic relevance of the evangelist 
decreased in the estimation of King, it grew in the eyes of Johnson, who sought out the 
evangelist as a political ally and racial conciliator.  Graham did not fulfill all of Johnson’s 
expectations, yet he did pay three visits to racially tense Alabama in 1964 and 1965.  
During these visits, his most celebrated interventions in the South, he appealed to the rule 
of law, as well as the rule of grace.  While Graham and his southern booster collaborators 
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worked to convince white southerners to accept the fated demise of legalized Jim Crow—
and, through desegregated evangelistic services, modeled one way to do so—they also 
steered the course of social change away from the more substantive goals of civil rights 
activists.  The moderate and, occasionally, progressive forces of law and order (so 
distinct and decent when contrasted with a George Wallace or a Bull Conner) grew 
petulant in the face of civil rights protests and two-sided when confronted with urban 
riots.  Graham’s brand of demonstrations highlighted the better part of the white South, 
but also foreshadowed the Nixonian politics of the “silent majority.” 
 
Different Dreams 
 Within popular evangelical historiography, a mythology of sorts has emerged 
seeking to equate the work of Graham and King on behalf of racial justice.  “Billy 
Graham Had a Dream,” reads the title of one treatment of the evangelist’s efforts to 
combat racism.5  Such a development threatens to obscure the significant distinction 
between those ministers who marched and those who did not.  Part of a larger 
conservative effort to invoke the legacy of King, this misleading equivalency has drawn 
sustenance from the residue of understandable civil rights-era dreams about what a King-
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Graham alliance might have accomplished.6  The interpretation first received popular 
dissemination in 1979 with the publication by Graham’s authorized biographer of a letter 
from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan to the evangelist.  “You and Rev. King,” wrote 
the Democrat and advisor to President Richard Nixon, “more than any two men—and, 
surely, with God’s help—brought your own South out of that long night of racial fear and 
hate.”  Graham’s autobiographical recounting of his relationship with King has 
contributed to the mythology, as well.7 
 A closer look at King and Graham does reveal some keen commonalities between 
them, but ultimately exposes the fundamental differences between Graham’s evangelical 
universalism and King’s prophetic realism.  By the late 1950s, the two had commenced a 
mostly cordial, consultative relationship.  Following King’s appearance at the 1957 New 
York City crusade, he and Graham held several meetings, leading to momentary visions 
among King associates about a joint crusade that might eventually penetrate even the 
Deep South.  Graham’s continued willingness to associate with Christian segregationists, 
such as Governor Price Daniel of Texas, soon put an end to such hopes, although King 
told a Canadian television audience in 1959 that Graham had taken a “very strong stand 
against segregation.”  As historian Taylor Branch has shown, moreover, King drew early 
inspiration for his own efforts from the example of the tightly coordinated, strategically 
targeted crusades of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (BGEA).  Most likely 
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with the encouragement of the evangelist, the Graham team willingly shared their trade 
secrets and public relations expertise with representatives from King’s Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC).  Meanwhile, the King-Graham friendship (a word 
befitting the first half-decade of their association) remained mostly a private one.8  
The 1960 Rio conference was both the high point of their relationship and the 
point of no return for their differences.  At the international gathering of Baptist leaders, 
Graham organized a banquet in honor of King and invited Southern Baptist leaders to 
attend.  Either in Rio or during a layover in Puerto Rico, the two found occasions for 
extended conversation.  At the time, all Graham recounted from their talks was his effort 
to sell King on Richard Nixon.  Graham soon advised Nixon to meet with King.9  
Subsequently, however, the evangelist’s memories of Rio have produced a quote from 
King that now stands as Exhibit A in the case for their ultimate complementarity.  
Graham’s autobiography quotes the following words of advice given by King: 
You stay in the stadiums, Billy, because you will have far more impact on 
the white establishment there than you would if you marched in the 
streets.  Besides that, you have a constituency that will listen to you, 
especially among white people, who may not listen so much to me.  But if 
a leader gets too far out in front of his people, they will lose sight of him 
and not follow him any longer.10 
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The first two published versions of this directive reverse the flow of those words, with 
Graham remembering a proposal to King to “let me do my work in the stadiums, Mike, 
and you do yours in the streets.”11  A subsequent source offers an earlier point of origin 
for similar words, the 1957 New York City crusade, but attributes the comments to 
King.12  The civil rights leader may well have privately affirmed or uttered sentiments to 
this effect, and his purported advice undoubtedly contained elements of strategic truth.  In 
a more reliable quote taken from the Rio banquet held in his honor and quoted by the 
BGEA as early as 1965, King praised “the stand Billy Graham has taken in the South 
against racial segregation,” a position without which “my work would have been much 
more difficult.”13  In the end, Graham likely would not have chosen any other course than 
the one he recalled King endorsing; doing so would have entailed a major departure from 
Graham’s social theology.  King was almost certainly aware of these parameters. 
Regardless of the origins of the remembered advice to or from Graham, it 
contained different implications in the context of 1957 or 1960 than during the latter part 
of the civil rights era.  During the former period, King needed mainstream American 
leaders (with southerners being particularly ideal candidates) to make the basic case for 
desegregation and racial justice.  Graham could contribute to this important, if broadly 
defined, task through his crusades, as well as through his private meetings with southern 
religious and political leaders.  As the Civil Rights Movement gained momentum and 
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increased in ambitions, however, King sought support both for his tactics and for specific 
civil rights legislation.  He found such backing neither from the eight white clergy to 
whom he addressed his famous “Letter from Birmingham City Jail” nor from Graham. 
 Occurring on the cusp of this transition, the Rio gathering ultimately signaled a 
point of departure for King and Graham more than a pact of alliance between them.  
Contrary to the suggestion of one scholar, whatever influence King exerted on Graham 
preceded the era of Birmingham and Selma.14  Four months after the Rio gathering, as the 
sit-in movement spread to his hometown of Charlotte, Graham conceded the propriety of 
using “every legal means to protest” injustice, but added that Christians have a duty to 
obey the law.  His comments followed a public affirmation by King of the right to 
disobey “unjust laws.”15  In the midst of the campaigns in Birmingham and Selma, the 
evangelist continued to call King one of his “personal friends” and to lend organizational 
and public relations counsel through back-door channels.16  By apparent coincidence in 
1962, they flew on the same plane from Miami to Chicago, where Graham was beginning 
a crusade.  Their disembarkation together created an opportunity to pose for a well-
circulated Chicago Tribune photograph, which has been misidentified as deriving from 
the 1957 New York City crusade.17  At the same time, Graham publicly criticized King’s 
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strategies and periodically called for a halt to demonstrations.  These criticisms carried 
more weight in the headlines than did professions of friendship. 
 The primary explanation for Graham’s departure from King was the evangelist’s 
opposition to civil disobedience as a mechanism for achieving social change.  The 
strategy of civil disobedience ultimately clashed with his obvious preference for 
transforming society by way of individual conversions and, even more strongly, with his 
Pauline respect for ordained authority.  He assumed that regenerated hearts normatively 
led to obedience to the law, not challenges to it.  “I believe in trying to change the law 
through the system,” the evangelist said during the height of anti-Vietnam War protests, 
“but when we go out and break one law, that leads to another law . . . until you teach a 
whole generation that it is all right to break laws.”18  As such, Graham quickly advocated 
prosecution of the whites who had attacked the Freedom Riders, yet remained 
unsupportive of civil rights activists who strategically violated, rather than tested, 
existing laws.19  Graham was decidedly unequipped and unwilling to address the 
psychology of racial terror.  The BGEA could offer helpful tips to the SCLC about how 
to coordinate transportation networks and schedule speaking events in order to gain 
maximum media exposure, yet the Graham team knew nothing about how to respond to 
bomb threats and belligerent sheriffs.  Graham’s respect for the law had never seriously 
been tested.  City authorities had welcomed him at each of his desegregated crusades 
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(even at Columbia), something that was obviously not true for demonstrators in Albany 
or St. Augustine. 
 While Graham seemingly had few bones to pick with the general cause of civil 
rights and argued that ministerial participation in demonstrations was a matter of 
individual prerogative, his description of the Civil Rights Movement suggested more than 
a little sociological distance from it.20  Graham may have personally known King and 
other SCLC leaders, yet he did not begin to grasp the movement they represented and the 
struggles they faced.  When discussing civil rights activism, he often employed 
grandiosely neutral language, describing it (albeit, in such Deep South states South 
Carolina and Alabama) as a “great social revolution” that had served to “arouse the 
conscience” of the nation.21  At times, these terms of abstraction evolved into discomfort  
or even outright opposition.  With each new landmark campaign—be it Birmingham 
(1963), Mississippi Freedom Summer (1964), or Selma (1965)—Graham called for a 
cessation of protests.  Under the influence of Federal Bureau of Investigation head J. 
Edgar Hoover, an obsessive opponent of civil rights who routinely passed along to public 
figures classified intelligence skewed to prove the presence of communists in King’s 
inner circle, the evangelist voiced concerns about subversive left-wing influences within 
the Movement.22 
 Graham’s criticism of the Civil Rights Movement inevitably spread to King 
himself.  In April 1963, during the height of the Birmingham demonstrations and amid 
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controversies over the city’s mayoral election, Graham urged his “good personal friend” 
King to “put the brakes on a little bit.”  The evangelist doubted whether most blacks in 
Birmingham actually supported the protest movement and worried that continued 
demonstrations would hinder the influence of white southern moderates, such as 
newspaper editors Ralph McGill and Harry Golden.23  The “brakes” line drew official 
censure from SCLC and the Fellowship of Reconciliation.24  Judging from the BGEA’s 
comprehensive clippings files, the statement represented a turning point for how many 
black newspapers and the most conservative portion of the white southern press 
separately responded to Graham.  In 1960, when some white southern papers criticized 
the evangelist for his suggestion that racism damaged the image of the nation, a 
columnist for the Chicago Defender, a famous black newspaper, praised him as “a 
powerful friend” who was “not a gradualist,” while a Norfolk Journal & Guide writer 
urged him to “[c]ome home” and witness to the white South.25  Three years later, the two 
groups exchanged positions.  Even though the “brakes” line resembled editorial positions 
taken by such national publications as Time and the Washington Post, it ignited a long-
simmering fuse of anti-Graham sentiments among civil rights activists who had grown 
weary of his reflexively moderate views, which looked much less impressive in 
Birmingham than they had in Little Rock four years earlier.26  “We have had the brakes 
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on too long,” one such activist, Birmingham’s own Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, 
declared in response to Graham.27  The evangelist appeared to fit King’s stinging 
description in “Letter from Birmingham City Jail” (which preceded Graham’s comments 
by one day) of “the white moderate who is more devoted to ‘order’ than to justice; . . . 
who paternalistically feels that he can set the timetable for another man’s freedom.”28 
Graham only confirmed his new reputation as a roadblock to the Civil Rights 
Movement when he failed to attend the August 28, 1963, March on Washington, which 
occurred during the evangelist’s second crusade in Los Angeles.  Graham referred to the 
march, where King delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” address, in a manner 
vacillating between insensitivity and dismissal.  On the day of the rally, Graham 
prophesied that “one day there will be a march on Washington which will dwarf the civil 
rights demonstration and it will be in the name of God.”29  In a subsequent address to the 
segregationist-dominated Georgia state legislature, the evangelist said he agreed with 
King’s vision of interracial brotherhood, although legislation could not fulfill this 
dream.30  Elsewhere, he was more skeptical.  “Only when Christ comes again,” he was 
quoted as saying, “will the lion lie down with the lamb and the little white children of 
Alabama walk hand in hand with the little black children.”31  While Graham still called 
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King a friend and claimed to support his general goals, they clearly had grown 
uncomfortable with each other’s interpretation of the relationship between human and 
higher laws, as well as the role and responsibilities of ministers in public life.32  As King 
called out moderates, Graham returned the favor.  A decade apart in age and more than 
that in temperament and, increasingly, theology, their differences only widened when the 
evangelist began attacking King’s opposition to the Vietnam War.33 
  
Back in the White House 
 As Graham’s relationship with King declined, his relevance to President Lyndon 
Johnson grew in intensity and visibility.  The evangelist and the politician had known 
each other since the early 1950s, when they met through a mutual benefactor, Texas 
oilman Sid Richardson.  Although they kept in touch during the next ten years, when 
Johnson served as Senate majority leader before becoming vice president, their affinity 
for each other increased when Johnson assumed the presidency in November 1963.34  
(Graham and President John F. Kennedy had maintained a cordial, but cool relationship 
during the preceding three years.)35  Johnson was the type of Texan whom Graham 
admired.  Even though the evangelist’s politics were decidedly Nixonian, he held great 
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affection for the gregarious, social Johnson, whose style differed from the guarded, 
calculating Nixon.  According to Johnson aide Bill Moyers, the North Carolinian and the 
South Texan had “an almost visceral attraction to each other,” due in part to their shared 
upbringings in southern outposts and, as Johnson later admitted, their propensity for 
stoking each other’s ego.36  Graham saw Johnson as a churchgoer with a Southern Baptist 
background, while the president considered the evangelist a well-meaning, if sometimes 
inconsistent, ally. 
 With the election of Johnson in 1964, Graham momentarily halted his support for 
Republican presidential candidates, which had continued through the 1960 election.37  As 
such, the evangelist paralleled the portion of the white-collar, metropolitan electorate in 
the South that had voted for Eisenhower and Nixon in previous elections, but returned to 
southern Democratic loyalties in 1964.  That year, the Republican Party failed to attain a 
majority of southern metropolitan voters for the first time since 1948—a development 
attributable to an increase in black voter registration, but also to the distaste many white 
moderates held for the GOP candidate, Barry Goldwater.38  During the election year, 
Johnson remained mindful of how Graham might assist his efforts to appeal to moderates 
throughout the nation.  In May, Johnson pondered attending a North Carolina fundraiser 
for the Kennedy Presidential Library for which Graham was scheduled to deliver the 
keynote address.  The president was responding to an inaccurate rumor of a possible 
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appearance by Jacqueline Kennedy, then still in a period of mourning.  Her presence, 
along with that of the evangelist, would give the event enough appeal for Johnson to 
consider making a brief statement on behalf of the fund-raising campaign.  He hoped to 
“circularize the hell out of it, even run it as an ad on what I say.”  The president 
ultimately decided not to attend the event, where before a crowd of 10,000 people 
Graham praised John F. Kennedy for his efforts to foster “racial understanding.”39   
 Much to the consternation of Johnson and his staff, however, more than a few 
Republicans desired to align Graham with their candidate in 1964.  Some even longed to 
make him the GOP nominee.  Starting at least a year before the election, right-wing 
activist and oil tycoon H. L. Hunt, a Republican and member of Graham’s home church 
in Dallas, touted the evangelist as the cure for the party’s woes.  Having similarly 
promoted General Douglas MacArthur in 1952, the eccentric, philandering billionaire had 
a history of sinking money into far-flung right-wing causes in a manner reminiscent of 
the present-day philanthropist Richard Mellon Scaife.40  Hunt was by no means the first 
person to become afflicted with Graham presidential fantasies.  (To cite one example, a 
scheme to draft him as an independent had surfaced among a group of southern 
fundamentalists in 1960.)41  Yet Hunt was the most determined of Graham’s suitors.  He 
was also the most connected to the evangelist, who visited him early in 1963.  Hunt, who 
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was closer to BGEA evangelist Grady Wilson than to Graham himself, wrote to Wilson 
in May 1963 regarding a possible Graham run against Kennedy.  “The Republican 
fortunes are looking up,” wrote the fanatical anticommunist, “but they truly do not have a 
logical candidate for President.”  Graham “would show up favorably in the polls,” Hunt 
suggested, if only the evangelist would insert more “calls for Freedom” (i.e., anti-
communism and anti-statism) in his columns.  Hunt appears to have viewed Graham as—
in the words of an action plan he passed along to Wilson—a “Prospect,” a potential 
candidate whom the GOP should secretly cultivate, without even the knowledge of the 
prospect himself.  The action plan listed the South as a region particularly ripe for 
Republican gains.  Other memos written by Hunt touted the political potential of an 
otherwise unnamed “Pastor Good.”  When Hunt’s ambitions found their way into a 
Dallas newspaper, he downplayed his interest in a Graham candidacy.  Soon, though, the 
story gravitated to U.S. News & World Report.42 
 The oilman’s machinations resurfaced dramatically in January 1964 when a well-
sourced writer for the Houston Press published an article, leaked by Hunt and later 
corroborated by Graham, declaring the willingness of the evangelist to consider a draft 
for the GOP nomination.  His likely opponent, of course, would be Johnson.  According 
to the article, which quickly traveled over the Scripps Howard newspaper circuit, interest 
came from at least three separate groups—one of which was undoubtedly Hunt himself, 
who had offered to bankroll the campaign—as well as several evangelicals close to 
Graham.  Party officials, who noted his popularity in the South and Midwest, had made 
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inquiries to the evangelist at least as early as his Los Angeles crusade of August 1963, 
three months after Hunt wrote to Wilson.  Graham, who was in Houston for a gathering 
of Protestant lay leaders when the story broke, did not immediately refute the article, 
which ran nationwide, and his delay allowed time for television anchor Walter Cronkite 
to mention the possible candidacy on the evening news.43   
 The following day, Graham moved to squelch the rumors.  Citing intense pressure 
from intimates, though, he acknowledged having considered a run for office.  In declaring 
his present unavailability, he reasserted his evangelistic priorities, as well as his political 
neutrality, noting that in previous years he had received similar inquiries from 
Democratic officials.44  Those inquiries, he did not say, had likely involved invitations 
from political conservatives to run for U.S. Senate seats in the overwhelmingly 
Democratic state of North Carolina.  In early 1964, Graham could plausibly invoke 
political neutrality because his political affiliation remained largely unknown, even 
though the betting money had him as a Republican lean.  Also, his budding friendship 
with Johnson, whom the evangelist had visited several weeks after the assassination of 
Kennedy, had yet to garner substantial media scrutiny.45  Graham would not advertise his 
status as a registered Democrat until the Nixon years, when he attempted to downplay the 
implications of his intimacy with the Republican president. 
 The short-lived and understaffed draft-Graham movement accentuated his 
perceived political utility (still, in Hunt’s eyes at least, as a candidate for the 
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anticommunist right), as well as his continued attraction to politics, and surely caught the 
attention of Johnson.  Word later surfaced during the GOP convention of a possible 
grassroots effort to promote Graham as Goldwater’s running mate.  According to political 
gossip columnist Walter Winchell, Hunt had promised to make that grass especially 
green for Goldwater if he could convince Graham to join his team.46  Years after the 
election, stories still swirled about secret overtures to the evangelist from Goldwater 
aides.47  Although these rumors likely all led back to Hunt, the president probably 
remained a bit anxious until election day.  Hope sprung eternal among Goldwater 
supporters that, in his heart, Graham knew who was right.  The evangelist claimed to 
have received “over one-million telegrams” on the cusp of the election (upwards of 
60,000 on November 2 alone, according to the Associated Press), the vast majority of 
which urged him to endorse Goldwater.  The telegrams bore all the signs of a well-
coordinated effort.48  Although unrealistic, a late endorsement from Graham might have 
helped legitimate a candidate battling charges of extremism, while also perpetuating 
Goldwater’s efforts to reach out to conservative Democrats in the South and elsewhere.  
Earlier memos from concerned Johnson staffers imply some cognizance of similar 
schemes, although Graham put to rest any worries when he accepted a strategically timed 
invitation, facilitated by Bill Moyers, to visit the White House one weekend before the 
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election.49  This was the second such visit intended, at least partly, to shore up his support 
for the president.50  It also occurred amid lingering political concerns over the arrest of 
Johnson aide Walter Jenkins on a “morals charge.”51  Over breakfast, Johnson happily 
advised Graham on how to describe his neutral position on the presidential race.52  A 
final cause for concern came only a few days afterwards (around the same time the 
deluge of telegrams commenced), when one of Graham’s daughters attended a Goldwater 
rally in Greenville, South Carolina, not far from Montreat.  The evangelist, whose father-
in-law was an active Goldwater backer, quickly reasserted his “strict neutrality” in the 
race.53  Goldwater “needed you as much as I did,” Johnson later told Graham, who 
publicly registered his opinion that the barrage of telegrams had resulted from an 
organized campaign.  The dreams of GOP loyalists aside, Johnson need not have fretted 
much about retaining the support of Graham, who informed the president after the 
election that he was “not only the choice of the American people—but of God.”54 
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 LBJ obviously found Graham a useful political ally—a link to both the angry 
South and the proverbial Middle America—in addition to being a valued friend and 
occasional confidante.55  The role he perceived for Graham extended beyond that of 
electoral symbol or pastoral peer, however.  Likewise, Graham’s support for Johnson, 
while undoubtedly rooted in their friendship, also reflected the comparatively moderate 
nature of his own politics during the mid-1960s.  The two remained for the most part 
aligned on a number of critical issues, including civil rights and the Vietnam War, and 
the president could count on Graham to support much of his agenda.  This fidelity was 
particularly important regarding civil rights, by far the most controversial agenda item 
during the first two years of the Johnson administration.  The president needed support 
from the few southern moderates who still had the ears of mainstream segregationists, but 
who had repudiated the politics of massive resistance.  Graham fit this bill. 
 Without specifically endorsing either the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, Graham supported the basic thrust of the administration’s civil rights 
agenda.  His basic understanding of socio-political equality squared with arguments 
Johnson employed in support of civil rights legislation and the larger programs of the 
Great Society.  “I believe when we speak of equality,” Graham wrote to a skeptical 
inquirer in 1966, “we refer to equal opportunity, equal rights, and equal chance for 
development.  Although we may never be equal, we all deserve the chance to advance 
and improve.”56  While the evangelist was on record as a backer of federal civil rights 
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legislation, the passage of which he appears to have thought inevitable, he almost always 
paired his support with a pointed invocation of evangelical universalism.57  “We need 
legislation, we need civil rights legislation,” he said in a statement released by the BGEA, 
“but it’s got to come from the heart.”58  Similar assertions that only personal conversions, 
not civil rights laws, would finally solve the race problem were easily misused by 
segregationist politicians, such as South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, who 
selectively cited the evangelist in one of his many fulminations against the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.59  Not long after that landmark bill had passed, Graham quoted liberal 
Senator Hubert Humphrey as saying to him, “Billy, legislation alone can’t do it.  It must 
ultimately come from the heart.”60  Graham soon urged Johnson to declare a national day 
of prayer regarding the race problem.61  During the Selma crisis of early 1965, which 
ultimately gave momentum to the Voting Rights Act, the evangelist released a 
statement—composed from a hospital bed in Honolulu, where he was suffering from a 
bronchial infection—stressing the “right to vote” of every citizen and offering a 
quintessentially moderate, if highly unrealistic, proposal for the president to bring both 
King and George Wallace to the White House for “a face-to-face discussion.”62  
Following Johnson’s nationally televised address in which he invoked the movement 
motto, “We shall overcome,” Graham effusively called it the “greatest speech on civil 
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rights of any president since Lincoln” before characteristically calling for a cessation of 
demonstrations.  With equal predictability, he emphasized that “a thousand civil rights 
bills will not ease the racial tension in America unless we have a spiritual renewal that 
will change our hearts and give us a new love for each other.”  At the same time, he 
spoke favorably of the pending Voting Rights Act.63 
 Endorsing specific legislation, however, was not Johnson’s primary aspiration for 
the evangelist in the policy realm.  Rather, the president hoped that Graham would assist 
with efforts to convince level-headed white southerners to peacefully accept 
desegregation laws.  The search for prophetic moderates, in fact, comprised a vital 
component of Johnson’s civil rights policy and received its most tangible expression in 
the Community Relations Service (CRS), a federal agency created to oversee the 
implementation of the Civil Rights Act in the South.  Modeled on existing human 
relations councils, the CRS was intended to mediate between white leaders and black 
activists.  Along those lines, a 1965 White House strategy memo, which pondered how to 
persuade white southerners to stop acquitting segregationists for crimes of racial 
violence, proposed  
an organized effort by Southern leaders whose integrity and love of the 
South cannot be questioned but who have the vision to see what can 
happen unless there are some changes.  These include men like Buford 
Ellington, LeRoy Collins, Luther Hodges, and others who, even though 
they hold ‘advanced views’ on human relations, still enjoy the confidence 
of conservative Southerners.  These men should plan a careful tour of the 
trouble spots of the South in which they will contact influential 
businessmen, professionals, and other community leaders who, when 
united, actually determine the fate of political leaders.  
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These figures, all of whom had close ties to Johnson, would inform the “Southern power 
structure” of the consequences of inaction, while also “persuading communities that 
murder is murder and must be handled as such.”64 
 Graham clearly fell into the category of the southern moderate who could still 
garner the respect of segregationist officials.  In his 1964 and 1965 visits to Alabama, he 
performed many of the duties later outlined in the memo.  Yet Johnson had originally 
sought an even more high-profile role for the evangelist.  Graham was apparently his top 
choice to chair the National Citizens Committee for Community Relations, a group of 
“influential citizens” created to assist the CRS “in obtaining compliance with the [Civil 
Rights] Act and in creating a better spirit of good relations in the country.”65  As a 
respected minister possessing regional cachet and lacking serious political baggage, 
Graham represented a logical choice for chair.  Moreover, Johnson had recently made a 
special appeal to Southern Baptists to accept the 1964 Civil Right Act.66  Graham likely 
discussed the position with the president before final passage of the legislation, around 
the same time Johnson was soliciting other members for the Citizens Committee.  In what 
would become a pattern during the Johnson years, Graham ultimately turned him down 
(as he would turn down several other formal or casual offers from Johnson), thus passing 
up perhaps his greatest opportunity for regional leadership outside of a crusade context.  
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However, he did accept a position on the 400-person Citizens Committee and promised to 
increase his evangelistic presence in the South.  “He simply said that he felt like he could 
do more good [through his evangelistic work],” Secretary of Commerce and North 
Carolinian Luther Hodges told Johnson, “and to tell you that he’s gonna try to have a 
crusade in St. Augustine and two or three other places in the South, including 
Mississippi, before long, and he thought this other [position] might detract from it.”  
“That may be,” Johnson replied laconically.  Graham soon wrote to Johnson justifying 
his decision and inviting the president to attend a crusade at any time.  The evangelist 
cited his busy schedule, as well as his belief that he could “contribute far more in the role 
of a preacher. . . . Certainly, the Civil Rights legislation needs to be undergirded by a 
moral and spiritual awakening.”  Johnson replied with an understanding letter and 
encouraged the evangelist and his wife to spend a night in the White House that summer.  
While Graham rarely mentioned his role in the Citizens Committee, he soon claimed that, 
“by and large the new civil rights law has been accepted by the people of the South.”67 
 Still, the evangelist found more than a few other ways to support the president.  
Johnson became the first sitting executive to attend a Graham crusade service (a 1965 
gathering in Houston) and the first to host the evangelist as an overnight guest at the 
White House.68  Moreover, Graham spoke in favor of the Organization of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) and, more controversially, defended the administration’s policy in 
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Vietnam.  Although the evangelist turned down an invitation to serve on the OEO 
advisory committee—a kind of citizens group designed to evaluate the centerpiece 
program of Johnson’s War on Poverty—he took the arguably more visible step of 
producing an antipoverty documentary with OEO director Sargent Shriver.  The film, 
titled Beyond These Hills, captured their helicopter visit to Avery County, North 
Carolina, an impoverished part of Appalachia not far from Montreat.  In the film and 
accompanying pamphlet, Graham offered a moderate conservative’s justification for the 
federal antipoverty program, citing relevant biblical passages and arguing that the OEO 
was not “sort of a handout.”  The evangelist, who earlier had called Shriver’s Peace 
Corps “godless,” now declared himself a “convert” to the War on Poverty and went so far 
as to testify in favor of anti-poverty legislation at a Capitol Hill luncheon.  The film was 
screened by a group of Democratic senators, including many southern conservatives, and 
received wide television and radio distribution throughout the South, its target audience 
and the region politically most resistant to the program.  “I believe this is the first and 
only time that Dr. Graham has consented to so endorse a domestic program of the United 
States Government,” Shriver crowed in a memo.69  This assertion may have been 
accurate, but only because of the evangelist’s tendency to avoid details and the equally 
technical distinction that his two Christmastime tours of Vietnam represented more of a 
blessing than an endorsement.  Privately, presidential aide Marvin Watson (a Southern 
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Baptist who would later serve on the BGEA board) paraphrased Graham as calling 
himself as an “all-out hawk” who wanted “to win quickly and get out.”70 
 Ultimately, when push came to shove, Graham readily marshaled his pastoral 
authority to defend the person of Johnson.  Vouching for the character of a given leader 
represented the ultimate trump card for the nominally nonpartisan and widely respected 
evangelist.  In comparison with his behavior during the subsequent Nixon presidency, 
though, Graham’s favorable public comments about Johnson were largely confined to 
matters of the president’s credentials and good intentions.  Despite supporting the civil 
rights and antipoverty programs of Johnson, the evangelist publicly criticized many 
aspects of mid-1960s liberalism, especially anything pertaining to criminal rights or 
prayer in school.71  His politics remained more in line with Nixon, to whom Graham later 
lent significantly more high-profile, as well as under-the-table, assistance. 
 
The Politics of Decency Comes to Alabama 
 Johnson did not protest Graham’s decision to forgo chairing the National Citizens 
Committee on Human Relations in favor of crusading in the Deep South.  Rather, he 
attempted to hold the evangelist to his word.  Two of Graham’s three mid-1960s 
interventions in Alabama came with the encouragement of Johnson, who viewed Graham 
as a conciliator in keeping with the CRS’s goal of “bring[ing] people together in 
constructive peaceful efforts.”72  The Alabama visits—a 1964 Easter rally in 
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Birmingham, an April 1965 tour of the state, and a crusade in Montgomery two months 
later—reprised many themes evident in Clinton and Little Rock.  In Alabama, though, the 
stakes were higher and the risks greater.  Graham’s visits came in the aftermath of civil 
rights demonstrations in Birmingham and Selma, two watershed moments of the Civil 
Rights Movement.  In place of activism, he substituted his brand of evangelical mediation 
of social change. 
 As the Civil Rights Movement grew in intensity and breadth, Graham himself 
grew more willing to exert influence on the nation’s domestic affairs.  In 1962, he 
ventured into the Deep South to hold a desegregated (and strikingly unpublicized) rally in 
Huntsville, Alabama, where a crowd of 35,000 heard him preach at the Redstone 
Arsenal.73  The rally, to be sure, took place on federal property outside of the jurisdiction 
of state segregation laws, as had the 1958 Columbia service.  By 1963, the BGEA had 
decided to dedicate the next two years to domestic crusades, citing “the moral, spiritual 
and racial problems” of the nation.74  The following year, Graham uncharacteristically 
used the term “integrated” when describing requirements for a proposed crusade in 
Atlanta; in a serialized autobiography published later in 1964, he returned to the less 
politicized “nonsegregated.”75  A few months later, the BGEA opened an office in 
Atlanta (from which all crusades would be run, even though the BGEA headquarters and 
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publishing operations remained in Minneapolis), in part because most team members 
resided in the South.76 
Graham also traveled to Birmingham in 1964.  Located two hours west of Atlanta, 
the city was disparagingly branded “Bombingham” and widely recognized as the most 
intransigently segregated large city in the nation.  It stood as a logical, if menacing, target 
for civil rights activists and, thereafter, for Graham himself.  As early as May 1963, amid 
the civil rights demonstrations that would prod Kennedy to introduce what became the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Graham declared his willingness to visit the city, provided he 
received the requisite invitation from the its evangelical ministers.  Within a few weeks, a 
local radio director publicly requested the evangelist to visit.77  An official biracial 
invitation from Birmingham ministers proved difficult to attain and only emerged when 
the public relations potential of a rally became more apparent.  In September 1963, after 
Graham had described the city as a symbol of violence in a crusade sermon telecast from 
Los Angeles, a distraught Birmingham television executive wrote to the evangelist 
lamenting this “unkind cut,” which would only encourage “misguided negroes” in their 
criminal demonstrations.  “Having so labeled our city and held it up for world censor 
[sic],” he wrote, “do you not feel that you are somewhat beholden to come and assist us 
with our problem?”78  Meanwhile, Catholic Bishop Joseph Durick, one of the eight 
clerics to whom King had drafted “Letter from Birmingham City Jail,” asked President 
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Kennedy to encourage the evangelist to hold an interracial meeting in Birmingham.79  
Both of these efforts occurred two days before the September 15 bombing of Sixteenth 
Street Baptist Church by segregationists, an event that killed four girls and decimated 
Birmingham’s remaining pretensions of moderation.  Graham soon reiterated his 
willingness to visit the city and apparently joined efforts to raise funds to rebuild the 
church.80  In Birmingham, white Episcopal minister John Turner helped to lead the local 
fundraising effort.  A racial moderate who held ties with the Graham team stretching 
back more than a decade, Turner became the driving force behind the effort to secure a 
biracial ministerial invitation to the evangelist, which arrived and was accepted by mid-
January 1964.81 
The rally had to weather a rocky period of planning.  In light of Birmingham’s 
well-earned reputation for violence, the event represented a legitimate risk on the part of 
Graham.  One concerned caller to the BGEA feared “a race riot” at the rally.  Hurlbert, 
who had pitched the idea of a crusade to Graham, wrote to the evangelist and stated 
bluntly that an integrated crusade was impossible.82  Arthur P. Cook, a Birmingham 
newspaper mogul who chaired the rally executive committee and who puffed the Graham 
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visit in his chain of local papers, was not inclined to disagree.  Aware of Graham’s 
seating policy, however, he chose to deny consciousness of the obvious.  “At no time,” he 
declared after the rally, “did I ever consider myself personally sponsoring an integrated 
meeting.”83  The rally executive committee contained at least two African Americans: 
insurance dealer and “Second Vice Chairman” of the rally John Drew, who had hosted 
King during the Birmingham campaign, and prominent Baptist minister J. L. Ware.  Both 
of them were pillars of Birmingham’s black establishment and possessed ties to moderate 
white leaders in the city.  The committee also included barbecue restaurateur Ollie 
McClung, a segregationist who headed the rally prayer committee.  Later that year, 
McClung challenged Title II of the Civil Rights Act, banning racial discrimination in 
public establishments, and lost a famous Supreme Court decision in December.84  Many 
committee members appeared less than enthusiastic about desegregating the service.  
(They would likely also have been unenthusiastic about Lyndon Johnson attending the 
rally, something the president reportedly considered doing, much to the horror of his 
Secret Service agents.)85  Graham’s motivations were entirely religious, the crusade 
backers conceded, yet his seating requirement came with “a good many problems.”  One 
of those problems was a legal challenge to the rally by the Jefferson County White 
Citizens Council, which unsuccessfully asked the Birmingham City Council to block the 
service.  In characteristic fashion, the Council preemptively absolved itself of 
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responsibility for any violence to come.  The rally committee ultimately rested its case 
for desegregated seating on legal grounds (the fact that the city had already authorized the 
integration of the rally site), as well as the equally compelling reality that Graham would 
not otherwise come to Birmingham.86 
Protestations aside, the March 29 Birmingham rally was by far the most 
desegregated of any Graham services previously held in the South.  An estimated 35,000 
people, slightly half capacity and containing similar numbers of blacks and whites, 
attended the Easter Day rally at Legion Field, a football stadium situated at the foot of an 
established black neighborhood bearing the tragic and telling nickname “Dynamite Hill.”  
A photo spread in the Birmingham News, along with photographs taken by the BGEA, 
revealed an integrated choir and thoroughly mixed seating patterns amid heavy security.  
Despite threats of violence, no incidents occurred during the heavily-secured service.  
The guests of honor included Mayor Albert Boutwell—a moderate in Birmingham, 
simply a segregationist in most other contexts—and University of Alabama football 
coach Paul “Bear” Bryant, then in the process of attaining legendary status.  J. L. Ware 
delivered the benediction.  Ware, who that morning had hosted the white editor of the 
BGEA’s Decision magazine at his church, was a moderate civil rights activist.  A rival of 
Fred Shuttlesworth, Ware had initially opposed King’s coming to Birmingham.  
Graham’s Sunday sermon eschewed emotive allusions to the city’s racial tensions.  
Although a pre-released sermon text mentioned bombs “thrown in the South against 
innocent people,” the spoken sermon contained more general references to “heart 
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trouble” and sin, which had “blinded our minds, hardened our conscience, and confused 
our judgment.”  In a radio address later that day, the evangelist discussed the “racial 
problem” more specifically, but classified it was a world issue “not limited to 
Birmingham . . . or to the southern part of the United States.”  According to the 
condescending lead of one local paper, the first respondent was an black woman whose 
“hat was an old black straw,” but whose smile “was as new as the Easter Day.”  Other 
descriptions of the rally were less dramatic, but no less affirming.  Ware identified the 
rally as a “turning point in changing the outlook and image of Birmingham into a city of 
peace, tranquility and prosperity for all people,” while Boutwell contended that Graham 
had made the city “an improved and better place in which to live.”87 
Not everyone emerged from the rally in good spirits.  The crowd total was 
actually a good thirty-thousand lower than what Cook had predicted.  In a wrap-up 
meeting of the executive committee, Cook blamed the attendance figure on fears of 
violence and cited plans by a states’ rights group to tear gas the stadium.  In a bizarre rant 
entered into the minutes, Cook proceeded to castigate critics of the rally, including Fred 
Shuttlesworth, extreme rightists, and even Black Muslims.  The Birmingham World, an 
African-American paper whose editor had taken offense when Cook did not personally 
invite him to a rally news conference, offered a notable reason to remain skeptical about 
the influence of the rally.  An editorial proposed that “twenty-five Negro policemen on 
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duty [at the service] would have been a better indicator of constructive [racial progress] 
than the seating arrangements.”88 
 Overall, though, the Easter rally was a momentary boon for Birmingham’s image, 
a fact city and rally leaders did not hesitate to tout.  Graham had predicted that the service 
would “create a new image for Birmingham,” making it “a symbol of love and harmony 
at the foot of the cross of Jesus Christ and at the open tomb of Jesus Christ.”89  The 
Birmingham News reflected less spiritual aspirations.  The city had “been commended, 
widely, in the nation’s press,” granting an opportunity to achieve a “harmonious 
condition of respect and mutual regard, one group of citizens for others.”  Newspapers 
around the nation described the rally as the largest interracial gathering in Alabama 
history, and headlines soon carried such messages as “Birmingham Bastion of 
Segregation Crumbling” and “Birmingham Giving Ground.”90  Morehouse University 
President Benjamin Mays, a renowned theologian who had criticized Graham during the 
segregated 1950 Atlanta crusade, called the rally “one of the most important things he has 
done in his whole career,” giving Birmingham a chance “to redeem its bad name.”91  
Respected Raleigh newspaper editor and white moderate Jonathan Daniels added another 
affirming editorial.92  The afterglow from the rally was bright enough for the Birmingham 
News to declare it “the most significant day of 1964” for the city.  “From the front pages 
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of newspapers such as New York Times and Washington Post . . . ,” wrote a publicly 
chipper Cook, who had invited members of the national press to attend a pre-rally press 
conference, “we now have a beachhead established.”  To the city sheriff, he wrote, “This 
is certainly something that we have all tried to gain for our city for a long time.”  Riding 
this momentum, the recently integrated Ministerial Association of Greater Birmingham 
petitioned Graham to hold a full crusade.93 
 Although Graham would not return to Birmingham for another eight years, he did 
visit other parts of Alabama one year later, holding rallies in Dothan, Auburn, Tuskegee, 
and Tuscaloosa during April 24-27, and then returning in June for a Montgomery 
crusade.94  He revisited the state at the request of Lyndon Johnson, who had supported 
(and may well also have approved) the Easter rally.  The president wrote Graham 
beforehand praising him for “doing a brave and fine thing for your country in your 
courageous effort to contribute to the understanding and brotherhood of the Americans in 
the South.”  In addition to the encouragement of Johnson, the evangelist received an 
overture from Tuscaloosa ministers, who believed a revival there would help “necessary 
social changes . . . come about more peacefully.”95  During the Alabama visits, Graham 
and his associates denied or avoided the connection between the president and his visit, 
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stressing to Alabamians and BGEA supporters the invitations received from local 
religious and civic leaders, black and white.96 
 Before and during these latter two visits to Alabama, Graham began casting his 
desegregated services as alternatives to civil rights demonstrations, a theme he had 
foreshadowed during his 1959 Little Rock rallies.  His comments about race became 
increasingly uniform as the civil rights crisis heightened.  At a Los Angeles press 
conference held two weeks before the March on Washington, the evangelist distributed 
copies of his Life, Reader’s Digest, and U. S. News and World Report articles on racial 
tolerance.  He later ordered the production of a flier detailing his contributions in the area 
of race relations.97  During the lead up to his Alabama visits, Graham characterized his 
habit of visiting southern cities in the aftermath of high-profile racial violence as a policy.  
“We try to get in there a little bit afterward to see if we can’t ring the healing message of 
the Gospel,” he told the New York Times.  He overtly cast himself as a southerner 
performing a mediating role, someone who “may have a little more influence than a man 
with a New England accent.”  For the moment, he said, “I have a voice in the South and I 
will try to provide the leadership I can.”  Still, he stressed that he was not traveling to 
Alabama “as a civil rights worker,” but rather “as a preacher of the gospel” for whom the 
simple act of holding desegregated services “conveys enough on the subject of race.”  
The evangelist made a conscious effort to distinguish himself from the activists who had 
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marched before him in Alabama.  “I have been holding demonstrations for 15 years,” 
Graham declared when announcing his Montgomery crusade, “but in a stadium where it 
is legal.”98  The interracial services in Alabama functioned as his alternative to King’s 
marches and strategies of civil disobedience, which, the evangelist feared, blurred the 
evangelical hierarchy of appeals to individual salvation over work for social change. 
 The Alabama rallies further accentuated the differences between evangelical 
universalism and liberal or prophetic approaches to civil rights.  In March 1965, during 
the height of the Selma crisis, Graham offered to hold an Easter service there.99  BGEA 
staffers soon visited the city and apparently proposed a June 12 date for a service.  
Business leaders in Selma responded favorably, only to withdraw their support amid 
persistent racial tensions.100  Meanwhile, word that Graham was coming to Alabama set 
off a flurry of requests from other parts of the state.  Inquiring towns faced the challenge 
of simultaneously demonstrating their racial progress and their need for a spiritual 
revival.  A letter from Phenix City (which had first proposed a revival back in 1954) 
lamented the city’s large un-churched population, yet emphasized plans to desegregate its 
school system.101 
Ultimately, Graham settled on holding rallies in comparatively calm parts of the 
state where he possessed social connections and could safely secure biracial invitations.  
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He canceled engagements in Great Britain to make room on his schedule.102  In Dothan, a 
wiregrass town where team member T. W. Wilson had recently resided and where 
Graham’s brother-in-law Clayton Bell pastored a Presbyterian congregation, the 
evangelist held two services before interracial audiences of several thousand each.  After 
one service, he met with local black leaders.103  The local paper asked Dothan residents to 
welcome the evangelist as a matter of basic hospitality, despite “something less than 
unanimity of opinion regarding the timing of his visit.”  The area Board of Revenue and 
Control endorsed the rallies, citing the necessity of efforts to “avoid the bitter strife 
recently created in our great state by outside agitators,” of which Graham was not 
deemed one.  As in Birmingham, the county Citizens’ Council opposed the Dothan rally, 
although a prominent Council leader agreed to a brief meeting with Graham (something 
the evangelist had not done during the 1956 Louisville crusade).104  Only in Tuskegee, 
which Graham visited as part of an integrated medical conference, did the evangelist 
specifically discuss racial matters during a sermon.  Speaking to a largely African-
American audience at Tuskegee Institute, where he faced opposition from a student 
group, he encouraged efforts “to solve the [race] problem through understanding, through 
dialogue, through legislation.”105  In keeping with precedent, though, Graham defended 
the state of Alabama in his weekly radio broadcast and bluntly prioritized spiritual over 
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social issues.  The major wire services featured a particularly startling declaration from 
that broadcast: “The church today spends too much time answering questions nobody is 
asking.”  The line—which apparently appeared in a pre-released text, but not in the 
delivered sermon—subsequently reappeared in two critical assessments of the evangelist.  
It captured the ambiguity and inconsistency of an evangelical advocate of desegregation 
who doubled as a critic of the Social Gospel.106  His target in the Dothan radio address 
was the latter.  By holding desegregated rallies in Deep South Alabama, Graham clearly 
was not advising the church to remain silent about race relations.  As his critics 
recognized, however, neither was he grabbing a bullhorn.  Hardly more than a month 
removed from the shocking violence in Selma, the thought had tellingly crossed his mind 
to attack and caricature attempts to prioritize social concerns over saving souls. 
 In Montgomery that June, Graham held his first integrated crusade in the Deep 
South; it was also his only full crusade held specifically in response to racial tensions.  
By the time of the crusade, most of the city’s public institutions had commenced the 
process of desegregation—reluctant and often modest undertakings not to be mistaken for 
heartfelt acceptance of the Civil Right Act.107  A BGEA memo alluded to the difficulty of 
organizing a truly interracial crusade in the original capital of the Confederacy, where 
less than three months earlier the already-famous civil rights march from nearby Selma 
had come to an end.108  Graham failed to procure his customary invitation from the local 
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minister’s conference.  The executive director of the Alabama State Baptist Convention 
did welcome Graham, despite believing that Johnson had orchestrated the crusade.109  
While some segregationist Alabamians did not count Graham among those “outside 
agitators” who had “tormented” them, others wrote letters to Governor George Wallace 
linking the crusade with King’s earlier presence in the state.  Still others defaced three 
billboards advertising the Montgomery crusade and somewhat ambiguously showing an 
image of Graham silhouetted in black.  Even Frank Boykin, the former congressman who 
had recommended to Eisenhower Graham’s services as a racial mediator, questioned why 
the evangelist had chosen Alabama for unique intervention.  Boykin, who copied his 
correspondence with Graham to a grateful Wallace, sent the evangelist a police report 
casting aspersions on the background of Viola Liuzzo, a white civil rights marcher 
recently murdered near Selma.110  Ever cautious in the face of criticism from his right 
flank, the evangelist forcefully, if not convincingly, denied that he had singled out 
Alabama, which he described as an economically growing state containing “more church-
going people . . . than anywhere else in the world.”  He again disavowed any civil rights 
agenda, noting simply that his services remained “open to those of all races to sit where 
they please . . . and listen to the gospel of Christ.”111 
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 Tensions aside, the rain-drenched Montgomery meetings proceeded without 
documented incident, attracting crowds of modest size.  BGEA photographs show a 
thoroughly integrated crowd, and newspaper shots reveal a similar dynamic for the 
crusade choir.  The crusade featured an introductory statement by A.W. Wilson, pastor of 
a leading black Baptist church, and a performance by Ethel Waters, a famous black 
vocalist who had worked with the Graham team for nearly a decade.  In his sermons, 
Graham only indirectly addressed race, commanding each audience member: “As one 
southerner to another, go out of your way to continue the spirit of unity and love that you 
have demonstrated this week.”  The Graham team apparently invested a great deal of 
energy in his visit to Montgomery, where he published a daily reflection piece in the two 
leading newspapers.  One of those papers subsequently labeled the crusade a success, 
while alluding to “some opinions to the contrary.”112  During the crusade, Graham kept 
Johnson aide Bill Moyers apprised of the good results, having earlier informed the 
president of this latest visit to Alabama.113 
 The evangelist went so far as to cast the Montgomery crusade as a complete 
vindication of evangelical universalism, both its theory of social change and emphasis on 
civic order.  “There are those who claim that this type of evangelistic effort is not 
relevant in our times,” he said in his weekly radio broadcast.  “The Montgomery crusade 
proves them wrong.”  In Montgomery, the evangelist had observed “how reverent the 
people were as I spelled out the universality of man’s need for God’s forgiveness” and 
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“as they marched, people of both races, not with hatred but in unity in a spirit of love as 
Christ drew them together at the foot of the cross.”  Such “racial harmony,” the 
evangelist’s brother-in-law, Clayton Bell tellingly proclaimed, “is never the product of 
concerted effort, programs, or legislation, but is easily achieved as a by-product of our 
commitment to our Lord and our common loyalty to His service.”  In what would become 
a habit, Graham soon criticized the national media for not extensively covering the 
crusade, which he had termed “another kind of march.”  Having elsewhere equated his 
significance with that of civil rights workers, he went one step further and pulled rank as 
an evangelist.  “In my opinion,” he bluntly declared, “this march in Montgomery is far 
more significant, more constructive and more revolutionary than the other marches we’ve 
read about in our newspapers and watched on our television screens.”114  These remarks 
demonstrated more than a little pride on the part of the evangelist—not to mention 
tactless disregard for the interests of the African Americans who had attended the 
Montgomery services.  One writer noted the irony of media criticism coming from a man 
who had “been given more publicity by the press, television and radio than any evangelist 
in history.”115  In truth, the Montgomery crusade attracted only slightly less newspaper 
coverage than had the earlier visit to Alabama, a fact attributable both to its redundancy 
and to the general failure of the evangelist to discuss race in his sermons.   
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 Graham’s portrait aside, other elements of the weeklong crusade suggested a less 
optimistic story.  Three of the most visible black supporters of the crusade—the “colored 
section” editor for the local dailies, as well as the presidents of the state-controlled (and 
hence, more conservative) Selma University and Alabama State College—came from 
sectors of the black community largely removed from the Civil Rights Movement.116  As 
in Dothan, Graham met with black and white leaders from the city and, as in 
Birmingham, the crusade executive committee featured co-chairs from both races.117  The 
black co-chair was A. W. Wilson, who had played a leadership role during the 
Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-1956.  The full chair was J. R. White, the racially 
moderate pastor of the white First Baptist church.118  In the run-up to the crusade, his 
congregation had revisited its policy on segregation, with the members voting to bar all 
racial demonstrators (i.e., blacks and integrationist whites) from attending services.  Their 
decision surprised the church’s deacons and prompted an emotional, but futile, address 
from White, who urged his congregants to cleanse themselves of racial prejudice.119 
 The white co-chair, Robert Strong, harbored no such reservations about his 
church’s similar policy.  CRS director LeRoy Collins described him as a “strong 
segregationist.”120  Trinity Presbyterian, his church, stood as a target for “kneel-ins” by 
                                               
 
116
 Montgomery Advertiser and Alabama Journal, 16 June 1965; both in BGCA, CN 360, R30; 
“God’s Radiance in Alabama,” Decision, August 1965, 8.  BGEA film, Billy Graham in Alabama, BGCA, 
CN 113, F35.  
 
117
 Meetings in Alabama Journal, 22 June 1965, in BGCA, CN 360, R30. 
 
118
 Executive committee list, 17 May 1965, BGCA, CN 17, 7-39.  For background on Wilson, see 
Thornton, Dividing Lines, 602n 86.   
 
119
 Flynt, Alabama Baptists, 479. 
 
120
 Leroy Collins to Johnson, 24 March 1965, LJPA, WHCF, FX FG 155-18, 228-“11/23/63-
8/22/63.” 
  154 
civil rights activists seeking to desegregate church services.  A northerner by birth, 
Strong became something of a celebrity among genteel partisans of Jim Crow because of 
a published April 1965 sermon in which he castigated King, defended his church’s policy 
of banning civil rights demonstrators from attending services, and likened activists to the 
money changers whom Jesus had driven from the temple.  Using the tortured logic of 
polite racism, Strong explained that, in the climate of the times, even the most ingenuous 
blacks or sympathetic whites seeking seats in his church qualified as “in actual fact 
sociological demonstrators.”121  A segregationist opponent of the Graham crusade 
ironically (but understandably) cited Strong’s sermon as evidence for his position.122  On 
the final day of the crusade, a racially mixed group of five persons and (in a separate 
incident) a black serviceman recently called to Vietnam were turned away from Trinity 
Presbyterian as they attempted to attend a sermon delivered by Graham associate 
Leighton Ford, brother-in-law of the evangelist.  Ford later professed ignorance of the 
back-door segregation policy (even though the church bulletin on the day of his visit 
advertised printed copies of the Strong sermon) and wrote letters to both Strong and the 
serviceman clarifying his opposition to church segregation.123  Still, the event was an 
embarrassment for Graham, whose denunciation of church segregation had grown 
stronger with time, but who obviously still permitted segregationists to serve on his 
crusade committees.  As for Strong, his interpretation of the Montgomery rally had little 
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to do with racial reconciliation.  In a published commentary, he praised Graham’s 
“willingness . . . to identify himself with our area at such a critical juncture.  A southerner 
himself, Billy Graham feels for us, for example, in the unfair treatment we have been 
given in the national news picture.”124   
 Rather than creating civil rights activists, Graham’s services quite differently 
served as a conduit for the politics of decency in Alabama.  One of the Trinity 
Presbyterian members who had initially enforced the church’s segregation policy was 
Winton Blount, a wealthy Montgomery contractor.  The elective affinity between 
Graham’s visits to Alabama and the politics of decency was nowhere more evident than 
in the person of Blount, who served on the Montgomery crusade executive committee 
and ran a prominent advertisement for his construction company in a newspaper section 
dedicated to the crusade.125  In many ways, Blount represented the quintessential southern 
moderate whom Johnson called upon following the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  As a 
member of the University of Alabama board of directors during the school’s 1963 
desegregation crisis, Blount had helped to barter the deal allowing George Wallace to 
make his symbolic stand in front of the schoolhouse door.  He had played similar roles 
during the Freedom Rides and agreed to serve as an honorary member of the CRS 
citizens committee, for which he hosted a meeting between white city leaders and 
Johnson administration officials in the days leading up to the Selma-to-Montgomery 
march.126  During the crusade week, he also hosted a meeting with the Graham team.127  
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A business progressive, Blount held political views resembling those of Graham, 
although he lacked the evangelist’s common touch.  He backed Eisenhower and Nixon, 
but was cool toward Goldwater and openly critical of Wallace.  Blount soon switched to 
the Republican Party and later served in the Nixon administration.128  
 Blount was part of a larger group of former segregationists working in Alabama 
to create space for whites to accept the legitimacy of federal civil rights laws, which now 
stood as a fait accompli.  His involvement in the crusade revealed the overlap between 
this project and Graham’s evangelical universalism.  Theologically informed 
individualism and respect for the rule of law, values clearly evident in Graham’s defense 
of the Montgomery crusade, comprised the key ingredients of this synergy.  One vessel 
for moderate Alabama business interests, the Birmingham News, made the connection 
explicitly.  The paper welcomed Graham’s return to Alabama in an editorial, titled “See 
the Human Being,” which labeled the civil rights crisis 
a human as well as a “legal” and a “social” problem which is before us.  
To the extent all, white or Negro, can think in terms of individuals being 
involved, single human beings and their families, mothers, fathers, 
children, we shall get a little further down the road toward mutual 
understanding and tolerance as to others’ views. . . . For—as we have 
said—we are all human beings, whatever our color.129 
 
By upholding the individual as the primary analytical unit for interpreting the conundrum 
of civil rights, the editorial emphasized the commonality of human beings without at all 
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addressing the specifics of legislation or court orders.  It offered morality without passion 
for the law, emphasizing respect for one’s neighbors.  Leon Macon, the influential editor 
of the Alabama Baptist, offered a complementary converse, law without concern for 
morality, stressing the responsibilities of citizenship.  A segregationist, Macon 
nonetheless argued for obedience to the Civil Rights Act in light of the biblical mandate 
for Christians to obey ordained authority.130  After only modestly covering the 1964 
Birmingham rally, Macon publicly supported Graham’s 1965 services, keeping his 
personal reservations largely to himself.131 
 The 1965 visits occurred against the backdrop of a revolt by moderate Alabama 
business interests against reflexive, counter-productive resistance to the Civil Rights Act.  
On April 15, 1965, a group of business leaders—representing the leading Chambers of 
Commerce in Alabama, as well as the state’s banking, industrial and textile 
associations—released a statement of principles to the local and national media.  In a rare 
marshalling of candidness from the white southern center (or what counted for the center 
in Alabama), the statement reflected the extent to which white southerners could no 
longer set the terms of the debate over Jim Crow.  The federal government had already 
passed sweeping legislation, and the white South needed to respond.  The published 
declaration resembled comments Graham had made for over a decade in magazines, press 
conferences, and private correspondence: 
The vast majority of the people of Alabama, like other responsible citizens 
throughout our nation, believe in law and order, and in the fair and just 
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treatment of all their fellow citizens.  They believe in obedience to the law 
regardless of their personal feelings about its specific merits.  They believe 
in the basic human dignity of all people of all races. 
 
After this opening pep talk, the statement offered specific proposals in a manner 
uncommon to Graham or other southern moderates.  Alabamians should obey the Civil 
Right Act—with business leaders taking specific responsibility for Title VII, banning 
employment discrimination—and respect the right of “every eligible citizen” to vote.  In 
keeping with the tradition of southern moderation, the statement denounced vigilantism 
and unlawful demonstrations with equal force, not unlike how the “Birmingham Eight” 
had appealed to “law and order and common sense” when denouncing the 1963 protests.  
Writing in the aftermath of these and other demonstrations, though, the business leaders 
belatedly heeded the advice of the Alabama Council on Human Relations for the state to 
“[s]olve its human relations problem and get down to the job of making Alabama 
prosper.”  The Alabama elites emphasized economic and educational progress for 
Alabama, urging “the establishment of positive new vehicles for communications 
between the races throughout all the State.”132 
 For the Birmingham News, Graham’s visits represented just such a vehicle for 
interracial dialogue.  The paper urged politicians like Governor Wallace (who in his own 
effort to improve the image of the state soon hosted a nationwide group of newspaper 
editors) to follow the example of those business and civic leaders.  Because they “wish to 
move ahead in general prosperity and reasonableness,” they had “come to understand that 
life is change, and that they must be part of it.”  Graham grasped this same reality, a later 
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editorial suggested, and in his April visit had “complimented the better efforts in 
Alabama.”  He had also complemented them.  “We can afford nothing but the highest in 
public and private life,” the paper argued.  “This could be the meaning of Billy Graham’s 
messages.”133  Alabama business moderates viewed Graham’s arrival in Alabama not as a 
slap in the face, as had Frank Boykin and segregationist critics of the evangelist, but as an 
opportunity to showcase the feasibility of their posited post-Jim Crow South. 
 With the contrast between Graham and Wallace already established, the 
Montgomery crusade became the site of a modest encounter between the politics of 
decency and the politics of rage.134  The evangelist was on record as a critic of the 
Alabama executive—saying at one point that he did not “often agree with Governor 
Wallace on very many things”—yet was characteristically quick to declare his desire to 
meet with Wallace while in Montgomery.  If an invitation from the governor was not 
forthcoming, “I might ask for it,” said the evangelist.135  Wallace likely interpreted the 
crusade as in part an incursion on his state.  He received a host of correspondence urging 
him to shun a meeting with Graham.  Some correspondents questioned Graham’s 
motivations for visiting the state, while one writer appealed to the governor “on grounds 
secular affairs not within province [sic] of ministers of gospel.”136  Wallace appeared 
conflicted about what effect associating with the evangelist might have on his 
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segregationist constituency.  According to Arthur P. Cook, the governor had prepared a 
statement in favor of the 1964 Birmingham rally, yet had chosen to withhold it for fear of 
using the evangelist for political gain.137  A more likely reason was the fear of linking 
himself with a desegregated event.  Boykin, again on edge as the Montgomery crusade 
approached, wrote to the governor proposing a special dinner for Graham and supposing 
that the evangelist would reciprocate by giving them prominent seats on the crusade 
platform.138  Wallace, though, followed many prominent Montgomery leaders in steering 
clear of the services.139  As both he and the Birmingham News recognized in their 
different ways, Graham abetted the agenda of those Alabama business interests who 
followed in the footsteps of Little Rock moderates by embracing racial tolerance along 
the lines of law and order.  As an evangelist, Graham could reach a part of Alabama 
society (in some respects, the very source of Wallace’s strength) not accessible to 
economic elites.  After several delays, the governor finally consented to a private “social 
visit” that lasted over an hour, during which they discussed “some sociological points,” in 
Graham’s words.  A picture of them together appeared in newspapers around the state.140 
 Yet Graham’s 1965 visits did more than simply assist the transition of a portion of 
Alabama whites toward greater tolerance of the civil right laws.  As with other crusades 
in the South, they also projected a positive image that business moderates and Wallace 
supporters alike could appreciate.  In fact, one conservative southern editor who had 
toured Alabama at the behest of the governor cited Graham’s affirming evaluation of the 
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state as a confirmation of his own views.141  The booster impulse was ever-present 
throughout the Montgomery crusade, for which the local Chamber of Commerce 
produced store window posters welcoming crusade attendees and workers to the city.142  
The evangelist’s public comments during and following the crusade more than justified 
the investment of the business community.  “I am convinced that the moral and spiritual 
resources are now available in Alabama for a rapid growth in racial understanding,” he 
said at a closing press conference.  If the Ku Klux Klan would “quiet down,” he added, 
and if civil rights activists would take a breather and politicians would resist the 
temptation to score points with white voters, Alabamians would have “time to digest the 
new civil rights laws” and, presumably, to obey them.143  Earlier, he had cautioned 
against turning the state into a public “whipping boy.”144  A few “more Selmas” might 
occur, he conceded, yet the deep friendship between southern blacks and whites bode 
well for the region.145  A BGEA-produced documentary about the Alabama visits 
presented an even rosier portrait.  While the film overtly condemned racial 
discrimination, it dedicated more space to glowing comments about the new spirit of 
interracial cooperation in the state.146 
 Similar rhetoric continued during Graham’s lone 1966 domestic crusade, his 
immensely well-attended visit to Greenville, South Carolina.  Supporters there cast the 
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crusade as a sign that the New South had arrived, but remained as religious as ever.147  
By the time of the Greenville crusade—for which the main source of tension was a ban 
fundamentalist university head Bob Jones, Jr., had placed on student involvement in the 
crusade—Graham’s tone had shifted from healing the South’s wounds to celebrating its 
virtues.148  From Greenville, he wrote to Ralph McGill expressing optimism about the 
direction of their region during “its most difficult period since the Civil War.”  “While we 
are not out of the woods yet,” the evangelist wrote, “I do feel that the sound of the wind 
in the mulberry bushes is evident everywhere.”149  That breeze had not reached the 
ghettos of the North, where Graham increasingly identified the nation’s main racial 
problems as residing.  Otherwise, though, the evangelist thought his nation was “making 
the greatest attempt that any nation has ever made” on behalf of racial equality.150  He 
reasoned that he had done his part. 
 
Law and Order Turns Rightward 
 During the peak years of the Civil Rights Movement, Graham adopted a practice 
of arriving at selected southern cities in the aftermath of racial violence.  In Alabama, he 
held services billed as the largest integrated meetings in either the state or locality.  These 
services, Graham argued, represented his form of activism.  In 1964, when civil rights 
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activists launched a student-infused voter registration campaign in Mississippi, Graham 
downplayed their efforts and cited his desegregated meetings in Nashville, Clinton, 
Birmingham, and other southern cities as evidence of a spiritual solution to the race 
problem.151  He made similar comments following the Selma demonstrations in 1965.  
While Graham and many civil rights leaders shared a common faith, their differences 
became more telling during the first half of the 1960s, when his services shifted from 
being plausible complements of King-style activism to being discernable alternatives to 
it.  Civil rights activists emphasized grassroots democracy, civic freedom, and Christian 
community.  They counted prophetic pastors and fearless organizers among their 
members, and they appealed to the consciences of political leaders.  Graham appealed to 
law and order, racial decency, and the transforming effects of individual conversations.  
He counted business moderates, established pastors, and the president of the United 
States among his supporters.  Graham inspired affirming portraits of Alabama’s better 
side, and unlike King during his interventions in the state, the evangelist did not publicly 
challenge or directly criticize its segregationist establishment, not even Wallace.   
Regardless of the demographic breakdown of Graham’s services in Alabama, he 
spoke primarily to the needs of whites there.  The evangelist helped to facilitate a 
momentary coalition of those white southerners who recognized the inevitability of (and, 
in some cases, the need for) change.  They viewed his services as conduits and models for 
transitioning toward an altered social order—and also for controlling it.  Graham’s 
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services offered a safe “way out” out of the racially Solid South, to use a memorable term 
first employed in reference to the electorally Solid South.152  By appealing to law and 
order, but also to such seemingly non-partisan qualities as neighborly love and spiritual 
piety, they supplied a path upon which moderates could back away from segregationism 
in a manner acceptable to regional mores.  In this context, Graham’s evangelical 
universalism contained clear political meanings: acceptance of existing civil rights laws, 
condemnation of racial violence, and dismissal of the need for further protests or 
legislation.  These values defined the politics of decency in the mid-1960s white South.  
Not every supporter of the evangelist completely agreed with him, of course; more than a 
few Graham backers remained segregationists, while a much smaller group held views to 
his left.  These basic principles, though, comprised the sum impact of his civil rights era 
interventions in his home region, revealing his hand in the fitful, yet enduring creation of 
a racially moderate white South. 
 This momentary, if always awkward and qualified, period of overlap between 
evangelical universalism and some of the basic goals of the Civil Rights Movement came 
to a swift and bitter end.  In August 1965, only two months after the Montgomery 
crusade, Graham flew to the Los Angeles neighborhood of Watts, where via helicopter 
and protected by a bullet-proof vest he toured the riot-torn community with Reverend E. 
V. Hill and other city leaders.  A prominent African-American minister and mayoral 
appointee whom Graham had met two years earlier and who would later join the BGEA 
board, Hill was also a founding member of the SCLC who had nominated King as 
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president, although he had subsequently distanced himself from the organization.153  The 
Watts visit occurred toward the close of Graham’s two-year focus on domestic issues.  
During the remaining period of the Johnson administration, the evangelist concentrated 
largely on promoting global evangelical unity, hosting an important conference in Berlin 
and holding meetings in communist Yugoslavia.154 
The tour of Watts left a distinct impression on observers of Graham, and the 
headlines regarding it differed markedly from those concerning his turn in Alabama.  In 
1958, Graham had told a Charlotte crusade audience that segregationist violence was 
sowing “the seeds for anarchy and overthrow of the government.”155  Seven years later, 
he felt similar premonitions about the rioting in Los Angeles.  In response to Watts—
which in popular memory has come to mark the disintegration of the classic, non-violent 
phase of the Civil Rights Movement—the evangelist grew nothing short of apoplectic, 
speaking, in an impolitic manner reminiscent of his more youthful days, about a “great 
racial revolution” of a more pernicious quality than the civil rights struggle he had 
sometimes labeled similarly.  For Graham, Watts was “only the beginning—a dress 
rehearsal for revolution.”  He warned ominously of “sinister forces” working to divide 
the nation, called for appropriate congressional action, and asked King to use his 
influence to call for a moratorium on further demonstrations.156  Conservative media 
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outlets immediately capitalized on these comments, as well as his subsequent 
condemnations of urban riots.157  Graham’s outburst over Watts contained a number of 
meanings and even included an element of catharsis, coming as it did after years of 
prophesying that racial violence in the North would exceed that of the South—a point he 
made again following his tour.158  Even before Watts, Graham had asserted that the early 
examples of such conflicts meant that northerners could no longer “point their accusing, 
self-righteous fingers” at the region.159  The evangelist’s reaction to Watts also revealed 
his strict adherence, even in the face of gross injustices, to a code of civility, a 
characteristic that distinguished him from King, but which had previously allowed him to 
support basic civil rights laws.  What the nation now needed was not new legislation, 
Graham believed, but rather obedience of existing laws.160 
The contrast between the Watts tour and the Alabama visits highlighted a critical 
rightward pivot for the socio-political implications of appeals to law and order, which in 
popular political discourse became almost the exclusive domain of conservatism.  The 
Alabama meetings offered glimpses of the Sunbelt style that would ascend in the 
1970s—image-conscious, “color-blind” boosterism combining developmentalist politics 
and evangelical piety.  For regional boosters, as for Graham, the South had found a way 
to solve its major social problems, and a better future lay ahead.  Graham’s interracial 
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gatherings served as legitimizing mechanisms for this brand of moderate southern 
politics.  His response to Watts, in contrast, hinted at the “silent majority” that Richard 
Nixon would later invoke in office.  Watts, of course, stood in stark relief to the glowing 
visage of the Sunbelt South; it violated the basic tenets of racial decency and law and 
order, and for Graham, it was not a southern problem.  In asserting these beliefs during 
the remainder of the decade and throughout the Nixon years, Graham’s crusades assumed 
a much more distinctly conservative cast.
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CHAPTER V 
 
BILLY GRAHAM’S SOUTHERN STRATEGY 
 
Yes, there is a ‘quiet revolution’ going on, and every one here tonight is a candidate for 
this revolution. 
 
Billy Graham1 
 
Charlotte and the changing South are in difficult struggle, much of which has a moral 
dimension to which people are blinded.  Mr. Graham’s court in Washington plays it, 
almost always, as nothing more than a political drama. 
 
Charlotte Observer2 
 
 Graham’s concerns about the increasing social and racial chaos in his nation—
first voiced in response to the 1957 Little Rock crisis, but later amplified in the aftermath 
of the 1965 Watts riots—ultimately dovetailed with the electoral prospects of Richard 
Nixon.  In December 1967, Graham received the Great American Award, given by 
Atlanta business leaders and radio station WSB, the self-described “Voice of the South.”  
Still recovering from a serious bout with pneumonia, the evangelist used the opportunity 
to deliver the kind of sermon his illness would prevent him from making for another three 
months.  His acceptance speech reprised his preference for avowedly Christian marches 
as alternatives to more explicitly political demonstrations.  Now, however, he 
distinguished such evangelical demonstrations not from civil rights or antiwar protests, 
but rather from the “rioting and rebellion” of the previous summer.  In contrast to this 
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turmoil, which had enthralled the media, Graham celebrated those Americans who were 
responding to the tumultuous times by turning to Christ and, hence, returning to the 
nation’s moral foundations.  These persons, whom the evening news ignored, were 
candidates for what Graham touted as a “quiet revolution.”  He included the same phrase 
in a nationally-syndicated newspaper commentary released that holiday season.3   
Discussing a different type of candidacy during a press conference earlier that 
day, Graham made clear his desire to see his friend Richard Nixon win the Republican 
presidential nomination, calling him “the most experienced” possible GOP candidate 
during a year when experience should particularly matter.4  The evangelist soon regretted 
this seeming endorsement and called Nixon’s secretary to explain himself.  Later that 
night, Nixon invited the ailing Graham to visit him in Key Biscayne, Florida.  Nixon had 
not yet officially declared his candidacy and he wanted to discuss the matter with his 
friend.  On the third day of the visit, Nixon finally put the question of a run to Graham.  
In Nixon’s telling, the evangelist urged him to seek office, noting the providential course 
of his receiving a second legitimate shot at the presidency.5  In a subsequent campaign 
commercial (a much more prominent venue than the Great American Award banquet), 
Nixon invoked another body of quiet citizens: “the forgotten Americans, the non-
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shouters, the non-demonstrators.”6  Once in office, he famously labeled this group the 
“silent majority.”7  He strategically tapped the anxieties of those citizens who had sat out 
the decade’s progressive movements and who needed reassurance that their version of 
America remained viable.  In differing, yet complementary ways, Graham and Nixon 
honored socio-political communities they had spoken into existence. 
 The thematic overlap between Graham and Nixon was no coincidence.  Their 
deep and well-known relationship has been viewed by the evangelist’s supporters as a 
loyal, if flawed, friendship—and by his critics as a case either of disingenuous 
partisanship on the part of Graham or raw manipulation on the part of Nixon.  These 
conflicting perspectives conceal the full complexity of their two decades of collaboration, 
which derived not only from an undeniable friendship, but also from a profound, 
enduring ideological synchronicity from which both men perceived potential benefits.  
While Graham loyally defended his friend late into the Watergate crisis, the evangelist 
had spent the previous two decades assisting Nixon’s political ambitions (to an extent he 
did with no other politician) primarily because he supported Nixon’s values and style of 
leadership.  He believed in Nixon the political leader, in addition to Nixon the man.  
Nothing revealed this fact more than Graham’s persistent and public support for the 
Nixon presidency, which began at a time when the evangelist had reached the height of 
his national and international influence.  Graham supported Nixon well after his 
evangelistic enterprise stood to benefit substantially from close proximity to power.  
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From the moment the evangelist spoke before bowed heads at the 1969 inauguration, his 
backing of President Nixon became a central and, for many observers, the defining 
moment of his public career, a period that tarnished his reputation and threatened to 
damage his ministry.  His intimacy with Nixon far surpassed his closeness to other 
political figures, including Eisenhower and Johnson.  With those presidents, Graham had 
served alternately as a consultant, liaison, or a politically useful chum.  For Nixon, 
Graham was all of these things and more.  Most famously (or infamously), he served in a 
public capacity as a “White House chaplain,” “court prophet,” or whatever label his many 
detractors affixed to him.  Behind the scenes, he was a strikingly candid, occasionally 
incisive, and periodically overwrought political advisor, offering the president and his 
aides insights they valued and selectively applied. 
To assume that Nixon simply “used” Graham, then, is to grossly underestimate 
the political side of an evangelist who, in 1960, 1968, and 1972, acted as an honorary 
member of the Nixon presidential campaign team.  Emphasizing Graham’s naiveté also 
does not adequately explain why, well before the Watergate scandal, he proactively and 
knowingly risked his reputation on behalf of Nixon.  Graham was always more of a 
political creature than either those who praised or dismissed him would concede.  He was 
more of a political creature than even he could admit.  If Nixon politicized Graham, he 
also provided the forum through which the evangelist played out his political dreams.  
For a two-decade stretch extending through the presidential election of 1972, Nixon stood 
as Graham’s ideal national leader, a political risk worth taking.   
 The Graham-Nixon relationship takes on particular significance when considered 
in the context of both the American South (the homeland of the evangelist and a central 
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focus of Nixon’s political ambitions) and the intimately related issue of the white 
evangelical electorate.  The complex—and, often, mutually rewarding—friendship 
between Graham and Nixon began in the early 1950s and climaxed with the evangelist’s 
important role in the southern and evangelical politics of the 1969-1974 Nixon 
administration.  In between lay many moments when evangelistic activities intersected 
with political priorities.  During the 1960, 1968, and 1972 campaigns, Graham operated 
not only as a Nixon supporter, but also as a kind of GOP partisan (contrary to his 
belatedly emphasized status as a registered Democrat).  In the latter two campaigns, the 
evangelist involved himself both implicitly and directly in the Republican “southern 
strategy,” Nixon’s attempt to attract white southern voters.  In the process, Graham 
inserted himself into a contentious debate over who should point the political compass of 
the newest New South.  He was something more than a just role player in Nixon’s quest 
for a new political majority.  While his connections with Nixon and other participants in 
the southern strategy clearly assisted that end (and consequently drew sharp criticism), 
they also reflected Graham’s underlying political commitments, which he sought to 
extend throughout the South and nation. 
 
Prelude to the Power and the Glory 
 Graham and Nixon clearly possessed a mutual affection for each other.  Yet a 
close comfort with electoral politics coexisted with their many visits to the golf greens.  
As was not the case with the vast majority of the “good friends” Graham possessed in the 
world of politics (a bipartisan group ranging from the liberal Hubert Humphrey to the 
arch-conservative Strom Thurmond), the evangelist saw enough to like in Nixon to assist 
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his ambitions through private advice and public stamps of approval.  Nixon clearly 
respected the input of Graham, and the frequency of their communication followed the 
election cycle.  To be sure, the evangelist was one of several religious leaders Nixon 
cultivated during his decades in electoral politics, and Nixon unabashedly used Graham 
to enhance his public image.  Yet White House staffers recognized the credit Nixon 
granted Graham as a political thinker and a successful salesman in his own right.  Former 
Nixon Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman described Graham as someone whom the president 
might call at the end of the day in order to “chat.”8  Those talks, however, often involved 
much more than friendly banter.  During them, Nixon scarcely departed from his stock 
role as the constant politician. 
 Graham and Nixon first met in 1950 or 1951 by way of North Carolina Senator 
Clyde Hoey, although the evangelist already knew Nixon’s parents from a revival 
service.9  From his mother Nixon had inherited a western brand of Quakerism “more akin 
to free-church fundamentalists that to the quiet pacifists of the East.”  Despite the many 
differences between the Quaker and Reformed theologies of their respective upbringings, 
Nixon and Graham were equally familiar with the culture of revival tents and altar calls.10  
Nixon thus differed from many of Graham’s high-profile peers who concealed their 
discomfort with the salesmanship and panache of evangelism.  Moreover, the politician 
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readily drew a connection between fishing for souls and campaigning for votes.  At least 
through 1972, the evangelist was only slightly less amenable to this analogy. 
 In certain respects, the early careers of Nixon and Graham paralleled each other.  
They rose to fame during the late 1940s, powered in part by the emerging Cold War 
culture of southern California (Nixon’s home region and the cite of Graham’s landmark 
1949 Los Angeles crusade).  Their profiles similarly benefited from close proximity to 
Dwight Eisenhower.  Graham, who likely was impressed with Nixon’s anticommunist 
credentials, undoubtedly delighted in his placement on the 1952 Republican ticket.  The 
two had already commenced a long-running tradition of golf outings.11 
 Nixon’s vice presidential papers contain extensive correspondence with Graham, 
who grew increasingly forward in offering political advice and proposing speaking 
engagements.  The evangelist’s letters reflect the flattery he routinely lobbed at political 
authorities of all stripes.  Nixon was the “greatest Vice President in history” and 
momentarily warranted the title “Mr. President” during one of President Eisenhower’s 
health scares.  To a prospective Nixon biographer, Graham labeled him a “Christian 
gentleman” who had “added luster to the office of Vice President.”12  Following the 1956 
Democratic National Convention, Graham made sure Nixon knew he did not approve of 
the quasi-sermon his close friend Tennessee Governor Frank Clement had delivered there 
against the Eisenhower administration.13  Graham felt personally compelled to distance 
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himself from Clement, who had entered the convention as a vice presidential candidate.  
Surely unbeknownst to Nixon, the evangelist had offered the governor at least two rounds 
of recommendations for the speech, including advice not “to attack Eisenhower or Nixon 
personally.”  Clement later sent Graham a thank-you letter.14 
 Flattery aside, Graham tended to address Vice President Nixon (or, by August 
1956, “Dick”) as the friend he was, in contrast to the more deferential, even fawning tone 
the evangelist struck with President Eisenhower.  Graham felt comfortable enough with 
Nixon to mention the relevance of biblical prophecy for Cold War and Middle East 
policy.  He also candidly asked Nixon for assistance with his overseas crusades in such 
places as India and Egypt, where the vice president helped set up meetings with heads of 
state.  Nixon also intervened in the Department of Treasury’s evaluation of the tax status 
for the evangelical magazine Christianity Today, which Graham had helped to found.15 
 By the close of the 1956 election season, two enduring, related themes had 
surfaced in their correspondence: the status of Nixon in the South and the desire of 
Graham for Nixon to align with the conservative Protestant electorate.  Much of their 
correspondence concerned Nixon’s political status—both his electoral prospects and 
opportunities for him to gain influence, particularly in the South and within the 
evangelical community.  Nixon consulted Graham during the September 1957 Little 
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Rock high school crisis.16  Afterwards, the evangelist urged him to attend a Presbyterian 
gathering in Miami, where southern racial moderates would be in attendance.  These 
clergy, Graham stressed, represented “the most powerful influence on public opinion in 
the South.”  The following year, Graham asked Nixon to visit his “fully integrated” 
crusade in Charlotte, where Nixon’s presence “would be extremely helpful at this 
moment of racial tension.”  Moreover, he wanted to chat with the vice president “on this 
racial situation.”17 
 The religious South contained a wealth of political capital, as Graham alternately 
implied or stated outright in his correspondence with Nixon.  Although Nixon turned 
down the Miami and Charlotte offers, as well as several others, Graham continually 
pitched opportunities for the vice president to address important Christian gatherings.  
Protestant leaders had begun to quiz the evangelist about his reliably conservative, yet 
religiously aloof friend.  “Very frankly,” Graham wrote to Nixon in 1956, “you are in 
need of a boost in Protestant religious circles. . . . I think it is time that you move among 
some of these men and let them know you.”  With the permission of Nixon, he had 
already advertised the vice president as a possible speaker at 1956 denominational 
meetings in the South.  Nixon soon accepted invitations to appear at summer gatherings 
of the Southern Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian denominations.  Graham passed 
along suggestions for the addresses, in which Nixon appealed for the church’s assistance 
in race relations.  Since all three gatherings took place in western North Carolina, the 
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retreat capital of southern white Protestantism, Nixon delivered the addresses in one busy 
day and still found time for his first visit to the Graham home in Montreat.18   
 Graham proposed such engagements for Nixon because he wanted to enhance the 
standing of conservative Protestants in the Eisenhower administration, but also because 
he saw Nixon as cut from presidential timber.  By the time of the 1956 election, they had 
already discussed Nixon’s presidential ambitions, and by March of the following year 
Graham considered him “well on the road to being the next President of the United 
States.”  Toward the end of 1957, the evangelist wrote the first of several letters 
analyzing the vice president’s electoral prospects.  At that early date, he identified 
Massachusetts Democratic Senator John F. Kennedy as a potentially “formidable foe,” 
even though he thought the “religious issue” could work against the Catholic Kennedy.  
Thereafter, almost every substantive letter Graham authored to Nixon contained some 
commentary on the upcoming presidential contest.  “There is no doubt that you will win 
the Republican nomination,” wrote an increasingly sanguine Graham in 1958.  Nixon 
would face a Democratic Party divided by both religion and, as the evangelist had 
stressed to Eisenhower back in 1956, race.  “There is also a growing possibility of a deep 
split within the Democratic ranks on the race issue,” wrote Graham in a letter that 
demonstrated the strong political tone of his correspondence with Nixon.  “Therefore I 
think there is every reason for at least mild optimism.”19 
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 During the election year of 1960, the evangelist offered advice to Nixon in eight 
formal letters, in addition to numerous telegrams, phone calls, and visits to Washington, 
DC.20  One of those trips was for the National Capitol Crusade, where he introduced 
Nixon at a service.21  Much of Graham’s political advice centered on the South, where he 
thought Nixon could continue the Republican advances of 1952 and 1956.  Here, the 
pivotal figure remained Eisenhower, whom the evangelist encouraged to stump for Nixon 
in a region where “even you do not realize with what affection you are held.”  The 
president, who remained cool toward the transparently ambitious Nixon, replied that he 
awaited orders from his vice president.  Graham cited this letter when giving the same 
advice to Nixon, who noted that Eisenhower was already scheduled to appear in Texas.22   
Although Graham saw race as a divisive issue within the Democratic Party, he 
viewed religion as the main reason why Nixon could succeed in the South.  In the context 
of a possible Democratic run by Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy, the “religious 
issue” (as Graham and others called it) translated as the matter of Kennedy’s Roman 
Catholicism.  Graham likely remembered why his father and many other Charlotte whites 
had voted against the 1928 Democratic presidential nominee, Al Smith, a Catholic and a 
foe of prohibition.23  He understood that a Kennedy candidacy would stir similar anti-
Vatican sentiments and expressed no reservations about that prospect.  “I think there is a 
distinct possibility that you can capture several Southern states if Kennedy is your 
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opponent,” Graham wrote to Nixon in May 1960.  As evidence, Graham sent Nixon a 
clipping about a Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) resolution urging that public 
officials be “free from sectarian pressures”—a thinly veiled nod to fears that Kennedy 
would acquiesce to the Vatican.  Graham, who at that same gathering had urged Southern 
Baptists to “take a place of leadership” in race relations, was not terribly concerned about 
the political effects of the race issue.24  He suggested that Nixon (who, along with his 
party, was not then perceived as racially conservative) meet with Martin Luther King, Jr., 
and advised the vice president that “in the South and border states . . . in spite of the civil 
rights issue the more conservative platform of the Republican Party and the religious 
issue could well put some of these states in your column.”  The presence of Texan 
Lyndon Johnson on the Democratic ticket would not put the South out of reach, Graham 
argued.  Nixon appeared to agree and noted the great reception he had received during 
summer visits to Greensboro, Birmingham and Atlanta.  His final two campaign visits to 
the region received assistance from Graham.25 
 As Graham’s analysis of the southern electorate indicated, he interpreted the 
election of 1960 primarily through the lens of religion.  According to information he 
passed along to Nixon in June, House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader 
Lyndon Johnson had confirmed that “the religious issue is the paramount issue in the 
forthcoming campaign.”  It was, of course, also the paramount issue for Graham.  With 
likely nominee Kennedy destined to attract the exclusive support of American Catholics, 
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Graham urged Nixon to “concentrate on solidifying the Protestant vote.”  Along these 
lines, he proposed his friend, Minnesota Congressman Walter Judd, an anticommunist 
stalwart and former missionary to China, for the vice presidency.  The suggestion 
revealed how religious and regional concerns blended in Graham’s mind.  Judd, he 
argued, would enable Nixon to “present a picture to America that would put much of the 
South and border states in the Republican column and bring about a dedicated Protestant 
vote to counteract the Catholic vote.”  Already in town for his Washington, DC, crusade, 
Graham made himself available to “talk this point over with you or any of your 
associates,” and Nixon soon proposed a private luncheon with the evangelist, Judd, two 
political aides, and Kentucky Senator Thruston Morton, chair of the Republican National 
Committee.26  Later in July, when a Judd nomination appeared unlikely, Graham 
recommended New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller (ideologically, at the opposite 
end of the party spectrum from Judd).  The highest priority was clearly a Nixon victory.27 
 Graham’s position in the 1960 presidential campaign involved much more than 
his loyalty to Nixon.  Although the evangelist had distanced himself from the papacy-
bashing world of fundamentalism, he clearly feared the prospect of a Roman Catholic in 
the White House.  He shared his concerns with a host of leading Protestants, including 
theological conservatives, such as his strongly anti-Catholic father-in-law, and less 
doctrinally-oriented ministers, such as celebrity minister Norman Vincent Peale, whose 
brand of  “popular Christianity” blended therapeutic theology with optimistic American 
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individualism.28  At the start of the election year, Graham and Peale refused a request by 
Kennedy to sign an open statement criticizing opposition to a Catholic president along 
religious lines.29  Graham may have believed that Nixon could win votes in the South 
simply by accentuating his faith, yet he was more than aware that many anti-Catholics 
wanted to accentuate Kennedy’s faith for the very same reason.   
Graham stoked the religious issue in 1960 more than he has ever been able to 
acknowledge.  That August, he convened a group of around twenty-five Protestant 
leaders in Montreux, Switzerland, for the ostensible purpose of discussing world 
evangelism.30  Perhaps the most pressing agenda among the strongly anti-Kennedy group, 
however, was the looming election.  Peale and Bell were among the participants in 
discussions that, ironically, resembled the very type of clandestine cabal many of them 
associated with the Vatican.  The attendees sized up Nixon’s chances in the South and 
fretted about the Kennedy team’s superior organization.  Graham agreed to join Peale in 
encouraging Nixon to address religion more specifically in his public speeches.  The 
evangelist, though, astutely refrained from lending his name to another Montreux 
proposal: a meeting in Washington, DC, to address Protestant concerns over the election.  
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Shedding additional light on Kennedy’s Catholicism, the Montreux group believed at the 
time, would only benefit the Nixon campaign. 
 While Graham conveniently remained overseas, the Montreux machinations 
brewed into a political storm stateside.  In early September 1960, Peale served as chair 
for the National Conference of Citizens for Religious Freedom, a Montreux-inspired 
event with close ties to the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE).  Graham 
encouraged Peale, who did not normally move in NAE circles, to attend the gathering.  
Journalists promptly levied charges of anti-Catholicism at what they branded the “Peale 
group.”  Peale—who, like Graham, prized respectability more than prophecy—quickly 
dissociated himself from the conference.  For understandable reasons, Peale’s supporters 
later alleged that Graham, whose links to the controversy remained largely unknown, had 
let Peale take the fall for what could just as accurately have been labeled the “Graham 
group.”31  To Nixon, who had steered clear of the conference, such developments 
confirmed his previously voiced belief “that you just can’t win on that issue!”32 
The Peale flap also confirmed Graham’s reconsideration of the role religion 
would play in the campaign, as he observed how allegations of religious bigotry could 
work to the advantage of Kennedy.  (Lost on Graham and Nixon alike, of course, was the 
eminently justifiable nature of those allegations.)  The evangelist had moved to protect 
his image even before the Montreux gathering.  Through Lyndon Johnson, Graham 
informed Kennedy in early August of his desire “to stay as much out of the political 
campaign as possible.”  Likely conscious of the open-ended nature of this promise, 
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Johnson wrote a gracious reply on Kennedy’s behalf.33  A week after detailing the 
Montreux meeting to Nixon, Graham released statements to Time and Newsweek 
denouncing religious bigotry and declaring he would not raise the religious issue during 
the campaign.34  As a result of the Peale fiasco, Graham’s advised Nixon to adjust his use 
of the religious issue.  While the candidate should still address “spiritual things” in his 
speeches (particularly in light of the NAE’s efforts to mobilize voters), Graham argued, 
he needed to recruit surrogate speakers—preferably, respected Republican elders, such as 
Thomas Dewey or Eisenhower himself—to denounce the Democratic manipulation of the 
religious issue.  In both cases, the evangelist waited in vain for action.35 
 Unresolved in the aftermath of the Peale fiasco was the question of a public 
endorsement of Nixon.  More than anything, the vagaries of the religious issue 
contributed to the evangelist’s final decision not to officially back his obvious choice for 
president.  It was a close call, however, as Graham ultimately confined his definition of 
endorse to the word’s most declarative sense.  An endorsement had earlier appeared 
likely.  “I have taken my stand,” Graham wrote to Nixon in late 1959, “and intend to go 
all the way.”  After proposing to come out for the vice president during a June 1960 
appearance on Meet the Press, however, the evangelist began to waffle.  Perhaps, he 
thought, a strategy of leaving “the implication” of support for Nixon, as he had done at 
the SBC gathering in May, would carry “greater strength than if I came all out for you at 
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the present time.”  At some point, possibly during a meeting involving Judd, the 
possibility was apparently raised of a public endorsement slated to occur before the 
August Democratic National Convention.36 
 Graham’s overseas travels from August to October, when he held services 
throughout Western Europe, bought him some time, but seemed merely to delay the 
inevitable.  In his correspondence concerning the Montreux meeting, the evangelist 
reported that he had sent a letter to members of his mailing list urging them to vote in 
November.  The list was numerically strongest in the heavily populated states of the 
California, Pennsylvania, New York, and the Midwest.  “I think in these areas plus the 
South we can be of greatest help,” he wrote, noting the likelihood that a majority of the 
recipients were Democrats or independents.  “I am on the trans-Atlantic phone constantly 
with people in various parts of America,” he added, “and will be delighted to be of any 
service I possibly can.”  He also suggested Nixon visit him in North Carolina that fall.  
Unimpeded by modesty, Graham forecast that such “a dramatic and publicized event . . . 
might tip the scales in North Carolina and dramatize the religious issue throughout the 
[n]ation without mentioning it publicly.”  Nixon did not accept the offer.  When he and 
his wife arrived at the Charlotte airport during an October campaign swing, though, 
Graham’s mother greeted them with a bouquet of flowers.  By then, Graham had come to 
believe that, because of “what the [p]ress did to Peale,” he could not overtly mention 
religion even if he did endorse Nixon.  Graham proposed to endorse Nixon on the 
presumedly unbiased grounds of his superior leadership experience as vice president, thus 
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making the evangelist “not so much against Kennedy as I am for you.”  In the final days 
of October, though, Graham publicly declared that he would not endorse a candidate.  He 
chose to remain on the path he had adopted in 1952 and 1956: offering advice, imploring 
Christians (implicitly, Protestant ones) to vote, and utilizing opportunities to, as he 
succinctly wrote to Nixon, “make statements by implication that will be interpreted as 
favorable to you without getting directly involved.”37 
 The final decision to eschew an endorsement, however, occurred after an incident, 
unpublicized at the time, which captured the precarious nature of Graham’s engagement 
with Nixon.  In mid-October, Graham discussed his endorsement conundrum with 
publishing mogul Henry Luce, a longtime Republican and an enthusiastic booster of the 
evangelist.  Luce invited him to contribute a piece to Life magazine explaining why he 
supported Nixon.  Despite some misgivings, the evangelist dashed off an enthusiastic 
article clearly endorsing Nixon, while avoiding direct criticism of Kennedy.  In the 
article, Graham invoked his “responsibility as a citizen of the United States to let my 
views be known,” something he noted Reinhold Niebuhr and other religious leaders who 
supported Kennedy had already done.  The evangelist praised Nixon’s qualifications, 
while marshaling his pastoral authority as a judge of character.  “But in my estimation, 
his outstanding quality is sincerity,” Graham wrote in language that, if published, would 
surely have resurfaced fourteen years later during the Watergate crisis.38 
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 The piece ultimately found its way into the archives, rather than Life magazine.  
No sooner had Graham sent the article to Luce than he began to seriously reconsider it.  
With Ruth, he prayed for some type of divine guidance.  Seeming answers soon arrived.  
Two of his conservative friends, journalists David Lawrence and Paul Harvey, strongly 
advised him against letting the article run.  Meanwhile, Luce had experienced his own 
doubts and mentioned the article to Kennedy, who unsurprisingly thought Life should 
also publish a piece by Niebuhr or another Protestant Democrat.  With publication 
delayed by a week, concerned phone calls to Montreat soon arrived from Florida Senator 
George Smathers, former Tennessee Governor Frank Clement, and North Carolina 
Governor Luther Hodges, southern Democrats and friends of the evangelist.  A similar 
appeal came from Atlanta Constitution editor Ralph McGill, who almost certainly had 
been alerted about the Life draft, urging the evangelist to avoid endorsing Nixon and to 
stay away from the religious issue.  The extra time gave Graham time to compose a 
substitute article promoting the duty of every citizen to vote.  Luce reluctantly agreed to 
run this decidedly less newsworthy piece, in which Graham still managed to warn the 
American people against voting as a bloc, reflexively supporting a particular party, or 
choosing a candidate based on who “is more handsome or charming”—points easily 
interpretable as jabs at Kennedy.  Throughout the frantic deliberations over the Life 
article, the evangelist had repeatedly attempted to contact Nixon, whose staff remained 
conflicted about how the piece would play politically.  Nixon himself was unsure.  In 
Graham’s telling of the incident, he eventually received “a definite green light” from the 
Nixon campaign, but only after the substitute article had already gone to press.39  This 
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detail does not appear in Nixon’s published account of the matter two years later, which 
has him overruling his staff out of sensitivity to the volatile religious issue.40 
 Graham soon offered Nixon a generous consolation prize.  On November 3, four 
days after declaring he would not endorse a candidate and five days before the election 
itself, the evangelist appeared with Nixon in the tightly contested state of South Carolina.  
Graham traveled to the state capital of Columbia at the urging of Nixon supporter James 
Byrnes, a segregationist whom the evangelist praised for attending his 1958 service at 
Fort Jackson.  Graham gave an invocation at the start of a televised address during which 
Nixon, in a manner foreshadowing his more racialized southern strategies of 1968 and 
1972, argued that Democrats had abandoned states’ rights and other “time-honored 
beliefs.”41  Nixon and Graham appeared together on the statehouse steps—where, two 
years earlier, the evangelist had been prevented from holding a desegregated crusade—
beneath a banner reading, “Dixie is No Longer in the Bag.”42  The sign slightly 
exaggerated the status of the GOP in the greater South, where Nixon picked up electoral 
votes only in Virginia, Florida, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Kentucky, and ultimately lost 
a closely contested election. 
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Two months after the November disappointment, Nixon revisited the Life article, 
calling the original version “[p]robably the best and most effective statement in my 
behalf in the entire campaign.”  He soon pitied himself that the piece was not published 
and still contended decades later that the article might have “made the difference” in the 
race.  “While I did not come out openly for you,” Graham replied, “yet [sic] I believe tens 
of thousands knew where I stood by my public and private statements—and by appearing 
with you in Columbia!”43  Both of them had a point.  Any serious inquirer could have 
surmised the leanings of Graham through the many well-publicized compliments he paid 
to Nixon.  Still, an outright endorsement in such a tight election might have a swayed a 
few more evangelical voters—especially among Democratic-leaning southerners 
skeptical of Kennedy, but also wary of a candidate who had long ago garnered the 
nickname “Tricky Dick.”  In later elections, Nixon would remember the difference 
Graham might have made in 1960.  Likely, as well, he took away lessons from the 
religious issue about how and how not to appeal to the prejudices of possible supporters. 
 Graham’s friendship with Nixon survived the election and likely grew in strength 
during the 1961-1968 interregnum.  After the 1960 election, Graham attempted to contact 
the vice president on several occasions to offer solace and to inform him that he had 
accepted an invitation, via George Smathers and with the approval of James Byrnes, to 
play golf with President-elect Kennedy.44  Nixon soon invited the evangelist to visit him 
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in Washington.45  In January, Nixon sent Graham a gracious letter thanking him for his 
friendship and offering flattering words about his political instincts.  Graham’s post-
election correspondence with Nixon commenced with an offer of pastoral care, yet 
quickly returned to the topic of politics, namely Nixon’s future.  By February 1961, 
Graham wrote Nixon of his confidence “that you will be the next president of the United 
States” and he soon urged Nixon to speak up on matters of foreign policy.  Later that 
year, Nixon asked for Graham’s input on a possible run for the California governorship.  
During the unsuccessful 1962 campaign, Nixon remained cognizant of Graham’s 
potential assistance.  “We have to get these people to go to work,” he wrote in a 
campaign memo regarding the evangelist and his supporters.  Graham, who had been 
“following with tremendous interest the developments in . . . California,” invited Nixon 
to contribute to Decision, the flagship magazine of the Billy Graham Evangelistic 
Association (BGEA), which he noted had a circulation of 100,000 in the Golden State.46  
Nixon’s article, titled “A Nation’s Faith in God,” appeared in the November issue.47  In 
July of that year, Nixon’s publicist told the evangelist that his candidate, whose campaign 
was stalling, needed more photographic coverage.  A shot of a Nixon-Graham golf outing 
soon appeared in the Los Angeles Times.48  After the election ended in bitter defeat and a 
seemingly career-ending meltdown during Nixon’s concession speech, Graham wrote to 
                                                                                                                                            
2 April 1962; both in NARA, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, White House Central Name Files, 1035-
“Graham, B.” 
 
45
 Graham to Nixon, 17 August 1974, RNL, PPBG, 1-2. 
 
46
 Nixon to Graham 15 January 1961; Graham to Nixon, 2 February 1961; Graham to Nixon, 17 
May 1961; Nixon to Graham, 17 August 1961; Nixon to unnamed, 23 February 1962; Graham to Nixon, 12 
March 1962; and Nixon to Graham, 18 June 1962; all in NARA, PRLN, RNPP, S320, 299-G. 
 
47
 Nixon, “A Nation’s Faith in God,” Decision, November 1962, 4.  
 
48
 Graham, Just As I Am, 443.  Los Angeles Times, 26 July 1962, in BGCA, CN 360, R29.   
  
 
190 
Nixon reaffirming their friendship.  He also proposed with more than a little forwardness 
that Nixon host a banquet for journalists and offer a cordial mea culpa.  “Strange as it 
may seem,” the evangelist added, “I feel that if you can come through this defeat with 
flying colors, you will have another major opportunity in the next few years to serve the 
American people.”49  He soon made a similar comment at a press conference.50 
 Graham did his part to facilitate Nixon’s long comeback, serving as both a private 
and public cheerleader.  He continued to speak highly of Nixon in national venues, 
including McCall’s magazine.  “I’ve heard people say, ‘I don’t like Nixon,’” he wrote.  “I 
have never understood this, because he is one of the warmest and most likable men I’ve 
ever known.”  Elsewhere, he called Nixon a possible “American Churchill,” and his 
similar comments during the election year of 1964 caught the attention of at least one 
editorial board.51  During the 1968 campaign and in later years, Nixon cited the 
evangelist’s encouragement at Key Biscayne as having “a great deal to do” with his final 
decision to seek the presidency.  Nixon, who had spent the better part of the mid-1960s 
ingratiating himself with GOP elites around the nation, almost certainly had made up his 
mind to run by the time of the December 1967 visit.52  Still, he clearly viewed Graham as 
a valuable consultant concerning his political future. 
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From the Quiet Revolution to the Silent Majority 
 While Nixon prepared the groundwork for a possible run in 1968, Graham helped 
to stir the tide his friend eventually rode into office.  The evangelist’s public rhetoric 
appeared to suggest the need for a mainstream candidate willing to run on a strong law-
and-order platform.  During the latter years of the Johnson administration, Graham grew 
increasingly concerned about the direction of American society, especially the direction 
of the church.  He focused specific attention on the renaissance of social gospel-
influenced theology within liberal Protestant circles, whether in the form of the trendy 
“God is Dead” theology or, more pervasively, the increasing involvement of clergy in 
opposing the Vietnam War.  “There is no doubt that secularism, materialism, and even 
Marxism not only have invaded the Church but deeply penetrated it,” the evangelist 
warned in a Christianity Today article, titled “False Prophets in the Church.”53  Although 
Graham remained supportive of social concern among Christians, he argued that the trend 
had moved too far in that direction.  In response, he reasserted his evangelical 
universalism.  “There is one Gospel and one Gospel only,” he wrote, “and that Gospel is 
the dynamic of God to change the individual and, through the individual, society.”54   
 These theological apprehensions dovetailed with the anxieties about lawlessness 
Graham had first voiced in the aftermath of Watts.  “There is no doubt that the rioting, 
looting, and crime in America have reached the point of anarchy,” he declared in a 1967 
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sermon with the stark title, “Rioting or Righteousness.”  The nation needed “new, tough 
laws” to deal with “subversive elements that are seeking the overthrow of the American 
government.”55  The nation also needed a new kind of Supreme Court Chief Justice, he 
believed.  Responding to Chief Justice Earl Warren’s initial declaration of his intent to 
resign, the evangelist wrote to the president in 1968 urging him to “give serious 
consideration to balancing the Court with a strong conservative as Chief Justice.”  
Graham was “convinced that many of the problems that have plagued America in the past 
few years are a direct result of some of the extreme rulings of the Court, especially in the 
field of criminology.”  John Connally, whom Graham had supported for Texas governor 
in 1962 and whom he had subsequently labeled a superlative future presidential 
candidate, “would make an ideal and popular choice,” despite likely opposition from 
“extreme liberals and radicals.”56  The electoral implications of Graham’s 
recommendation were obvious.  “With elections coming up next year . . . ,” he predicted 
in the same 1967 sermon, “the American people are going to show their displeasure by 
the ballots they cast.  The majority of the American people want law, order, and security 
in our society.”57  The specter of a lawless society would reappear throughout the 
Nixon’s 1968 campaign. 
 As the 1968 presidential race approached, observers wondered whether Graham’s 
closeness with Nixon would threaten his loyalty to Lyndon Johnson.  Before Johnson 
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withdrew from the race (a surprising move for most observers, but not necessarily for 
Graham, to whom the president had much earlier confessed he might not run again, citing 
health concerns), the evangelist faced the prospect of the man he had long encouraged to 
run, Nixon, opposing an incumbent whom he had mostly supported in office.58  After 
Graham declared Nixon the most-qualified potential GOP nominee in December 1967, he 
sent a letter reassuring the Johnson team of his intention to avoid political involvement.59  
At Key Biscayne, though, the evangelist informed a highly skeptical Nixon of his opinion 
that Johnson would not seek reelection.60  Around this time—possibly for the first time in 
public—the evangelist began highlighting his status as a registered Democrat, something 
he had not done even when H. L. Hunt tried to draft him as a Republican candidate in 
1964.  Although he continued to call himself a Democrat throughout the Nixon 
administration and beyond, few media outlets heeded his self-description.  A 1972 
Parade article, for example, placed Graham at the top of a list of powerful “behind the 
scenes” Republicans.  The Arkansas Gazette, then emerging as one of his harshest critics, 
labeled him “one of those self-styled ‘Southern Democrats’” who voted like a member of 
the other major party.61 
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 After Johnson bowed out of the campaign, intrigue about the evangelist’s role in 
the race only intensified.  Democrats from Tennessee expressed alarm that Graham was 
ready to “come out for Nixon,” something they knew he had almost done eight years 
earlier.  They asked Johnson how such a development might be avoided.  A handwritten 
note on their letter offered one logical possibility: “John Connally?”62  Probably 
unbeknownst to anyone on the president’s staff, however, Graham was then attempting 
(unsuccessfully, for the moment) to woo his ideal chief justice toward support for 
Nixon.63  Meanwhile, on the Republican side, a Philadelphia newspaper columnist termed 
Graham the “X Factor” in the upcoming campaign and cited concerns among GOP 
supporters of rival candidate Ronald Reagan that the evangelist would back Nixon.64  A 
different source had the evangelist pitching Texas Representative George Bush, another 
Graham acquaintance from the Lone Star state, as an ideal GOP running mate.  Graham 
denied the allegation.65   
 The role Graham eventually played in the 1968 campaign takes on particular 
significance when understood in the larger context of Nixon’s southern strategy.  This 
strategy primarily consisted of Nixon’s outreach to the traditionally-Democratic southern 
white electorate.  More immediately, though, Nixon needed to woo the many southern 
delegates at the Republican National Convention who found the strongly conservative 
Reagan more appealing.  Before and during the Miami GOP convention, South Carolina 
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Senator Strom Thurmond, a 1964 convert to the party of Lincoln, kept the South alive for 
Nixon.  With the encouragement of Thurmond aide Harry Dent, Nixon had already met 
with southern Republicans and pledged his reliability on a slate of issues ranging from 
Supreme Court nominations to forced busing and textile policy.  Nixon repeated these 
pledges at the convention, where in backdoor meetings he convinced southern delegates 
of his trustworthiness on civil rights.66 
Graham was a conspicuous presence at the GOP convention, much more so than 
at the subsequent Democratic convention in Chicago, where he gave an invocation.  In 
Miami, the evangelist did more than offer a blessing.  According to reports leaked by the 
Nixon campaign team and tacitly confirmed by Graham, North Carolina GOP 
gubernatorial candidate Jim Gardner confided to the evangelist his support for Nixon, 
only to renege and embrace Reagan.67  The Associated Press, meanwhile, reported that 
Graham had discreetly visited Nixon’s convention headquarters to pick up a packet 
containing information about members of the highly-vulnerable Alabama delegation, 
which eventually voted 14-12 for Nixon over Reagan.68  As Graham directly 
acknowledged, he took part in high-level discussions between nominee-elect Nixon and 
party officials concerning the candidate’s vice presidential choice.  At the invitation of 
Nixon, Graham participated in a second, more conservative (and mostly southern and 
western) group whom the candidate consulted.  When Nixon unexpectedly asked 
                                               
 
66
 Nadine Cohodas, Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1993), 365; Dent, Prodigal, 77-84, 97; and Carter, Rage, 329-330. 
 
67
 Durham Herald and Lexington (NC) Dispatch (UPI), 2 November 1968; both in BGCA,  
CN 360, R31. 
 
68
 A Nixon staffer said that Graham merely wanted to get in touch with friends from Alabama at 
the convention.  See Arkansas Gazette, 27 June 1970, in BGCA, CN 360, R33.  Dennis Wainstock, The 
Turning Point: The 1968 United States Presidential Campaign (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1988), 107.   
  
 
196 
Graham, the lone non-politico present, for his input, the evangelist proposed Oregon 
Senator Mark Hatfield, among the most liberal vice presidential possibilities.  A highly 
unlikely nominee who would not have survived a Thurmond veto, Hatfield was a 
dedicated Southern Baptist whom Graham thought might balance the ticket and whom 
Nixon knew the evangelist favored.  Later that night, Graham informed Hatfield that he 
had not been selected.69 
 Nixon, of course, harbored hopes of continuing and even expanding the 
Republican Party’s presidential inroads in the South.  In 1968, he desired to engage the 
region in a manner resembling Eisenhower’s campaigns, in contrast to Barry Goldwater’s 
1964 appeal to the politics of massive resistance.  The resounding failure of Goldwater, 
who had alienated moderates nationwide, led Nixon toward a strategy by which, in the 
1969 words of Republican analyst Kevin Phillips, the GOP “abandoned its revolutionary 
Deep South scheme and returned to reliance on evolutionary inroads in the Outer 
South.”70  This “suburban strategy,” as one historian has recently termed it, focused on 
the region’s growing Sunbelt metropolises, invoking a rhetoric of color-blindness, rather 
than of overt racial backlash.71  Although Nixon aspired to be a national candidate with 
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broad-based appeal, his 1968 southern strategy lite emerged only after the third-party 
candidacy of Alabama Governor George Wallace appeared irreversible. 
Graham, Nixon later told H. R. Haldeman, “was enormously helpful to us in the 
Border South in ’68 and will continue to be in ’72.”72  The evangelist was particularly 
useful in Nixon’s efforts to minimize the electoral impact of Wallace, who single-
handedly kept several Deep South states out of the Republican column.  Nixon ultimately 
responded to Wallace by casting himself as “opposed to segregation but favoring only 
voluntary integration.”73  In seeking to accentuate the contrast between a reliable Nixon 
and a fire-breathing Wallace, Nixon staffers remained aware of Graham’s status as “the 
second most revered man in the South among adult voters.”  Campaign aide William 
Safire went so far as to propose using Graham directly against Wallace, an idea Nixon 
vetoed.  Nixon adman Harry Treleaven, meanwhile, sought to “follow up on the 
suggestion that we produce a Billy Graham program for use in the South.”74  Advice 
along these lines undoubtedly contributed to Graham’s visible attendance at a staged 
question and answer session that Nixon taped in Atlanta.  During the early October 
recording, which appeared on television screens throughout the South, Nixon contrasted 
his style with the oppositional approach of Wallace and cited Graham when discussing a 
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religious revival among American youth.75  Even Nixon’s September appearance at a 
Graham crusade service in the swing state of Pennsylvania played out against the 
backdrop of southern politics.  The televised service, during which the evangelist 
glowingly introduced Nixon, was broadcast the week before election day in a number of 
states—including, as newspapers noted, closely contested South Carolina and Texas.  In 
response, the Texas chapter of Wallace’s American Independent Party demanded a 
federal investigation into what his supporters saw as an unregulated advertisement for 
Nixon.  One San Antonio station consented to grant Wallace “equal time.”76   
In the election of 1968, Graham’s greatest contribution to the ambitions of Nixon 
in the South and elsewhere may have been his role in raising law-and-order issues in a 
manner beneficial to a mainstream conservative candidate.  His presence at the chaotic 
Democratic convention in Chicago only reinforced his sentiments along these lines; he 
remembered commiserating with Southern Democrats worried about the future of their 
nation and, likely, of their party.77  Race hovered over all of these concerns, of course, no 
matter how much Nixon sought to sell himself as a color-blind moderate.78  His 
calculated inattention to civil rights matters made him a respectable alternative to 
Wallace.  With Wallace running well in the Deep South and the plantation-belt regions of 
the Upper South, Nixon sought and largely won over the growing affluent suburban 
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population of the region, picking up several peripheral southern states, as well as 
Thurmond’s South Carolina.79 
 On a larger level, Graham was emblematic of the longterm, if gradual, success of 
the Republican Party in attracting presidential adherents in the South.  The evangelist was 
a forerunner among a powerful political, social, and religious network of southerners that 
had gravitated toward Nixon since the Eisenhower era.  Some of these southerners 
officially joined the GOP, while others remained conservative Democrats who supported 
Republican presidents.  Prominent members of what amounted to a kind of Nixon-
Graham nexus included John Connally, who eventually served as Secretary of Treasury 
under Nixon; Winton Blount, a key founder of the modern southern GOP who served as 
Nixon’s Postmaster General and later headed Connally’s unsuccessful 1980 presidential 
campaign; and William Walton, cofounder of the Memphis-based Holiday Inn hotel 
chain and an occasional guest at the Nixon White House.80  More peripheral figures 
included James Byrnes, who endorsed Nixon in 1960 and 1968; Democratic 
congressional Representatives Mendel Rivers and Frank Boykin, who had supported 
Eisenhower during the 1950s; Florida Democratic Senator George Smathers, who later 
backed his friend Nixon in 1972; George H. W. Bush, also a friend of Blount’s; and even 
Marvin Watson, a Southern Baptist and former Johnson aide whom the evangelist hoped 
might switch parties in the early 1970s.81  What these persons held in common was a 
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friendship with Billy Graham, which in some cases preceded their support for Nixon.  
Their closeness with Graham by no means ineluctably impelled them toward Nixon; but 
the synergy between the two trends is difficult to dismiss as a coincidence or a mere 
byproduct of the evangelist’s general popularity. 
 In 1968, as in 1960, Graham flirted with an endorsement of Nixon, but settled for 
something similar.  According to Harry Dent, who left Thurmond to serve as Nixon’s 
point man for the South, the evangelist was “prepared” to endorse the candidate “if 
necessary.”82  Graham was still useful in many other capacities.  His brother and son-in-
law were members of North Carolina’s sixteen-person Nixon campaign committee.83  
More significantly, the evangelist put his relationship with the sitting president to use by 
extending an olive branch to Johnson on behalf of Nixon.  During a mid-September 
meeting, which the evangelist had requested concerning a matter of “some importance,” 
Graham communicated the candidate’s respect for the president and assured Johnson that, 
if elected, Nixon would consult him and do nothing to damage his reputation.  The 
evangelist was repeating instructions Nixon had given him during their appearance 
together in Pittsburgh.  A gracious, if probably wary, Johnson reiterated his loyalty to the 
Democratic candidate, but said he would cooperate with a President Nixon.  According to 
a leading Johnson biographer, the overture worked at least momentarily, as an embittered 
Johnson remained no more eager to assist Hubert Humphrey, his vice president, than 
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Eisenhower had been to help Nixon in 1960.84  When Johnson supporters later believed 
Nixon had broken his pledge not to criticize the ex-president on Vietnam, Graham wrote 
a letter disputing the charges.85 
 The evangelist contributed to the 1968 campaign in several other, more visible 
ways.  Graham and Nixon appeared together in widely-circulated wire service 
photographs three times during the last two months of the campaign.  The Pittsburgh 
service was the most publicized of these appearances.  There, Graham felt compelled to 
remind the audience of his policy of avoiding political positions (and, for balance, read a 
telegram message from Hubert Humphrey).86  Two weeks later, Nixon again saw 
Graham’s mother during an election year, this time for a publicized tea at her home in 
Charlotte.  While campaigning in the Queen City, Nixon told a television interviewer of 
his basic agreement with the Brown decision, but expressed opposition to busing 
programs or other forms of “forced integration.”  At a well-attended rally, he invoked the 
“forgotten Americans.”87  The visit occurred nine days before Billy Graham Appreciation 
Day, an event sponsored by the city leadership.  Upon returning to his hometown, 
Graham spoke about “a great unheard from group . . . both black and white, who [is] 
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probably going to be heard from loudly at the polls.”88  The tea with Morrow Graham 
came amid sagging poll numbers for the candidate and was part of a late effort to 
emphasize the personal and familial side of a candidate ever vulnerable to the “Tricky 
Dick” tag.  When a former member of the Johnson administration questioned Nixon’s 
integrity, the evangelist countered with an October 16 statement describing his “friend” 
as “a man of high moral principles.”89  The two soon attended a church service together 
in Manhattan, talking a very public stroll afterwards.90  Around that time, a flu-stricken 
Graham returned to New York to preview a campaign documentary that presented Nixon 
as a family man.  Nixon thought it “too personal,” yet had agreed to let it run pending the 
approval of Graham.  The film soon received national release.91  Six days before the 
election, Graham confided to a Dallas newspaper that he had cast an absentee ballot for 
Nixon, a fact southern strategist Harry Dent used in television advertisements that likely 
had been in the works well before the evangelist’s revelation.92 
Two days before Graham turned age fifty, the evangelist received what one 
congratulatory telegram termed a “nice birthday embellishment,” a Nixon victory.93  The 
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evangelist visited Nixon at his campaign headquarters early the morning after election 
day.  With victory assured, Nixon asked Graham to lead a prayer.94  The presidential 
transition period left Graham at the height of his influence as a national figure.  During 
the final months of the Johnson administration, the evangelist visited South Vietnam on 
behalf of the sitting president, but also found time to ask John Connally to serve in the 
future administration as either Secretary of Treasury or Defense.95  When Nixon assumed 
office, the evangelist quite literally remained at his station.  He and Ruth had spent the 
final weekend of the administration as the Johnsons’ lone guests in the White House, and 
the following Monday the evangelist led a prayer at Nixon’s inauguration.96 
During his inaugural address, Nixon spoke eloquently of a “crisis of the spirit,” 
which in turn demanded an “answer of the spirit.”97  These words, while emblematic of 
the lofty, metaphysical turns of phrase common to speeches of state, also revealed a 
telling similarity between his rhetoric and that of Graham.  Since the mid-1950s, the 
evangelist had delivered a durable stock sermon on the theme of “America’s Great 
Crisis.”  In the sermon, Graham outlined four major crisis points in American history: the 
American Revolution, the Constitutional Convention, the Civil War, and finally, the 
present predicament.  Cold War anxieties aside, the contemporary crisis did not derive 
from a war or a political impasse.  It was rather a crisis of moral decline threatening to 
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sever the nation from its religious heritage.98  During the early years of the Nixon 
administration, the evangelist readily latched onto the president’s similar invocation of a 
crisis uniquely confined to the realm of character and values.  He quoted the inaugural 
address at an October prayer breakfast in Washington, where he delivered his own crisis 
sermon.  “I think that Mr. Nixon is right when he says that ours is a spiritual crisis,” he 
told an interviewer on British television.99  Graham believed the Nixon presidency would 
counteract this national crisis and revive the spiritual progress he thought had defined the 
latter half of the Eisenhower administration.100  Nixon’s inaugural performance caught 
the attention of other evangelical leaders, including SBC President Herschel Hobbs, a 
former Johnson supporter, who thanked the evangelist for his role in the service and 
praised Nixon for his spiritual earnestness.  “I have been delighted with the wonderful 
way that your administration is beginning,” Hobbs wrote to the president.  “I want it to 
continue that way not only because I happen[ed] to vote for you, but because I have a 
deep interest in you personally through our mutual friend Billy Graham.”101 
 
At the White House, in the Stadium—and on the Telephone 
 During and after the fall of Nixon, Graham often insisted that, contrary to popular 
perceptions, he had actually spent more time in the Eisenhower and Johnson White 
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Houses than he had with Nixon.  His point, while difficult to believe at the time, probably 
was technically accurate, particularly in light of his numerous overnight stays at the 
Johnson White House, which Graham once estimated at twenty-six in all.102  Nixon was 
not nearly as social a man as his predecessor.  Yet such clock-consciousness on the part 
of the evangelist belied the manifold other ways in which he assisted President Nixon.  
Indisputably, the evangelist played a vastly more important role in the Nixon 
administration than in any other administration before or since.  More than a sanctifying 
symbol or a link to a vital constituency (although he was those, too), Graham served as a 
political advisor who offered himself as such and whom Nixon saw as such.  He both 
administered and received political favors, and he delighted in analyzing the president’s 
television coverage and offering media pointers.  His periodic conversations with Nixon, 
who often phoned Graham (as well as many other supporters) after delivering major 
addresses, revealed the strikingly political nature of their relationship.  The president 
“wants to get Billy Graham in tomorrow to talk about politics” read one entry in Chief of 
Staff H. R. Haldeman’s diary.103 
 Besides their numerous conversations, the evangelist assisted Nixon by 
supporting or seeming to support his policies on such controversial issues as school 
busing and the Vietnam War.  He also appeared with Nixon at high-profile events 
intended in part to connect the president with his asserted silent majority.  Whether the 
issue was busing, Vietnam, or a national crisis of the spirit, the evangelist’s rhetoric often 
paralleled what pundits would now call the “talking points” of the administration.  For a 
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president who had courted the moderate white South so assiduously, the school 
desegregation issue presented a political dilemma (if not a moral one).  After a 1969 
Supreme Court decision mandating immediate integration, the president struggled to 
support obedience of the law without demonstrating enthusiasm for it.104  On the cusp of 
the 1970 school year—the first integrated term for many districts in the Deep South—
Nixon and aide Leonard Garment asked Graham to record five television spots for 
broadcast throughout the region.  The evangelist did so with the help of Charlotte-based 
media mogul Charles Crutchfield, a racial moderate cut in the mold of Winton Blount 
(i.e., a southern moderate on race, but little else) and with close ties to both Graham and 
the president.105  The spots contained a mixture of the evangelist’s traditional support for 
lawfulness and his equally customary defensiveness about the South.  He reaffirmed his 
regional identity and argued that most southerners recognized the value of the public 
education system.  While many persons “don’t agree with the changes that are taking 
place” in the schools, he contended, “I really believe the South will set an example of 
respect for law.”  In the end, he asserted, “anybody who expects to be able to make the 
South the butt of their jokes this fall is going to have to look for a new source of 
amusement.”  Many southern whites who heard him on donated media time throughout 
the region undoubtedly found these words more agreeable than an outright endorsement 
of integration.  Nixon later praised Graham for his work, both publicly and behind the 
scenes, “in developing support in the South for my civil rights policies.”  In truth, the 
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president sent strategically mixed signals to southern whites and blacks alike on the 
nature of those policies.  The 1970 television spots perpetuated this ambiguity.  In one 
version, Graham mentioned the “on record” opposition of Nixon to “busing to achieve 
racial balance.”106  Soon afterwards, the evangelist predicted that “blood will flow in the 
streets of northern cities” if the Supreme Court upheld judicially-mandated busing 
programs, which had then commenced in his hometown of Charlotte.107 
 Graham did not record media spots on behalf of Nixon’s Vietnam policy, yet he 
supported it through unmistakable gestures and only slightly less-explicit public 
statements.  Characteristically, the evangelist denied any charges that he was an 
unabashed supporter of the war effort.  If his communication with Johnson and Nixon is 
any indication, though, he remained a committed, if chastened hawk into the early 1970s.  
Writing to Johnson weeks before Nixon assumed office, Graham declared himself 
“enthusiastically optimistic about the prospects of Vietnam becoming a strong free nation 
in Southeast Asia.  I am certain that history is going to vindicate the American 
commitment if we don’t lose the peace in Paris.”108  While these words were partly 
intended to lift the spirits of Johnson, and while Graham followed most Americans in 
questioning the viability of a long-term American presence in Vietnam, they evinced an 
unwillingness to question the legitimacy of a war that continued into the administration 
of Nixon (who had also had much to lose in the Paris negotiations).  A more specific 
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indication of Graham’s views on Vietnam came from reports, based on conversations 
with missionary friends stationed in Southeast Asia, which the evangelist passed along to 
Nixon and, on a separate occasion, to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.  The 
missionaries and, by strong implication, Graham supported the policy of Vietnamization; 
they remained fiercely opposed to North Vietnam, but had grown skeptical about the 
viability of a visible American presence in South Vietnam.109  Whatever doubts Graham 
possessed about Vietnam (and they were not the doubts of a dove) rarely surfaced 
publicly.  When they did, he either mentioned that escalation of the war had occurred 
under Democratic administrations or, more commonly, he attempted to differentiate 
between support for the war and support for the president.110  While he had not “taken 
any public stand since the beginning on the Vietnam War,” he declared on a television 
show in 1970, he was “going to take the president at his word.”111  In the text of a 
Birmingham crusade service two years later, Graham more bluntly urged his crusade 
audience to “get behind the president’s goal and objectives of getting out of Vietnam.”112  
Wary of a land war from an early date, the evangelist appears to have favored a “hit quick 
and hit hard” war policy, one that would “get it over with,” yet “maintain the honor and 
dignity of America.”  He had made similar comments since 1964, well before Vietnam 
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became a quagmire.113  Early in 1973, he called Nixon to reaffirm his support for the 
president’s Vietnam policies.  Nixon hardly needed any reassurance; Graham had assisted 
his foreign policy in a multitude of ways.114 
 What would resonate in the memories of many Americans, though, were those 
moments when Graham services or appearances seemed to double as Nixon campaign 
rallies.  During a time when the evangelist had grown especially comfortable doing the 
kinds of things celebrities do (e.g., appearing on the late-night Dick Cavett Show and 
serving as Grand Marshall of the Rose Bowl Parade), he and Nixon made controversial 
appearances at high-profile events staged in the fictive Middle America.  These 
appearances came with Graham’s approval and, often, his direct encouragement.115  The 
first such event during the Nixon administration was the Knoxville crusade of May 1970.  
The East Tennessee Crusade occurred amid the 1970 congressional campaign, the second 
and more intense run of the southern strategy, when Nixon “waged a midterm campaign 
with very few parallels in American history.”116  Seeking to expand his right flank, the 
president intervened in a number of congressional campaigns, including Tennessee 
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Republican Bill Brock’s senatorial challenge to liberal incumbent Albert Gore, Sr.  With 
encouragement from Winton Blount and others, Nixon also opposed the gubernatorial run 
of George Wallace, who needed the office as a base for his presidential ambitions.  In 
advance of this more aggressive stage of the southern strategy, the Nixon team had 
already shifted from a nominal 1968 theme of national unity to an outright embrace of the 
silent majority (or, alternately, Middle America) and was keen to engage in suitable 
symbolic politics.117  Harry Dent suggested inviting country and western musicians to 
perform at White House functions.  Graham had already proposed the services of his new 
friend, Johnny Cash, who had accepted an invitation to perform in Knoxville.118 
The Knoxville crusade differed from Graham’s earlier desegregated services in 
the 1950s and 1960s South because it wholly affirmed community norms, rather than 
even modestly prodding them. 119  Knoxville indicated the momentary alignment of his 
domestic crusades with the Nixonian political style.  As the crusade approached its end, 
newspapers reported that the president would participate in a service billed as “Youth 
Night.”  Although he had attended and been introduced at other crusade services, Nixon 
took the unprecedented step of addressing the audience in Knoxville, located in a heavily 
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Republican part of Tennessee.  The visit was apparently the president’s idea.  His 
presence complicated Graham’s earlier promise to “stay away from politics” during the 
crusade.120  An overflow crowd of 100,000, twice the size of the average crusade crowd 
in Knoxville, gathered inside and around the University of Tennessee’s Neyland Stadium 
to hear Nixon and the evangelist.  Introducing Nixon, Graham quoted Nixon on the 
“crisis of the spirit” and highlighted the stature and difficulty of his job: “All Americans 
may not agree with the decisions a President makes—but he is our President,” the leader 
of “the blacks as well as the whites.”  As the conservative Knoxville Journal and many of 
the letters that poured into both city papers argued, the service functioned as a 
performance of the silent majority, complete with a small, but vocal group of protesters 
who acted as foils.  In his brief address, Nixon echoed Graham’s conciliatory tone, 
although he expressed pleasure that “there seems to be a rather solid majority on one side 
rather than the other side tonight.”  The other side consisted of around three-hundred 
demonstrators who intermittently chanted antiwar slogans throughout the service.  To the 
delight of most audience members, the protesters struck a nerve in black BGEA vocalist 
Ethel Waters.  “If I was over there close enough, I would smack you,” she declared.  “But 
I love you, and I’d give you a big hug and kiss.”121 
 The Nixon appearance received widespread news coverage, not for its theatrics, 
but because it played out amid his continuous catering to the white southern electorate 
and, more recently, his efforts to improve his standing among American youth.  (This 
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was his first public appearance since the Kent State massacre of May 4.)122  CBS 
television news reporter Dan Rather linked the visit with Nixon’s intervention in the 
gubernatorial race in nearby Alabama.123  Connections with the Tennessee senatorial race 
were more evident.  The delegation traveling with Nixon from Washington, DC, to 
Knoxville consisted of Bill Brock, several other Tennessee Republicans running for 
office that year, and a Democrat whose district included East Tennessee.  Despite having 
an event scheduled in Knoxville that very day, Senator Gore was not invited, ostensibly 
on the grounds that he did not hail from East Tennessee (even though a Memphis 
Republican was part of the delegation).  Nixon and Brock posed beside each other in 
group photographs.124  As the 1970 election grew nearer, Graham explicitly denied any 
connection to the southern strategy.  He did, though, echo a Nixon campaign theme in 
declaring his preference for “the moderates and the conservatives” whom he believed 
voters should give “a chance.”125  Whether assisted or not by the Knoxville service, 
Brock went on to defeat Gore in November.  The crusade also reverberated in local 
politics when a Republican congressional incumbent falsely accused his Democratic 
opponent of picketing the Graham service.126  Overall, though, 1970 was not a propitious 
year for Nixon in the South, where his rightward shift reprised the Goldwater failure of 
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1964.  The GOP gained two Senate seats, but surrendered twelve net seats in the House, 
and Wallace regained the Alabama governorship.127 
 Two other events highlighted the Graham-Nixon friendship for millions of 
Americans.  The first of these, the Honor America Day celebration of July 4, 1970, 
represented a somewhat anticlimactic fruition of the evangelist’s desire for alternative 
rallies in the face of political protests.  With the approval of Nixon, Graham helped to 
plan the nominally bipartisan affair, which featured performances by Bob Hope, Glenn 
Campbell, and other beacons of Middle America.  At the rally, which Graham 
unsuccessfully encouraged Nixon to attend, the evangelist delivered a rousing defense of 
American institutions and patriotism.  He tapped E. V. Hill, a black minister from Los 
Angeles whom Graham viewed as a possible Nixon ally, to emcee the service.128 
Another controversial event took place over a year later in Charlotte, where 
Charles Crutchfield proposed an extravagant gala in honor of the evangelist.  Nixon 
(whom Crutchfield invited), Connally, Strom Thurmond, and most of the leading 
politicians of North Carolina journeyed to Charlotte to celebrate Billy Graham Day.  
According to the patently unsubtle notes of Haldeman, the event was also a “contrived 
deal to calm [the] So[uth]” and to bring blacks and whites together amid the 
implementation of court-ordered desegregation programs.  It was scheduled so as not to 
coincide with the start of the school year.129  Nixon clearly followed Eisenhower and 
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Johnson in thinking of Graham as an ideal mediator of southern race relations.  The 
political benefits of the event struck many observers as much more apparent, though. 
Billy Graham Day encapsulated both the obvious and indirect elements of the 
southern strategy.  As one Nixon critic noted, the October 15 celebration coincided with a 
major administration announcement on textile policy.130  The day’s festivities included a 
parade, a private reception complete with cross-shaped sandwiches, and the unveiling of 
a plaque at Graham’s birthplace.  In an address at the Charlotte Coliseum, Graham 
praised his hometown, which had “peacefully” followed “demanding” court rulings.  “If 
all Americans were like the people of the Piedmont section of the Carolinas, we would 
have little of the problems we have today in the country,” the evangelist said.  Nixon’s 
brief address received national coverage and (as Graham reminded him) was broadcast 
nationwide on the BGEA’s Hour of Decision radio show.  “And while it was, indeed, 
Graham’s Day, it might as well have been the beginning of President Nixon’s campaign,” 
declared the critical Charlotte Observer.  Subsequently released documents showed 
somewhat tense consultations among city leaders, White House staffers, and local 
Republican leaders in organizing the event.  Presidential aide Charles Colson solicited 
follow-up phone calls to leading Southern Baptists and reported their positive responses 
to the Charlotte visit.  “I’ll you this, boy,” Nixon replied to Colson.  “Billy Graham 
country . . . . They’ll go out and pray and work like nothin[g].”131 
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 While Graham’s relationship with Nixon was not completely a one-way street, the 
traffic flow remained imbalanced.  To be sure, Nixon made attempts to reciprocate 
Graham’s loyalty.  The president once ordered a report on a Washington Post journalist 
who had written a critical piece about the evangelist.132  Similarly, a Baton Rouge VISTA 
director who had criticized Graham during a crusade there soon faced a federal 
investigation.133  After the evangelist complained to John Connally about a possible tax 
audit of the BGEA, Nixon pledged to ensure that the IRS instead looked into his Jewish 
critics and the head of the liberal National Council of Churches.134  For his part, Graham 
thanked Nixon for the fact that many of the president’s friends had apparently started 
supporting the BGEA, as well.135 
 Ultimately, though, the value of these contributions paled in comparison to the 
price Graham paid for his loyalty to Nixon.  The toll continued into the present century 
with the 2002 release of a White House recording that quickly came to symbolize the 
nadir of Graham’s association with Nixon.  Their exchange of February 1, 1972, 
suggested how distant Graham’s relationship with Nixon then stood from any semblance 
of pastoral care.  The heart of their conversation was tinged with anti-Semitism.  It began 
as a typical discussion about the upcoming presidential race, with Graham counseling the 
president to run on his record and his “integrity,” and (perhaps with Knoxville and 
                                               
 
132
 Staff Secretary to Hebert Klein, 17 July 1969; and Klein to Nixon, 18 July 1969; both in 
NARA, NPM, WHCF, Subject Files (SF), Religious Matters (RM), 1-“1-69/12-70.”   
 
133
 Athens (TN) Post-Athenian (AP), 2 November 1970, in BGCA, CN 360, R33.  For more on the 
Baton Rouge crusade, see Chapter VI. 
 
134
 Nixon and Haldeman conversation, 13 September 1971, in Stanley Kutler, ed., Abuse of 
Power: The New Nixon Tapes (New York: Free Press, 1997), 31-32.  
 
135
 White House conversation 16-124, 10 December 1971, NARA, NPM. 
  
 
216 
Charlotte in mind) to use television more effectively by creating “events” at which to 
appear.  The evangelist then mentioned an upcoming meeting with the editors of Time 
magazine, which he said had “dropped” him after the passing of conservative publisher 
Henry Luce.  Ever ready for a round of media criticism—and, by extension, Jew-
bashing—Nixon launched into a tirade against the Jewish-dominated media.  Graham 
was more concerned with the pornography industry than with mainstream publications, 
yet he certainly agreed with the thrust of Nixon’s critique of liberal media elites.  Graham 
likewise denounced the Jewish “stranglehold” on the media and, as the president urged 
him on, declared that even those Jews who “swarm around” him because of his support 
for Israel did not “know how I really feel about what they’re doing to this country.”  He 
“would stand up under proper circumstances,” he cryptically added.  The conversation 
revealed the extent to which mainstream evangelicals like Graham distinguished between 
Jews as a People and Jews as people.  In response to the latter, non-covenantal sense of 
Jewry—which Graham apparently segregated from his intimacy with Israeli Prime 
Minister Golda Meir and his friendliness toward the Anti-Defamation League—he was 
willing to indulge Nixon’s prejudices and, in this case, voice a few of his own.  Graham 
did not share Nixon’s obsession with liberal Jews, but neither was he willing to contradict 
it.  The conversation eventually turned away from the Jewish media and back to Nixon’s 
intended topic: politics, namely the status of John Connally in the administration.  Nixon, 
who harbored dreams of asking Connally to serve as his second-term vice president, was 
concerned about the possible resignation of the Treasury Secretary, then suffering from 
health problems.136  Nixon often discussed Connally with Graham and in 1970 had 
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considered asking the evangelist to make a second request to Connally to join the 
administration; Haldeman eventually made the successful pitch.  In the February 1972 
conversation, Graham averred that Connally was “important politically right now” and 
agreed to lend his help with what Haldeman called the “Connally problem.”137   
 The infamous Graham-Nixon exchange revealed the depths of Graham’s 
involvement in the 1972 campaign, during which he behaved in a manner further belying 
his self-proclaimed nonpartisanship.  After momentarily considering steering clear of the 
election—to the point where he had drafted a letter to Nixon saying he would do so—
Graham explicitly made himself available for campaign work that day.  According to 
Haldeman, Graham “agreed to hit the key states during the fall, especially Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, Illinois, maybe New York, and California.”  Graham, the Nixon aide continued, 
would “answer attacks on us and that sort of thing whenever he felt he could, if I would 
direct the request to him.”138  Nixon assigned Haldeman to handle direct communication 
with the evangelist and later gave him instructions to call Graham “about once every two 
weeks to discuss the political situation.”139  Haldeman was to keep in touch with 
Connally, as well.  Using Haldeman as an intermediary kept Nixon, who wanted to make 
sure Graham felt included in the campaign, removed from overt politicking with the 
evangelist.  The arrangement also protected Graham, allowing him to claim in a press 
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conference that he only occasionally talked with Nixon and that the president never 
sought advice on specific policies.140  According to talking papers prepared for 
Haldeman, suggested topics for discussions with Graham and Connally included the 
candidacy of George Wallace, school busing, and the status of prospective Democratic 
nominee Edmund Muskie.  Thus, while the evangelist undoubtedly remained oblivious to 
the dirtiest tricks of the Nixon campaign, he offered advice of obvious use for the 
reelection effort.141 
 As in earlier campaigns, Graham’s direct political assistance to Nixon in 1972 fell 
into two broad categories: a southern strategy and an outreach to evangelical voters.  
Updated and intensified since the 1968 election, both elements complemented the 
president’s search for a new electoral majority.142  Much of Graham’s advice held 
implications for the South, where the evangelist had ties with figures ranging from 
Johnson to Wallace and Ruben Askew, the moderate Democratic governor of Florida.  
Graham consulted Askew about the status of McGovern in the Sunshine State and 
reported to Nixon about his election-year conversations with Johnson, whom the 
evangelist believed to be “secretly in favor of Nixon.”  With great exaggeration, Johnson 
had earlier told Graham, “I’m still a Democrat,” but “I’m not sure how long I’m gonna 
remain one.”  Later in the election year, Haldeman asked Graham to advise Johnson on 
how to handle an upcoming visit with Nixon’s campaign chair.  Graham did as requested 
and passed along a suggestion from Johnson (prescient, in retrospect) that Nixon should 
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appear presidential and largely ignore his opponent.  (Graham, meanwhile, encouraged 
Nixon to attack the welfare state in his August acceptance speech.)  Around that time, 
Graham turned down a request from Democratic vice-presidential candidate Sargent 
Shriver to pray at the Democratic convention, and Johnson informed Graham that he 
would not stump on behalf of his party’s ticket.143 
 By the spring of 1972, Nixon’s most realistic barrier to reelection was another 
Wallace campaign, which would surely cost the president votes in the South.  Graham 
had helped to effect this comfortable situation.  One year earlier, he had expressed 
concern about the popularity in the South of prospective Democratic candidate Edmund 
Muskie.144  On the GOP side, Harry Dent had informed Graham that Oregon Senator 
Mark Hatfield, a prospective Republican protest candidate for president, would receive 
Nixon’s full backing for reelection if he stayed out of the presidential primaries.145  If 
Wallace would also stay out of the presidential race, a landslide victory appeared likely.  
In 1968, Nixon had cast himself as a moderate vis-à-vis Wallace, and Dent had argued 
afterward that a “moderate South would help ‘bring the nation together’ and concurrently 
help the fortunes of the Nixon Administration as well as Republicans generally.”  Soon, 
however, political analysts Ben Wattenberg and Richard Scammon published alluring 
data from the 1968 election.  In the South, 80 percent of Wallace voters would have 
otherwise backed Nixon.  “Only in . . . a two-party context,” warned Kevin Phillips, 
“would the racially-motivated core Wallace vote be available to the President in 1972.”  
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Such an apple was too tempting for Nixon to resist taking a complete bite, rather than the 
more restrained nibble of 1968.  Recognizing the obvious benefits of modifying his 1968 
strategy and ensuring that Wallace run as a Democrat (where he would not survive the 
primaries), Nixon put Dent in charge of his “Wallace-watch.”146 
 Graham unofficially served on this watch.  He was particularly valuable because 
of his cordial relationship with Wallace, which dated back to their awkward meeting 
during the 1965 Montgomery crusade.  In June 1972, Nixon told Haldeman that the 
evangelist 
has a line to Wallace through Mrs. Wallace [Cornelia, his second wife], 
who has become a Christian.  Billy will talk to Wallace whenever we want 
him to.  [Nixon] feels our strategy must be to keep Wallace in the 
Democratic Party and Billy can help us on that. . . . Graham should put the 
pressure on Wallace to decide whether he’s going to be used as a spoiler, 
which would surely help elect [George] McGovern.147 
 
This exchange occurred two months after an assassination attempt had left the governor 
paralyzed from the waist down.  Graham talked with Wallace in a pastoral capacity 
during the week of the shooting, and in July the evangelist agreed to help dissuade the 
ailing governor from a third-party run.148  In a conversation with Wallace following a 
major operation, Graham told him that his candidacy would take away many more votes 
from Nixon than from McGovern.  “Wallace said he would never turn one hand to help 
McGovern . . . ,” Haldeman recorded, “and that he’s 99 percent sure he won’t do it, but 
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he won’t close the door completely.”149  The president considered Graham for the task of 
making a final appeal to Wallace.  Nixon chose Connally for the job instead, although 
Graham agreed to “get a read” on Wallace in late September.  Blount, who ran 
unsuccessfully for a Senate seat in 1972, had also served as a liaison between Nixon and 
the governor, whose health prevented serious consideration of a renewed run.150 
 If Nixon’s attempted co-option of the Wallace vote stood as the foremost 
evidence of his decision to embrace racial politics in the white South, then his belated 
support for the senatorial run of converted Republican Jesse Helms in 1972 offered 
further confirmation.  Here, as well, Graham had a part.  In an election in which Nixon 
hung out to dry a number of GOP senatorial candidates in the South, including Winton 
Blount, the president found time to visit North Carolina and publicly endorse Helms days 
before the election.151  At some point during the election year Helms and his wife had 
paid a well-photographed visit to the Graham home in Montreat.152  A turn in Montreat 
was becoming something of a rite of passage for Tarheel politicians.  (The Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate also visited that year, motivated by an ad his GOP opponent had 
run picturing a golf outing with the evangelist.)153  Still, a decision on Graham’s part to 
avoid the particularly contentious and controversial Helms campaign, which had drawn 
national attention, would have been more than understandable.  The Montreat visit likely 
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benefited the former radio and television host Helms, who ran on the racially- and 
ethnically-loaded slogan, “He’s One of Us!”154   
Graham’s involvement by degrees in the Republican southern strategy raises the 
question of his ultimate complicity in the Nixonian politics of race.  Little reason exists to 
believe that the evangelist avowedly endorsed Nixon’s shift toward Wallace-style 
strategies and rhetoric, or that he considered the president or even Helms to be a race-
baiter.155  Yet Graham knew well that the motivations of many southern white voters 
extended beyond simply supporting the most God-fearing candidate, and he knew why 
southerners in Charlotte and elsewhere felt marginalized.  His election advice dating back 
to 1956 and 1960, as well as his efforts to check Wallace, demonstrated his awareness 
and apparent acceptance of the fact that the race issue could work to the GOP’s 
advantage.  Like any effective politician, moreover, the evangelist recognized the 
importance of communicating by suggestion rather than by declaration.  Graham came 
about his own dissembling with much more anguish and much less calculation than did 
Nixon, yet he had repeatedly skirted the truth when praising the president while denying 
any political motivations.  In the early 1970s, Graham clearly knew the electoral score.  
He knew why Haldeman asked him about the politics of busing.  He knew why most 
Wallace supporters would rather back Nixon than McGovern—and, despite previous 
hopes to the contrary, he eventually confessed to Haldeman his sense that the president 
stood little chance of attracting new black voters in 1972.156  Content in his belief that 
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further court rulings or strict enforcement of existing civil rights laws would only 
exacerbate tensions in the South, Graham could reassure himself that Nixon’s popularity 
and reelection would serve to benefit other, more important causes.  Conscious intentions 
aside (and included), Graham implicated himself in Nixon’s racial politics.  He abetted a 
return to Barry Goldwater’s 1964 strategy of “hunting where the ducks are.”157  
 As long as Wallace remained out of the race, though, Nixon largely had his ducks 
in a row in Dixie, where his liberal antiwar opponent, George McGovern, had little 
chance of summoning traditional Democratic loyalties.  The evangelical community, 
however, stood as an enticing source for additional inroads.  Following the 1970 midterm 
elections, the president emphasized to Haldeman the need “to remember that our primary 
source of support will be among the fundamentalist Protestants, and we can probably 
broaden that base of support.”158  Graham—with his obvious appeal among fellow 
evangelicals, including many traditionally Democratic southerners—was a logical choice 
to assist such an effort.  In keeping with Nixon’s dreams of a sweeping electoral 
realignment, Graham hoped to widen the president’s support among evangelicals 
(especially evangelical youth), whom Graham somewhat excessively feared might be 
attracted by McGovern’s credentials as a minister’s son.159  The 1972 race represented 
the high point of Graham’s service as both a bridge to evangelicals and a strategist in the 
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larger effort to establish them as a pillar of the new majority.  While he had previously 
served as a conduit between presidents and conservative Protestants, his work intensified 
during Nixon’s first term, when one presidential supporter proposed him as a “liaison 
between the Office of the President and the various religious groups in this country.”160  
Although Graham never accepted an official position, he helped to organize the 
unprecedented and controversial White House church services and prepared a broad-
ranging list of possible Protestant participants.161  Traffic on the bridge between 
evangelicals and the White House ran both ways, of course, to the point where Graham 
complained of an inability to satiate the many evangelicals who expected him to facilitate 
face time with Nixon.162 
 Graham did his best to balance supply and demand, although in most cases the 
push came from Nixon, much to the delight of the evangelist.  In addition to his 
assistance with the White House church services, Graham set up numerous meetings 
between Nixon and clergymen, usually Protestants and quite often of the conservative 
type Nixon preferred.  (Meanwhile, Department of Veterans Affairs administrator and 
Southern Baptist leader Fred Rhodes kept Charles Colson apprised of Graham’s public 
statements about Nixon.)163  Some of these meetings concerned specific policy matters, 
while others were clearly electoral in nature.  In 1970, for example, Graham advised 
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Nixon to meet with the moderate Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and made 
sure to note two Catholic-related policies many Baptists opposed: funding for parochial 
education and U.S. relations with the Vatican.164  The evangelist also facilitated an 
extended March 1970 meeting between the president and a group of about a dozen black 
church leaders, including E. V. Hill, who were upset by administration plans to cut social 
programs.  Graham proposed the meeting at a low-profile gathering he had called 
between white and black evangelicals seeking to find common ground.165 
 Of more striking and long-term significance, though, were Graham’s efforts to 
connect Nixon with the conservative white evangelical establishment.  In August 1971, 
Nixon met with a “who’s who” of evangelical leaders and Graham supporters, including 
Harold Lindsell of Christianity Today and W. A. Criswell.  Afterwards, Nixon and 
Graham chatted in the oval office.  “Well, they will go back,” the president told Graham, 
“and they influence so many people, you know.”  Graham voiced hope that Criswell was 
coming around on the issue of granting recognition to mainland China, a policy that had 
exposed Nixon to much criticism from Cold War hawks on the right.  “That’s what we 
wanted,” added the evangelist, who had set up the meeting at the request of the 
president.166  Indeed, the evangelist helped to mollify the periodic tensions between 
Nixon’s conservative rhetoric and some of his more moderate policies.  Graham used his 
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influence to ease worries among conservative Protestants about the appointment of Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Jr., as special envoy to the Vatican, recommending that Nixon invite SBC 
President Carl F. Bates to officiate a White House church service.167  He later organized a 
consultation between Henry Kissinger and a diverse group of several dozen Christian 
“friends and acquaintances of Billy Graham” to again explain the administration’s China 
policy.  The guest list ranged from divines to donors (i.e., from televangelist Oral Roberts 
to Holiday Inn head William Walton).168 
 Years removed from the intense electioneering of the Nixon White House, 
Graham would express incredulity when presented with evidence of his role in such a 
deeply politicized administration (a role that, of course, liberal critics of both Graham and 
Nixon at the time took for granted).  The president “made it clear to Haldeman that he 
wanted to nurture whatever influence I might have with certain religious leaders,” the 
evangelist wrote with seeming ingenuousness in his autobiography.  “Needless to say, 
this was not discussed with me at the time.”169  Here, as with many of Graham’s 
professions of political innocence, the evidence strongly indicates otherwise.  It also 
suggests that Graham viewed Nixon as an ideal conduit for his own concerns, specifically 
his desire to maximize the influence of evangelicals in national politics.  Of utmost 
importance in this respect was the reelection of the president in 1972.  In addition to 
assisting with damage control among evangelicals, Graham helped to secure the coalition 
that gave Nixon a triumphant second-term mandate.  The election year saw an all-out 
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effort by the Nixon campaign to woo conservative religious groups, be they Catholic or 
Protestant (or, in a few cases, Jewish).  Retaining and expanding the evangelical vote, 
though, was a paramount priority in a White House that, to its eventual detriment, refused 
to take victory for granted.  Indeed, Graham had already stressed to Nixon aide Leonard 
Garment the hunger among many church-goers for a brand of social involvement more 
palatable than the liberal activism presumably emanating from so many pulpits.170  
Colson’s notes from an apparent talk with Nixon include a blunt proposal for appealing to 
this population: “[U]se Graham’s organization.”171  Haldeman’s records suggest a similar 
ambition and also reveal the extent to which Graham reciprocated (but not to the point of 
surrendering the BGEA’s mailing list).172 
 In addition to speaking highly of Nixon at nearly every possible moment in press 
conferences or interviews during the 1972 campaign, Graham served less conspicuously 
as a liaison between Nixon and a wealth of conservative Protestant electoral capital.  He 
recommended, for example, that Nixon establish contacts with the pentecostal-
charismatic evangelist Oral Roberts, who had expressed to Harry Dent a desire to assist 
the campaign.173  That year, Nixon considered accepting an invitation to address the SBC, 
where Graham was scheduled to appear.  He would have been the first president to do so, 
and even some pro-Nixon Southern Baptists opposed such a blatantly political move.174  
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Graham also wanted Nixon to attend Explo ’72, a well-publicized Dallas festival 
proposed as an evangelical alternative to the counterculture; but Campus Crusade for 
Christ director Bill Bright objected to such a visit.  A talking paper for one of 
Haldeman’s conversations with Graham notes that a survey of Explo ’72 participants 
indicated strong backing of the president.  “Is it now appropriate . . . to work with [BGEA 
team member] T. W. Wilson to bring some staff of the Committee for the Re-Election of 
the President [CREEP] together with Bright of Campus Crusade?” Haldeman was to ask 
Graham.  Either Haldeman or Graham proposed that Bright and the evangelist remain in 
the background, while putting the Nixon forces in touch with evangelical youth workers 
potentially willing to take leave time for campaign work.  Graham soon passed along “the 
names of all his Christian youth types.”  He also facilitated a consultation between 
Nixon’s youth division and a group consisting of BGEA staffers and/or evangelical youth 
leaders.175  Although CREEP ultimately chose to eschew the formal mobilization of 
Nixon-leaning clergy, the BGEA apparently surrendered the services of Harry Williams, 
the evangelistic equivalent of a precinct whiz.176  As if to confirm the success of the 
Nixon campaign’s outreach to evangelicals (and his own role in this effort), Graham sent 
to Haldeman an election-eve story noting the influence among evangelicals of his 
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backing of the president.  Earlier, when Graham had called Haldeman to recommend 
Bible verses for Nixon to reference during his acceptance speech at the Republican 
convention, the evangelist argued that the president’s strongest supporters would be 
expecting as much.177 
 Graham had more than earned the right to expect reciprocation from the president.  
A few weeks before the election, he told Nixon he was available to do “anything you can 
think of you want me to do. . . .  I’m not in a position to know all I could do, but you just 
tell me and I’ll do it.”  With his reelection effectively guaranteed, Nixon assured the 
evangelist that he did not “need any guidance. . . . Your political instincts are very 
good.”178  By then, Graham had again declared his intention to vote for Nixon.179  In the 
aftermath of the landslide victory, the evangelist’s influence in the Nixon White House 
appeared as entrenched as ever.  In February 1973, Nixon told Haldeman “to use Billy 
Graham also in the kitchen Cabinet,” which Nixon was assembling to discuss his second-
term agenda.180  Graham could take comfort in the knowledge that Nixon had won an 
overwhelming victory among evangelicals, southerners, and most Americans.  The quiet 
revolution was silent no more.  Within five months of the election, though, the Watergate 
crisis began to expose a side of the Nixon White House Graham may never have known 
directly, but from which he could not escape implication.   
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Whither the New South? 
 During the years of the Nixon administration, Graham exposed himself to an 
unprecedented degree of criticism, spread equally among secular and religious 
commentators, mostly of a liberal persuasion.  Some saw Graham as pernicious, others 
saw him as naive, and almost all left-leaning critics linked him with socio-political 
reaction.  (Fundamentalist critics, meanwhile, still saw him as a sell out to ecumenism.)  
A less skeptical generation of journalists had, with a few exceptions, considered his 
visibility in the Eisenhower and Johnson White Houses, in addition to his less-
remembered presence at Kennedy’s prayer breakfasts, as more ceremonial than 
political—as transparent parades of symbolism rather than conniving products of 
memoranda.181  In contrast, Graham’s support for President Nixon took on a more 
publicly partisan air, making it one of the defining issues of his career, the persistent 
opening question during his election-year press conferences.  For Life correspondent 
Barry Farrell and other elite journalists, the evangelist shifted when Nixon took office 
from being a source of mere disapproval (an influential simpleton, but little more than a 
proxy for the underside of Cold War society) to being an “American Rasputin” (a serious 
threat to the liberal consensus).  For another author, Graham was the atavistic “voice of 
old country boys and Middle Americans everywhere,” and for aging nemesis Reinhold 
Niebuhr, the evangelist had helped to effect the “unofficial establishment” of religion in 
the White House.182  Other analysts applied sociologist Robert Bellah’s popular “civil 
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religion” thesis to the Honor America Day speaker and Rose Bowl Parade grand marshal.  
In a 1967 essay, Bellah defined civil religion as a set of rituals, beliefs, and symbols that 
legitimated and lent transcendence to the national mission, broadly conceived and often 
historically interpreted through the narrative lens of the biblical Israel.  Importantly, he 
distinguished this civil religion from official religions, including Christianity.  While 
Bellah saw civil religion as a vehicle potentially useful for all types of political ends, 
many more Vietnam-era critics saw its obvious expression in the unabashed God-and-
country talk of war supporters, including Billy Graham.183  The civil religion thesis left 
the evangelist vulnerable to charges not only of blind patriotism, but of heresy, as well.  
Several Bellah-influenced works appeared denouncing the “Christian Americanism” and 
“folk religion” of Graham and the Nixon White House.184 
 The presence of Graham in the Nixon administration took on particular 
significance for southern observers participating in a larger debate over the direction and 
fate of the South.  At this critical stage for a region ambiguously on the cusp of the post-
civil rights era, the evangelist provoked strong criticism from such liberal-leaning 
southerners as prophet-theologian Will D. Campbell and newspaper editor Reese 
Cleghorn.  In earlier periods—during the Little Rock school crisis and, later, during the 
early years of the Johnson administration—Graham and many white southern liberals had 
not stood so far apart on racial matters.  The polarizing politics of the southern strategy, 
though, forced southerners to choose sides. 
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The most publicized criticism of Graham from the southern left appeared in the 
form of “An Open Letter to Billy Graham,” published in early 1971 by Campbell and 
Berea College professor James Y. Holloway in Katallagete, the eclectic publication of 
the Committee of Southern Churchmen.  Campbell, the lone white participant in the 
founding of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, had risked his career and 
livelihood on behalf of racial equality.  Since the mid-1960s, he had criticized liberals 
and conservatives alike for failing to address the needs of poor southern whites.  
Holloway shared these sentiments.  The Katallagete letter read partly as a squabble 
among southerners, with Campbell and Holloway accusing their “Baptist brother” of 
becoming a “court prophet” for Nixon.  As students at liberal divinity and graduate 
schools during an earlier era, the authors had defended Graham’s evangelism.  Now, in 
his services in Knoxville and in his comments about busing and Vietnam, Graham 
blessed the Nixon line.  Such concerns with civility and respectability, Campbell and 
Holloway implied in their open letter and elsewhere, served as crutches for existing 
institutions and sapped Christianity of its prophetic character.  In an intentionally 
eccentric invocation of scripture, they urged Graham to “prophesy to the Pentagon and 
White House—in the tradition of Micaiah, son of Imlah” (i.e., to declare divine judgment 
on temporal rulers).  The shift of Campbell and Holloway from defending (or tolerating) 
Graham to criticizing him held significance for larger debates about the South.  Only with 
the rise of Nixon’s southern strategy had they begun to associate the evangelist with 
negative influences on the region.  In many respects, their Baptist perspective held more 
in common with Graham’s theology than with the ideology of many New Left radicals; 
they shared a wariness of liberal legalism and a bias toward personal redemption.  They 
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differed sharply, though, on matters of political power, specifically that of the Nixon 
administration, which Campbell and Holloway saw as part of a fallen order.185  When 
Graham became a spokesman for this ordained authority, he lost the support of two 
previously sympathetic southerners.  Their open letter received national coverage and, in 
a rare direct response to critics, drew a cordial letter from Graham, who offered to meet 
with the authors.  According to Campbell, though, their subsequent inquiries went 
without response.186 
Another reader of the Katallagete piece was Charlotte Observer editor Reese 
Cleghorn, who applied it to the Billy Graham Day festivities.  Cleghorn, who came to the 
paper from the liberal Southern Regional Council, had sharply criticized the evangelist in 
a 1969 column for the Atlanta Journal, where he then worked.  The evangelist’s 
“abysmally shallow” theology and “often ill-informed” world views were prominently on 
display during Billy Graham Day, Cleghorn believed.  An Observer editorial blasted the 
evangelist for his comfort with “the material things,” as well as “the affluent and the 
powerful.”  Discreetly alluding to the Katallagete piece, the editorial linked the day with 
the machinations of the southern strategy.  “Charlotte and the changing South are in 
difficult struggle, much of which has a moral dimension to which people are blinded,” the 
editorial read.  “Mr. Graham’s court in Washington plays it, almost always, as nothing 
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more than a political drama.”187  The more conservative Charlotte News, in contrast, 
praised Graham as a forward thinker who, especially on racial matters, had “contributed, 
in his own way, to deepening the social consciousness of conservative Christianity.”188  
Both of the Charlotte editorials contained elements of truth.  Through his personal 
connections and his popularity as a public figure, Graham participated in the southern 
strategy of Richard Nixon.  In the process, he continued helping to facilitate a new type 
of southern politics in which the GOP became more appealing to white southerners—
first, on a national level, and with time, on a local one, as well.  Yet Graham did not do so 
through appeals to the shibboleths of racial solidarity.  A southern moderate who had 
supported desegregation at an early date and who later tolerated the thrust of the Great 
Society, but who evinced a clear preference for Republican presidential politics, Graham 
spoke a language of regional progress suggestive of the Sunbelt image, rather than the 
white backlash.  Whatever the personal preferences for business-oriented racial 
moderation among Graham’s GOP intimates during the Nixon presidency, though, many 
of them opportunistically dipped into the playbook of Wallace (or tolerated doing so), 
especially after the 1968 election.  As long as Graham remained an obvious Nixon 
partisan, he could not avoid association with such political realities.  As Campbell and 
Holloway recognized, the evangelist ultimately represented a decidedly non-prophetic 
politics more than a reactionary posture.  During the polarized Nixon era, however, when 
the president implicitly and sometimes overtly asked Americans to choose between the 
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stark options of a silent majority or a privileged elite, non-prophetic politics often 
functioned as reactionary politics.  The strategies followed by Graham’s ideal politician 
ironically collapsed or subsumed the very space where the politics of decency had found 
refuge.  Centrism became synonymous with cynicism, threatening to render Graham’s 
brand of moderation a rhetorical impossibility or simply another path to partisanship.  
Graham was complicit in these developments and he did little to abate them.  Earlier, in 
1968, Jesse Helms had written to ABC television suggesting Graham as an ideal speaker 
to counter “the glorification of Martin Luther King, Jr.,” following the assassination of 
the civil rights leader.189  A posturing Helms proposed a voice of moderation on behalf of 
his own reactionary agenda.  The nominally neutral Honor America Day presented a 
similar dynamic of inescapable partisanship for Graham.   
The Nixon years so thoroughly politicized Graham that such complicating details 
as his record of support for racial tolerance or his friendships with certain liberals grew 
blurry amid the whirl of photo ops, church services, and bull sessions.  He could not help 
but to sanctify the Nixon way (even that which occurred beyond his notice) because he 
had not only offered his services carte blanche, but had actively sought opportunities for 
political work.  The evangelist remained blind to the plumbing beneath Nixon’s politics, 
although not to the basic assumptions above it.  Nixon, the usual suspect in all things 
Machiavellian, did not have to manipulate Graham so much as he merely had to assent to 
the evangelist’s own proposals.  Rather than treating the evangelist as an innocent or a 
tool, Nixon treated him like the politico he had momentarily become.  In this respect, the 
Watergate crisis would out Graham along with Nixon.  Before then, though (while liberal 
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critics, lacking access to such smoking guns as the White House tapes and Haldeman’s 
diary, slugged away at the standing target of civil religion), the evangelist retained a 
distinctive voice in many parts of the South, one that resonated with a brighter side of 
Nixon’s southern strategy, the side of Connally rather than of Helms.  This was the voice 
of a Sunbelt on the make. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CRUSADING FOR THE SUNBELT SOUTH 
 
It may well come to lie with the South in the near future, as it lay with the North in 1860, 
to save the Union in its own way. 
 
Walker Percy1 
 
 While Graham abetted the southern strategy, the southerners he best identified 
with tried to project an altogether different image.  That visage was never as removed 
from the region’s Jim Crow past, nor as separated from the specter of racial politics, as 
either Graham or many of his southern crusade supporters preferred to believe.  In 
September 1976, more than two months after the national bicentennial extravaganza, a 
special issue of Time magazine boasted that the “present Southern emotion is a sense of 
imminent victory—over circumstances, poverty and history.”  While the seventy-one 
pages dedicated to “The South Today” contained some glaring misreadings of the 
magnolia leaves (in the aftermath of Watergate and on the cusp of a Carter victory, Time 
presented the GOP as a paper elephant in the New South), one truism emerged: The 
South’s image had changed for the better.  Even Birmingham, slightly more than a 
decade removed from pressure hoses and attack dogs, was “A City Reborn” and “a model 
of Southern race relations.”  Further evidence of regional progress included photographs 
of the “shimmering skyline of Charlotte” and of a Charlotte native, Billy Graham, 
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addressing a gathering of the rapidly growing Southern Baptist Convention.2  The two 
pictures held more than circumstantial connections.  A symbol of Charlotte-style growth, 
a suburban high rise housing the regional offices of IBM, also contained a plaque, 
unveiled by Richard Nixon in 1971, commemorating the “[w]orld-renowned evangelist, 
author, and educator and preacher of the gospel of Christ to more people than any other 
man in history.”  The memorial was a bow to the building’s location: the birthplace of 
Graham.  “My father had a red clay farm that he hardly earned a living on when I was a 
boy,” Graham told an interviewer in 1977.  “But some of the best part of Charlotte moved 
on top of it—banks, IBM, Esso headquarters for the Southeast.”  Journalist Marshall 
Frady, himself of Southern Baptist stock, treated the replacement of dairy farm with IBM 
building as a metaphor for Graham’s theology, which remained bound to the pieties of a 
vanquished South.  Frady mistook burgeoning modernity for latent liberalism, as had 
many students of southern Protestantism.  Writing fifteen years later, another journalist 
offered a corrective.  In Charlotte, Peter Applebome wrote, “God and mammon—a desire 
to do good and a desire to do well—are knitted together . . . like threads in an intricate 
pattern.”3  The visual contrast between farmstead and officeplex concealed a deeper 
affinity between evangelical faith and the booster ethos of the Sunbelt South. 
 A range of elements—entrepreneurialism, asserted racial progress, and traditional 
faith—combined to form what commentators during the 1970s began calling the Sunbelt 
or, more specifically, the Sunbelt South.  Coined by political analyst Kevin Phillips and 
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later popularized by journalist Kirkpatrick Sale, the Sunbelt (which Sale usually called 
the “Southern Rim”) was originally defined to include the Southwest and California, in 
addition to the South proper.4  Yet, as historian James C. Cobb observed, “the term 
became increasingly interchangeable with the South.”5  While the notion of a Sunbelt 
found its most eager audiences on the extremes of discussions about the modern South 
(i.e., among the region’s boosters and critics), the term did capture a key impression of 
the newest New South as race declined, however ambiguously, as a distinguishing factor 
for the region.  During the postwar decades, corporate leaders and their political allies in 
the metropolitan South had embraced a “Sunbelt Synthesis” consisting of “a booster 
vision designed to transcend the burdens of the region’s history through the twin pillars 
of rapid economic development and enforced racial harmony.”6  This image crested 
during the 1970s, even as race- and class-tinged controversies over school busing and 
municipal annexation threatened its continuation.  At the start of the post-civil rights era, 
a peculiar blend of folksy piety and flashy modernity began to replace racism as an 
ingredient in many popular representations of the South.  When Sale wrote of “the 
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unmistakable and irreversible shift of power . . . away from the Eastern Establishment 
and toward the Southern Rim,” he cited Billy Graham’s influence in the Nixon White 
House as evidence of this transition.7  As the Time series suggested, Sale lamented, and 
novelist Walker Percy conceded, Graham was a significant player in the cultivation of the 
Sunbelt image.8 
 Two Graham crusades in the 1970s South—Birmingham (1972) and Atlanta 
(1973)—revealed the role of the evangelist in promoting the Sunbelt.  In the case of 
Birmingham, civic and religious leaders viewed the crusade as a chance to show how far 
this newly christened “All-America City” had advanced since Graham’s desegregated 
rally there in 1964, several months after the bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.  
In the flagship New South city of Atlanta, crusade chair Tom Cousins was even more 
ambitious.  Cousins sought to use the crusade to shape a new generation of leaders for a 
city on the cusp of electing its first African-American mayor.  Graham was a willing 
partner in both projects.  The successes and struggles of the Birmingham and Atlanta 
crusades seemed to confirm and expose what Charlotte Observer editor Reese Cleghorn 
and other southerners had feared in the evangelist’s alliance with Richard Nixon: the 
potent superficiality of nominal post-segregationism stamped with a religious mandate.  
To supporters of the evangelist, however, his crusades placed a welcomed spotlight on a 
region once reviled, now revived.  Graham’s avowedly non-prophetic brand of activism 
both reflected and impelled the particular combination of traditional evangelicalism and 
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dynamic boosterism that came to characterize the Sunbelt South, an imagined region 
blending piety, modernity, and—increasingly—Republican politics.  
 
Revivals, Graham, and New South Discourse 
 A rich historiographical tradition exists for viewing religious revivals not simply 
as secondary products of larger cultural and economic transformations, but rather as 
active congealers of new social relations.  Such a perspective, while not without risks, is 
useful for the historical settings at hand and is in keeping with the critique of 
secularization theory proffered here.  In an American context, the argument that revivals 
can serve to reify larger shifts in social structures appears most famously in Paul 
Johnson’s A Shopkeeper’s Millennium.  Johnson analyzed Charles Finney’s 1831 revival 
in what was then emerging as the evangelical heartland of the nation, Rochester, New 
York, where the revival “created a community of militant evangelicals that would remake 
society and politics.”  Their post-millennialist optimism, while at some level utopian, 
served on a temporal level to strengthen capitalist structures.  The initial targets of revival 
were the masters and manufacturers themselves, who in turn channeled their newfound 
behavioral restraints into workplace discipline.  Johnson, to be sure, wrote about a society 
in which Christianity possessed a type of prescriptive authority not attainable following 
the “second disestablishment” of American religion during the interwar years of the 
twentieth century.  Moreover, some reviewers have taken Johnson to task for seemingly 
reducing the significance of personal faith to social location.9 
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Disestablishment, however, was (and perhaps remains) much less of a reality in 
the American South, where both a general and conversion-centered evangelicalism have 
overlapped unselfconsciously with the spheres of business and politics.  In the cases of 
Birmingham and Atlanta during the early 1970s, this was so much the case that, to a 
striking degree, local crusade organizers did not always feel compelled to describe their 
motivations in religious terms.  The argument here is not that Graham crusade committee 
members internalized the lessons of Rochester.  Yet their behavior did agree with the 
representative of Dixie Business magazine who, when awarding Graham its 1975 “Man 
of the South” award, candidly declared religion “the greatest business in the South and in 
the world.”10  Piety did not always require specific declaration; it was, as Graham himself 
argued with some exaggeration, an assumed requirement for seeking public office in the 
South.11  Still, even granting the sincere faith of most crusade committee members (and 
there are few reasons not to), many of them clearly sought more from a Graham crusade 
than conversions.  These benefits included a more unified leadership class and an 
improved image for the city.  At a basic level, as well, Graham crusades (like modern 
political conventions and the Olympics) were an opportunity to showcase new stadiums, 
highways, and other civic improvements.  The evangelist encouraged such signs of 
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progress.  He was keenly aware, for example, of the importance of stadiums and arenas to 
the image of the urban South.  In 1972, Graham chided Charlotte for lacking a large 
outdoor stadium (which, of course, would benefit his own evangelism), “because you are 
moving very rapidly to big city status like Atlanta or Dallas and to be a big city today one 
of the things you have to have is a stadium.”  Seventeen years earlier, he had made 
similar comments when dedicating Charlotte’s indoor coliseum.12 
At press conferences and other venues, Graham’s eschatological pessimism 
regarding national and world events almost reflexively turned to optimism when the 
subject switched to the South.  “During the past few years, the South has been 
undergoing a gigantic economic and social revolution,” the evangelist told his weekly 
radio audience in 1965.  “It is one of the most exciting places in the entire world.”13   His 
advocacy on behalf of his home region—what might be termed his New South 
discourse—gave prospective boosters hope that a successful wooing of the evangelist 
would reflect well on their cities.14  Woo they did.  When Graham announced his 1965 
visit to Alabama, letters poured in from across the state.15  During the Greenville, South 
Carolina, crusade of the following year, clergy from Macon, Georgia, and Memphis 
attended in hopes of attracting the evangelist.16  While the Memphis crusade never 
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occurred because of Graham’s health problems at the time, the correspondence 
surrounding it was telling.  Not only the white ministerial elite of Memphis, but also the 
mayor, the head of Holiday Inn, and the presidents of Memphis State and Mississippi 
State Universities implored the evangelist to visit.  Even black Methodist minister James 
Lawson, one of the leading teachers of Gandhian tactics of civil disobedience during the 
Civil Rights Movement, requested Graham’s presence.  “Prophetic preaching from such a 
person as you now, [sic] could make a significant impact upon the atmosphere of 
Memphis,” Lawson wrote to the evangelist in 1966, undoubtedly at the behest of the 
Memphis Ministers Association, whose executive committee he had recently been invited 
to join.  In an effort to impress the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (BGEA), an 
executive committee list identified Lawson by his race.17 
Graham’s popularity in the South showed no signs of diminishing in the early 
1970s, even though the Nixon years represented a low point for popular representations 
of the evangelist, a time when Lawson would have been much less likely to support a 
crusade.  The newspapers of the urban South (Birmingham’s, especially, and Atlanta’s, to 
a lesser extent) tended to treat the evangelist with more deference than did their 
counterparts in other regions.  Since the 1950s, Graham had consistently argued that the 
South would eventually surpass the North in the quality of its race relations, and such 
rhetoric persisted two decades later.  He continued to complain about the lack of network 
news coverage of his 1965 desegregated services in Alabama, which he later described as 
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part of the “quiet revolution” of average Americans.18  In the subsequent era of the 
southern strategy and Sunbelt hype, his advocacy on behalf of the South grew more 
salient.  Graham not only defended the South against its detractors; he cast the region as a 
potential model for the nation.  “[T]o me it is rather hypocritical for people up North to 
be talking constantly about the problems in the South,” he declared during his 1970 
crusade in Baton Rouge, when “they’ve got it right on their doorstep and it’s ready to 
explode.”19  Elsewhere that year, Graham said he was “very proud” of how the South had 
responded to court-ordered busing—something, he suggested, a Boston or a New York 
City would not handle so well.20  Upon the death of famed southern liberal and Atlanta 
Constitution editor Ralph McGill, whom the evangelist had earlier labeled “Mr. New 
South,” Graham praised him as “a courageous pioneer in race relations and social 
reform” who had offered critical advice over the years.21  In the context of the Sunbelt 
1970s, though, Graham’s comments on the South reflected the interests not of liberal 
supporters of the Southern Regional Council, but of regional boosters, most of whom 
were recovering segregationists.  “The South is no longer the old South that we once 
knew,” Graham stated in a 1972 press conference in Atlanta.  “It’s become probably the 
most dynamic part of America.”22  Two months earlier in the same city, when delivering 
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a speech reflecting the ideas of southern strategist Harry Dent, Richard Nixon had 
likewise described the South’s progress as “probably the greatest of all in the nation.”23 
 
The Birmingham Easter Rally, Continued 
 By 1972, the city of Birmingham touted its own progress as among the greatest in 
the nation.  The 1964 Easter rally figured prominently in this narrative from 
“Bombingham” to “All-America City” (so designated in 1970 by the National Municipal 
League), from miscreant to model.24  City boosters had immediately presented the Easter 
rally as both a fresh start and a confirmation that Birmingham had not fallen so far, after 
all.  Crusade chair and regional newspaper baron Arthur P. Cook recognized the image-
shaping value of the rally in a letter to the Jefferson County sheriff: “On the front pages 
of . . . major dailies in the nation were glowing, good remarks about Birmingham.  This is 
certainly something that we have all tried to gain for our city for a long time.”  To Mayor 
Albert Boutwell, Cook wrote that “we now have a beachhead established.”25 
 Understandably, Birmingham’s leaders wanted more of a good thing.  Efforts to 
have Graham return for a full crusade commenced almost immediately after the Easter 
rally and included the requisite invitation from the Ministerial Association of Greater 
Birmingham (which, by then, contained one black “Associate”) “to return to Birmingham 
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for a full length Crusade at the earliest time.”  The invitation arrived too late to ensure 
such a possibility.26  Still, an eventual crusade seemed likely.  Graham, who claimed to 
consider southern invitations with particular regard, had something of a special 
relationship with Birmingham, the largest southern city in which he had not held a full 
crusade.27  His 1964 visit, as well as his nominal involvement in the rebuilding of 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, had occurred following comments in which Graham had 
described Birmingham as emblematic of racial violence.  During the rally, he publicly 
declared his desire to return to the city, a pledge to which BGEA staffers felt bound and 
which longtime crusade advocate Gilbert L. Guffin (dean of religion at Samford, nee 
Howard, University) was not inclined to let them forget.28 
 By May 1965, Birmingham leaders had identified an ideal period for Graham to 
return: the city’s centennial celebration, set to extend through 1972.  Crusade promoters 
pitched the visit as the climax of centennial festivities—a spiritual gut check for a city on 
the move—and informed Graham of the city’s racial progress.  Denson N. Franklin, vice 
president of the centennial planning committee and a Methodist minister, remained in 
frequent contact with Grady Wilson, to whom in 1967 he stressed that blacks and whites 
in the city were “ready to move forward. . . . I have seen this city change completely in 
atmosphere during the last three years.  As one of our leading Negroes says, 
‘Birmingham has made more improvement than any city in America in human 
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relations.’”  Other correspondents reiterated the pivotal role of the Easter rally.  City 
Council President M. E. Wiggins echoed these sentiments, but added that “much remains 
to be accomplished.”  Indeed, crusade boosters were sure to note the primacy of religious 
motivations for the crusade.  Despite the support of business leaders and the Chamber of 
Commerce for the crusade, wrote three Birmingham clerics, “the motivation of everyone 
seems to be a deep sense of need for a spiritual awakening among us and not as a mere 
event in the centennial.”  Indeed, argued Guffin, centennial plans had “quickened the 
pace of the [c]ity and, of course, economic growth and expansion are natural 
consequences.  What we need most of all, and critically, is a great spiritual awakening.”  
What Birmingham needed, that is, was a crusade to mediate (and perhaps stimulate) 
progress.  “How has God used Birmingham?” asked a centennial-year promotional 
booklet.  “The answer is simple.  For He is not yet through.”29 
 A letter copied to Graham outlined early plans for the centennial festivities in a 
city the promotional booklet described as “still reaching for national acceptance.”  In 
1960, the author declared, Birmingham had ranked thirty-sixth in the nation in 
population, “and if we sit still and do nothing we’ll still be 36th in the nation” a decade 
later.  Unstated in the letter, but surely implicit, was concern over the city’s lingering 
connotation with racial violence.  The centennial celebration would do its part through 
four huge bonfires, to be lighted on Red Mountain, four-hundred feet above the city.  The 
fires would “rival, in height and heat, the famous Pharos light at Alexandria, the mouth of 
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the Nile River.”  A final flame would shine during a Graham crusade, proposed as the 
climactic event of the centennial year, since “no man in this world can so ably tie up the 
present day world with that of Christ as could Billy Graham.”30  In the end, though, the 
centennial festivities kicked off in December 1971 with the opening of a more temporal 
emblem of the city’s progress, a new civic center.31 
   The Billy Graham Alabama Crusade finally occurred in May 1972.32  
Birmingham greeted Graham with public sentiments in keeping with those previously 
expressed in private correspondence.  City boosters now cited the 1964 rally as “the first 
integrated public outdoor meeting in the city’s history,” when, “[i]n a twinkling, racial 
segregation at public meetings had become obsolete in the city.”  (No mention was made 
of the much more significant role of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as the 
demonstrations that preceded it, in ending public segregation in the city.)  According to 
this glossy narrative, Graham’s visit had sparked what crusade executive committee chair 
Mark Hodo called a “renaissance.”  Hodo had served on the same committee in 1964, 
when Birmingham’s reputation had reached its nadir.  Since then, declared the 
Presbyterian and head of the City Federal Savings & Loan Corporation with more than a 
hint of paternalism, “we have had less racial disturbance than any city . . . in proportion 
to our size.  We developed a communication during that period.  We brought in the 
blacks to meet with us and . . . we developed a camaraderie and a communication that has 
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been terrific.”  Mayor George G. Seibels, Jr., a Republican, declared the crusade week 
“Billy Graham Days,” when the Graham team would accentuate “the spiritual heritage 
which has helped to make this an All-America City.”  The Birmingham News, a fount of 
journalistic boosterism whose motto was “Serving a Progressive South,” picked up its 
affirming editorials where it had left off in 1965.  Graham’s earlier visit had enabled the 
resolution of problems that now seemed confoundingly simple, although how exactly 
these problems had been resolved remained unspecified.  In a toast to evangelical 
universalism, the paper welcomed Graham’s social message that “only through spiritual 
revival of the individual will come improvement in the quality of life of the community, 
and that without the brotherhood of man no city or people can endure.”33  Indeed, 
Graham added in a crusade sermon, “we could create the finest conditions and still have 
crime, war, and prejudice so long as our relationship with God has been broken.”34 
 In terms of social issues, the most significant theme of the crusade was that which 
was nominally missing: race, a matter crusade boosters viewed as resolved.  Relative lack 
of discussion about race, of course, itself represented a type of racial discourse—a 
qualified admission of past problems, but an even stronger relegation of those problems 
to the dustbin of history.  This perspective willfully ignored, among other things, the 
numerous riots Birmingham had experienced since 1964 in response to such issues as 
police brutality.35  “In 1964 the races learned they could sit side by side,” gushed the 
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News.  “In 1972 they learned they could work side by side.”  Graham seemed to concur.  
“There is a rare situation in Birmingham,” he declared at a press conference where he sat 
alongside Hodo and J. L. Ware, a prominent black Baptist minister who had also 
participated in the Easter rally.  “Things have changed greatly,” the evangelist added, 
noting that blacks had greater access to higher education than ever before.  Later that 
week, Graham referred to a period of southern racial problems a decade or more removed 
from the present.  For the Easter 1964 sermon, the News wrote, “the problem was racial.  
This time, other issues are at hand—the decaying church institution, the Vietnam War, a 
generation of youth questioning the very basis on which this country is founded” 
(emphasis mine).36  These latter issues, of course, did not leave the South singled out for 
ridicule.  The Birmingham World, a Republican-leaning black newspaper that rightly 
viewed racial inequality as still a substantial problem in the city, offered only minimal (if 
supportive) coverage of the crusade.37 
Amid crusade appearances by Dallas Cowboys coach Tom Landry, Alabama 
Crimson Tide head man Bear Bryant, and former Tide star Joe Namath, Graham’s 
sermons and statements hinted at the emergence of newly salient gender and family 
issues, as well as the lingering dilemma of American involvement in Vietnam.  In his 
opening press conference, Graham made good on his assurance to Nixon Chief of Staff 
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H. R. Haldeman that he would affirm Nixon’s renewed hard line in Vietnam.  The 
president, Graham said, wanted peace as much as anyone, but believed in sticks, as well 
as carrots; in a sermon, the evangelist urged the audience to support Nixon’s plan for 
pulling troops out of Vietnam.38  Regarding American social issues, Graham suggested 
the application of “biblical laws” in the face of crime and violence.39  While backing 
down from previous calls for a constitutional amendment regarding school prayer, he 
continued his tradition of calling for alternative, faith-based demonstrations by saying he 
might lead his own “march on Washington” on behalf of that cause.  In another sermon, 
Graham reaffirmed traditional gender roles, as opposed to “masculinizing women and 
feminizing men.”  There is “no unisex in the Bible,” he added.40 
 Another event quickly supplanted the crusade in the minds of most Alabamians: 
the shooting of Alabama Governor George Wallace, then seeking the Democratic Party 
presidential nomination.  On the second day of the crusade, Wallace was shot at a 
campaign rally in Maryland, leaving the governor paralyzed in both legs.  Graham and 
Wallace had held a cordial, semi-private meeting during the 1965 Montgomery crusade, 
and since then they had maintained a line of communication that, as Wallace might well 
have reasoned, ultimately ended at the Nixon White House.  The evangelist had talked 
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with Wallace the day before the shooting, and the two kept in touch throughout the 
recovery process.  The governor had planned to attend services later in the week, when 
Graham said the candidate “probably would have been asked to sit in the audience and 
not on the stage to avoid any political overtones” (in contrast to the treatment Nixon had 
received in Knoxville).  Upon learning of the shooting, Graham called it “a terrible shock 
indicating the sickness of the country,” a condition he attributed to Satan.  He asked for a 
moment of silent prayer and adjusted the topic of his sermon to address the “pornography 
of violence.”  All Americans, “black and white, conservative and liberal,” Graham 
declared, should pray for recovery, “whether we agree with him or not. . . . He knew we 
had differences, especially in the matter of race.  But he’s always warm and friendly.”41  
The moment represented an uncomfortable, if not at all uncommon, intersection of 
Graham’s ministerial responsibilities and his political involvement, of his public duties 
and the partisanship he tried to reveal only selectively.  Conscious of Haldeman’s 
assignment “to keep Wallace in the Democratic Party,” Graham talked with the governor 
following an operation two months later and received assurance that a third-party 
candidacy remained unlikely.42 
 In Birmingham, the evangelist criticized the national television media for not 
covering those who ventured to Legion Field “to demonstrate for God and in peace” as 
much as they had covered earlier marches in the city.43  This contention possessed 
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obvious racial overtones that, at the very least, reflected his continued hesitancy to 
privilege racism as a sin in need of redress.  The News shared Graham’s critique of the 
media elite and editorialized against one of many published works labeling him a 
practitioner of civil religion.44  Certainly, the city’s leadership class hoped others were 
taking notice of what was happening in this cradle of the silent majority.  Total 
attendance stood at nearly 375,000, or around 47,000 nightly in the 70,000-seat Legion 
Field—an above-average crowd for an American city in keeping with the high turnouts 
typical of southern crusades.  African Americans comprised over one-third of the crowd 
on some nights, numbers similar to Graham’s 1964-65 services on Alabama.45  Gilbert 
Guffin was sure the crusade would go down as the most significant event of the 
centennial year.  Another correspondent, City Clerk Jackson B. Bailey, described the 
crusade as the “mountain-top experience of all our public celebrations.”  Birmingham’s 
renewed image, he insisted, would not have been possible without the improved race 
relations dating back to the 1964 Easter rally.46     
Graham compensated for the lack of network news coverage by speaking well of 
Birmingham to other outlets.  Likewise, he assured Mayor Seibels, BGEA broadcasts of 
the services would mean that “[m]illions throughout American and in other parts of the 
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world will be able to see and hear about Birmingham.”47  To the chagrin of militant 
Protestant Ian Paisley, one of Graham’s next stops was Northern Ireland, whose 
religiously rooted violence Graham contrasted with developments in the All-America 
City.  On the front page of the News a week after the crusade, an Associated Press story 
quoted Graham upholding Birmingham as proof that a “spiritual awakening” could turn 
around any city, perhaps even Belfast.  “I suddenly realized that Birmingham had perhaps 
the best race relations of any city in the southern part of the United States. . . . It is one of 
the most progressive cities in America,” Graham said.48  His characteristic hyperbole was 
consistent with his description of the South as a whole, a perspective Time would echo in 
its 1976 special issue on the region.  An editorial in the Florence (SC) News delighted in 
Graham’s use of a southern example.  The flagship magazine of the BGEA, Decision, 
reiterated the post-Easter rally narrative of a city that had straightened out its priorities.  
“We’re an All-America city . . . ,” declared a crusade leader,” but we need spiritual 
renewal.”49  A newspaper headline for the 1964 Easter rally had read, “Graham Calls on 
City to Lead.”  Eight years later, according to the News, Graham “found a changed city” 
when he returned to Birmingham.  In 1972, despite the overt persistence of racial 
inequalities and tensions in Birmingham, city crusade leaders told themselves and others 
that they had answered Graham’s call and become a model, a Sunbelt city claiming a 
spiritual stride with every social and economic one.50 
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Atlanta: Tom Cousins’ Dream 
 Unlike Birmingham, Atlanta desired to maintain, rather than surmount, its image.  
Indeed, during the early 1960s, the city had cemented its identity as New South capital 
(in the famous words of Mayor William Hartsfield, a city “too busy to hate”) in explicit 
contrast to the violence 150 miles west in Birmingham.  While Bull Conner terrorized the 
black community of Birmingham, Mayor Ivan Allen, Hartsfield’s heir, endorsed what 
became the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  In the mid-1960s, the mayor even lured a Major 
League Baseball franchise and its star African-American slugger, Henry Aaron, away 
from Milwaukee, a move that solidified Atlanta’s big city status.51  Also attracted was the 
BGEA, which in 1964 opened its Team Office near Hartsfield Airport, meaning that all 
domestic crusades were henceforth coordinated from Atlanta, rather than from the main 
office in Minneapolis.  At the press conference announcing the new office, Graham cited 
Atlanta’s progressive stance on race as a reason for the move.  (The city was also closer 
to the homes of most team members.)  He even put in a word of reassurance for persons 
concerned about how Atlanta would receive Aaron, as the evangelist’s black associates 
could vouch for the city’s racial tolerance.52 
 In the early 1970s, then, it only seemed natural for Atlanta real estate developer 
Tom Cousins to believe that a Billy Graham crusade could harvest a new generation of 
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leaders for the city.  A Nixon administration document (possibly using Graham’s own 
words) identified Cousins as among “the brilliant, rising young business tycoons of the 
South.  Now frequently introduced as ‘Mr. Atlanta.’”53  Cousins had ascended during the 
1960s from a model home builder to a sports franchiser and a major force in downtown 
development.  Widely assumed to be one of the inspirations for Charlie Croker, the 
stoically southern protagonist of Tom Wolfe’s 1998 novel, A Man in Full, Cousins 
conformed to the stereotypes of an ambitious Atlanta mogul, including owning the 
requisite quail plantation in southwest Georgia.  Cousins was involved in many of the 
projects through which Atlanta had started defining itself as not only an all-America, but 
an “international” city, as well.  These undertakings included the quintessentially Sunbelt 
Omni International, a multi-use complex containing a mall, a theme park, and—
fittingly—a sports coliseum.  Cousins also owned the Atlanta Hawks of the National 
Basketball Association and the Atlanta Flames of the National Hockey Association, the 
primary tenants of his coliseum and additional symbols of Atlanta’s big-city status.54  In 
short, Cousins was an Atlanta booster extraordinaire, a predecessor of the more 
flamboyant Ted Turner. 
 Cousins and Graham first met during the 1965 crusade in Montgomery, where 
Cousins owned a lakeside home.  Through the evangelist’s brother-in-law, Leighton 
Ford, they kept in contact during the following years, and by the early 1970s Cousins 
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began pitching the possibility of a crusade.55  Cousins described himself as a former 
agnostic (in his words, not a “religious fanatic”) who was initially attracted to church 
work more than worship services.56  Not unlike Richard Nixon, Cousins evinced a certain 
reticence about personal expressions of religiosity, possessing what one friendly observer 
called “a religious faith reflected in deeds not words.”57  This image was in keeping with 
both his reputation for having a low-key demeanor (as much as was possible for a 
prominent developer) and his identity as a Presbyterian.  He seemed most comfortable 
when employing the language of a business prospectus, a mixture of salesmanship and 
the bottom line. 
 Atlanta during the late 1960s and early 1970s was experiencing a significant 
transition within its political and economic leadership, and Cousins thought a Graham 
crusade would help ease this transition.  For decades, Atlanta politics had revolved 
around an alliance between moderate, business-oriented whites and the city’s African-
American leaders.  The 1970s in Atlanta saw “a major reformulation of the tacit rules of 
engagement between city government and the business community, as well as the 
emergence of a new set of players.”58  From the perspective of the white downtown 
establishment, the inevitability of black political power in a city moving rapidly toward a 
black majority represented the most significant change of all.  In 1969, Atlanta elected its 
first black vice mayor, Maynard Jackson.  While hailing from the “Morehouse Man” 
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lineage of elite black leadership, Jackson threatened a closely guarded tradition of 
racially moderate, yet inescapably paternalistic white control over city politics.59  Cousins 
was part of a new group of white leaders who, while not especially attached to the 
stewardship tradition of Hartsfield and Allen, were worried about the direction Atlanta 
would take if black politicians felt no accountability to business leaders.60  Their concerns 
reflected scarcely concealed racial and class anxieties.  In 1971, a report by the Atlanta 
Chamber of Commerce pronounced the death of its “marriage” with a City Hall.  “The 
‘junior partner’ role of the black leadership in the last decade has been rejected by the 
black leaders,” the report stated.61  Cousins candidly recalled almost identical concerns 
about a new generation of Atlanta politicians who thought the business establishment had 
overlooked them.  He believed these tensions would hinder the development and 
economic vitality of the city.62  To ward off polarization, he proposed “a shock treatment 
for Christ”—that is, “spiritual and moral growth along with bricks and mortar.”63 
 A Graham crusade could provide just this shock treatment, Cousins reasoned.  
During the extensive mobilization the crusade would entail, Cousins hoped to identify a 
biracial group of current and future leaders and to ensure their involvement in the crusade 
effort.  In March 1972, he brought together area ministers to outline his vision for the 
crusade that was to occur fifteen months later.  After clarifying that he neither had 
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gubernatorial ambitions nor merely sought a new client for his coliseum, Cousins 
described his “particular first personal concern” for the crusade.  Atlanta, he declared, 
could become “the finest city in the world,” a place “where people can live together.”  
For the moment, however, the city was “at a cross roads” and its leadership was “either 
dying out or being pushed out.”  The leaders who would inevitably emerge during the 
crusade would get a taste of how they might influence the city in the future.64  Despite 
worries that Cousins prioritized social matters at the expense of spiritual ones, he 
remained the face of the crusade.  Likewise, while Cousins admitted that his intentions 
for the Atlanta crusade might not square perfectly with the BGEA’s mission statement, he 
retained the full backing of Graham.  The BGEA had accepted Atlanta’s invitation for a 
crusade on the conditions that Cousins chair the executive committee and that the black 
community of Atlanta support the evangelist’s visit.65  Whatever Atlanta’s reputation, the 
latter stipulation proved more difficult to satisfy.    
 The civic justifications Cousins offered for the crusade would have given militant 
fundamentalist critics of Graham additional reason to believe that his evangelism had 
strayed from the narrow path.  “I don’t know that you even have to be Christian to 
appreciate” the value of a Graham crusade, Cousins declared in the Sunday paper.  “I 
think the non-Christian would acknowledge that the true, convicted Christian is an 
excellent citizen,” he added.  (Cousins may have aimed these comments at Jewish 
members of the Chamber of Commerce who held understandable reservations about an 
evangelistic effort.)  As an Atlanta journalist wrote about Cousins, “He speaks of ‘new 
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leadership’ in the sense that some present or future leaders may become ‘new’ men in 
Christ as a result of Billy Graham’s crusade.”  After all, a godly city would be a better 
place for everyone, and in Atlanta such a condition seemed distinctly possible—a 
sentiment Graham reinforced in his press conferences.  Cousins thus set about identifying 
a new generation of leaders to chair the numerous crusade committees.  Most of these 
persons, according to the same journalist, came “straight out of the power structure.”  
Cousins also garnered a crusade invitation from the Chamber of Commerce (an 
uncommon source) and a letter from Governor Jimmy Carter urging members of the state 
General Assembly to attend Graham’s services.66 
 A photograph in the Sunday paper featured Graham smiling over the very 
downtown Atlanta skyline Cousins had helped to shape.67  Graham’s comments regarding 
the city appeared to support the ambitions of Cousins, even as the evangelist continued 
his custom of denying socio-political motivations of his own.  As much as in 
Birmingham, however, Graham operated in full booster mode regarding a city he called 
“one of my hometowns.”68  In press conferences before and after the crusade, Graham 
voiced confidence about Atlanta’s race relations and its position in the nation.  The racial 
situation in Atlanta “with all your problems is still one of the best in the country,” he 
said.  “And I think that Atlanta has been one of the most progressive cities.  I think that 
what happens in Atlanta gives direction to the rest of the South.”  Compared to other 
cities, Atlanta was “a little bit of heaven.”  Again, the city was “an example of good race 
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relations and progressiveness and economic boom”—as well as, most importantly, “a city 
of churches.”69  Graham even credited Atlanta’s recently retired police chief, Herbert 
Jenkins, with influencing his own move away from segregation in the early 1950s.70   
 As Graham had done during the 1965 Montgomery Crusade, he published daily 
articles in the city’s two largest newspapers, thus adding to his social message a layer of 
intentionality that had been missing a year earlier in Birmingham.  The pieces reflected 
Graham’s evangelical universalism and provided a more overtly spiritual component to 
the boosterism of Cousins.  In one article, Graham quoted Martin Luther King, Jr., on the 
difference between love and race-consciousness before defining prejudice as “the 
distance between your biased opinions and the real truth.”  Honesty before God would 
eliminate this distance.  “Where we’ve missed the mark in handling racial problems,” 
Graham added in a statement representative of his theory of social change, “is simply that 
we’[v]e legislated new moral and legal standards, (which incidentally I am for) without 
suggesting the power that could implement them.”  In another article, fittingly titled 
“Social Justice a By-Product of God’s Love and Mercy,” Graham argued that social 
justice “is never the main part of the Gospel, nor of a crusade effort.  We need something 
deeper and higher than that—the life-changing experience of faith in Christ.”  While the 
evangelist addressed non-racial social issues somewhat less than in Birmingham, he 
described a nationwide spiritual and moral “crisis”—a theme he had voiced since the 
mid-1950s, but which also resonated with the tone of many Nixon speeches—and argued 
that the Ten Commandments should be read in every school classroom.  As if to rein in 
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whatever utopian expectations Cousins might have unleashed, Graham carefully framed 
what he offered as an evangelist, clarifying that he was “not a social reformer; I’m not a 
political leader.  I don’t ever intend to go into politics.”71  Ralph McGill’s successor at 
the Atlanta Constitution affirmed these sentiments, advising that the crusade not be 
“thought of in a political context at all.”72  The Atlanta Daily World, an influential black 
newspaper supportive of both Graham and Nixon, echoed this sentiment.73       
 Such a wish proved naive in light of Atlanta’s racial climate, as well as the 
emerging politics of Watergate.  In Atlanta, unlike in Birmingham, race ultimately 
surfaced and exposed the one-sidedness of the Sunbelt image of the South, as the crusade 
suffered from pervasive criticism and low attendance by significant portions of the black 
community.  This occurred in spite of what Cousins considered a good-faith effort to 
ensure the black support Graham desired.  Very early in the crusade planning process, 
Cousins included Rev. Martin Luther King, Sr.—the father of the civil rights martyr, and 
a civic leader cut out of the more conservative “broker” tradition.  King became a 
consistent and public backer of the crusade.  Cousins also secured a biracial executive 
committee, including black and white co-chairs (in keeping with a tradition dating back 
to the Birmingham Easter rally), although his subsequent claim that the committee 
contained nearly equal numbers of whites and blacks was greatly exaggerated.74   
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 The Graham team and a number of civic leaders of both races assisted with these 
efforts.  Crusade director Harry Williams suggested that an interview with King would 
enhance publicity in Atlanta and elsewhere.75  Crusade supporters produced a detailed list 
of leading black Atlantans, and the ministers from this list received invitations to a 
special meeting hosted by Andrew Young, U.S. Representative and former executive 
director of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), at the Butler Street 
YMCA, a black Atlanta institution.  “While a few of us may have had some reservations 
about the crusade,” the invitation read, “we feel that most of these have been resolved” to 
the point where they could “work toward bringing Black and White Christians 
together.”76  Young and Carter had already hosted a breakfast meeting with similar 
intentions.77  Carter went so far as to grant leave time for a staff member, Rita Samuels, 
to focus on stimulating black interest in the crusade.78 
 For the most part, these efforts did not have their intended effects.  Black 
attendance remained conspicuously low throughout the crusade.  Graham himself 
estimated that no more than 5 percent of the average crusade audience was black—a 
number much lower than in any of his meetings in Alabama, although more in line with 
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his early desegregated crusades in such places as Louisville and Charlotte.79  While 
Graham received his customary attacks from the theological right, the most stinging and 
publicized criticisms came from the black activist community, thus continuing a tradition 
of black skepticism toward Graham that had evolved into outright animosity during the 
Nixon years.  Black criticism of Graham made headlines days before the first crusade 
meeting, when Hosea Williams, a civil rights veteran and president of the Atlanta chapter 
of SCLC, accused the evangelist of practicing a “theology of hypocrisy” and urged blacks  
and “right-thinking whites” to boycott the crusade.  A survivor of the nightsticks and tear 
gas of Selma, Williams had developed a well-earned reputation as an activist gadfly.  
Tellingly, Cousins dismissed him as a notorious racist.  Williams was joined in his 
opposition by national SCLC President Ralph Abernathy, who claimed his church had 
not received materials advertising the crusade.  Williams, on the other hand, lamented the 
“high pressure” crusade supporters had exerted on black ministers to back the revival.  
Protesters picketed the first crusade service with signs reading, “Billy Graham is a 
Racist” and “Billy Graham Feed the Hungry.”80 
Hosea Williams offered a thorough list of his problems with Graham.  His 
criticisms resembled those of Baton Rouge activists who had confronted the evangelist 
during his 1970 crusade there.  The evangelist had not only “furnished the theology” of 
Nixon, said Williams; he had failed to oppose the numerous federal cutbacks supported 
by the Nixon administration.  Unbeknownst to Williams, Graham had in fact invited 
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Nixon to attend a service in Atlanta or at three other crusades later that year.  (He had 
also invited Lyndon Johnson to attend the Baton Rouge crusade.)  In addition, Williams 
charged, Graham was on record as a supporter of capital punishment.  While, in truth, 
Graham had publicly stated that he was reconsidering the issue of capital punishment, the 
matter had particular salience in the recent aftermath of an offhand remark from Graham 
that rapists should face the penalty of castration.  The racially loaded comment, which 
Graham had made while holding desegregated rallies in South Africa, was roundly 
denounced in the American black press.  Graham had also spoken optimistically about 
the future of South Africa’s race relations, drawing an analogy with “the early days of 
integration in the Southern part of the United States.”  In response, Abernathy had 
castigated him as someone who “heaps praise on South Africa, a country which is worse 
than South Louisiana.”  Lastly, charged Williams, Graham had yet to speak critically 
about the allegations surrounding the Watergate break-in.81  Indeed, while Williams 
ignored Graham’s recent op-ed piece in the New York Times arguing in favor of 
prosecuting Watergate-related crimes (which Graham did not link to Nixon), the 
Watergate crisis represented to Graham in Atlanta what the Wallace shooting had in 
Birmingham: an outside issue the evangelist could not escape no matter how much he 
selectively circumscribed his role as a public figure.  In the case of Watergate, though, 
Graham’s investment in the issue was a matter of public assumption, not to mention 
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public intrigue.  As he continually ducked the many questions about Watergate that came 
his way, his lack of comment made headlines.82 
A final source of black criticism grew out of the very nature of Cousins’ 
ambitions.  The crusade quickly became associated with the business elite of Atlanta, a 
connection a Sunday paper profile of Cousins helped readers make.  “When Billy 
Graham came to Atlanta, who was his host?” asked Williams.  “Mr. Cousins, one of the 
richest men in the Southeast.  When Jesus Christ came into a town, he dwelled among the 
poor people.”83  The Washington Post likewise quoted an SCLC official who wondered 
why Graham had not reached out more extensively to lower-income residents.  Instead, 
Graham had “established ties with the rich,” with “people like Tom Cousins.”84 
 Cousins, unsurprisingly, was not inclined to accept this explanation for the low 
black attendance, about which he and Harry Williams expressed initial perplexity.  As 
possible reasons, they cited the difficulty of communicating with Atlanta’s many small-
sized black churches and, most importantly, an unexpected, mid-week strike by city bus 
drivers.  The latter explanation had credence, since many Atlanta blacks relied on the bus 
system.  Cousins successfully sought a court injunction against the allegedly wildcat 
strike, but the ruling did not take effect until after the crusade had ended.85  Despite the 
strike, overall attendance remained high, justifying the decision to hold the crusade in the 
baseball stadium of the Braves, rather than in the Omni Coliseum, as Graham had 
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originally desired.86  In the end, the strike could not account for the depth of Graham’s 
unpopularity among many African Americans, a trend that had only increased during the 
months since the Birmingham crusade.  In Atlanta, a city with more extensive black 
activist networks than Birmingham, the distrust of Graham was especially acute.  This 
wound, as subsequent crusades in Raleigh and Minneapolis revealed, would not begin to 
heal until well after Watergate and Nixon had run their courses.87 
The Graham team responded to its race problem with a mixture of denial and 
adjustment.  Having predicted a solid black response to the crusade, the evangelist 
initially downplayed the criticism, describing Hosea Williams as a long-time friend 
(albeit a “misinformed” one) and inviting him and his supporters to attend services 
whether “they come with a picket or not.”88  The evangelist referenced the past support of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., whose grave he had recently visited with the elder King, noting 
that the younger King had played a role in an earlier invitation to hold a crusade in 
Atlanta.89  Graham also gave an interview to the friendly Atlanta Daily World in which 
he again spoke highly of South Africa and argued that blacks had “more freedom today 
and [a] higher standard of living” as a result of civil rights advances.90  Because of the 
unavoidable nature of the issue in Atlanta, Graham’s sermons addressed race in a more 
direct manner than in Birmingham—or any previous southern crusade, for that matter.  
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Agape love, he stressed, remained “the key to the race question in Atlanta or any other 
city in America.”  Graham also declared, as he had to selected audiences since the 1950s, 
that Jesus had brown, not white, skin.  Still, he dedicated more substantive time in his 
sermons to other social matters, such as marriage, which he claimed faced greater threats 
than at any time “since Sodom and Gomorrah.”91 
Other responses to the low black turnout were more programmatic.  John Wilson, 
a white former president of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, urged members to bring 
their black friends to the crusade.92  The Graham team prominently featured at least one 
black platform guest during each crusade service.  Invitees included former president of 
Morehouse University Benjamin Mays, who had expressed sympathy for Graham’s 
Birmingham rally back in 1964 (but who did not accept the invitation).  Martin Luther 
King, Sr., gave the invocation during one service, as had his son sixteen years earlier in 
New York City.  Another platform guest was Rev. Edward V. Hill, a strong Graham 
backer and founding member of SCLC (who was introduced as such).93   
The Graham counteroffensive climaxed with a mid-week public affirmation of the 
crusade released by seven leading black clerics, including J. A. Wilborn of Union Baptist, 
co-chair of the executive committee.  Released the same night when Graham received 
eight bound volumes of signatures from South Carolinians eager for their own crusade, 
the ministers’ statement urged greater black attendance and declared that black leaders 
had been included in all aspects of the crusade from the beginning.  The statement 
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bolstered the accuracy of Graham’s subsequent claim that a majority of black ministers in 
the area supported him.  An Atlanta Journal article mentioned in passing that a meeting 
between the black ministers and Cousins had preceded the release of the statement.  
Cousins remembered the meeting as a critical moment when he let his guard down, 
blasting the ministers for not countering Hosea Williams.  In paternalistic fashion, 
Cousins reminded them of the many times they had asked him for help in the past; this 
relationship, he bluntly stated, was now in jeopardy.  According to Cousins, he then left 
the room, and the ministers voted in favor of a statement.94  Still, the gesture did little to 
increase black attendance.  Out of an average crowd of 38,000 per service, black 
attendance reportedly dipped as low as 400 one night.95 
Following the crusade, Graham grew more candid about his frustrations; like 
Cousins, he struggled to find explanations.  Some black ministers had suggested to 
Graham that black Atlantans were hesitant to leave their homes at night for fear of 
robbery.  Besides, the total population of metro Atlanta area was only 20 percent black, 
making the 5 percent turnout appear somewhat less extreme.  Graham contended that he 
lacked the appeal of Reverend Ike (Frederick Eikerenkoetter), a black evangelist and 
wealth gospel advocate.96  The crusade caused much soul searching within the BGEA, 
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which soon released a booklet documenting Graham’s desegregated crusades as far back 
as Chattanooga in 1953.  The booklet included a small photograph of the Atlanta choir.97 
Cousins was likewise unsure about the upshot of the crusade for his vision of a 
renewed Atlanta leadership.  His ambivalence reflected larger tensions within a city 
transitioning away from the civil rights era and toward black political dominance.  
Because of the biracial crusade planning process, Cousins optimistically insisted four 
years later, Atlanta’s race relations clearly exceeded those of northern cities.  By then, 
many of the persons he had identified for roles in the crusade remained involved in civic 
activities.  Cousins and fellow crusade boosters had discussed such matters as crime and 
poverty, and had even proposed asking area ministers to boycott the city’s liberal 
newspapers.  A biracial “What Now?” committee, headed by John Wilson and created for 
the purpose of implementing Cousins’ vision, yielded few substantive results, however.  
The major reason was the race issue.  As a result of the crusade’s problems, the otherwise 
theology-shy Cousins professed a definite belief in Satan, a force Graham often told 
crusade committees could disrupt even the most bountiful evangelistic harvest.98  For the 
bus strike, at least, Cousins could find no other explanation.  Like the real estate king in A 
Man in Full, Cousins went on to hit an economic rough patch during the mid-1970s, 
when his Omni Coliseum failed to fulfill its promise as a downtown magnet.  Likewise, 
white Atlanta business elites struggled to adjust to Mayor Maynard Jackson, who won 
office several months after the crusade and who, while by no means a Hosea Williams-
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style activist, possessed majority strength in the very neighborhoods where Graham’s 
crusade had held little sway.  Both Cousins and his fellow Atlanta elites, however, saw 
better times by the subsequent decade, when they continued the city’s tradition of 
reinventions on a New South theme.99  For Cousins, this meant following the flow of 
capital to the suburbs.100  In Atlanta’s successful bid for the 1996 Summer Olympics, it 
sold itself as “a city that has managed to shape a technologically-advanced environment 
without compromising its moral vision or charming quality of life.”101  Perhaps this was 
what Cousins originally had in mind. 
 
The Posited Model South 
 In both Birmingham and Atlanta, to be sure, Graham never fully embraced the 
more civically oriented ambitions of area crusade boosters, reiterating on numerous 
occasions the primacy of his spiritual motives.  Before the Atlanta crusade, he denied any 
aspirations for his revival to affect Atlanta’s politics.102  BGEA staffers appeared to share 
this concern.  Longtime Graham supporter Vernon Patterson complained of a trend, 
noticeable in Charlotte one month before the Birmingham crusade, in which the crusade 
leadership consisted of visible civic figures, rather than well-known Christians.103  
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Another BGEA staffer asked an Atlanta crusade leader whether he thought the crusade 
was primarily an effort to improve the image of the city and ease its racial struggles.104 
 Yet the same Graham who had communicated to the point of exaggeration his 
electoral usefulness to Richard Nixon surely supposed his crusades might boost the civic, 
as well as the religious, spirits of Birmingham and Atlanta.  For both types of leaders in 
those cities, the perceived benefits of a Graham crusade clearly extended beyond the 
BGEA’s stated mission of spreading salvation.  While this dynamic had been present in 
Graham crusades since the early 1950s, it assumed particular relevance for the urban 
South during a period when the evangelist possessed a discernable socio-political 
identity.  In Birmingham and Atlanta, Graham supported the interests of white leaders 
distancing themselves from their segregationist pasts.  At least since his 1958-1959 
interventions in Clinton and Little Rock, he had stressed the significance of his 
evangelism for the larger social trials of the South.  Like Charles Finney’s 1831 revival in 
Rochester, moreover, Graham crusades paid special attention to the city’s leadership 
class, emphasizing high-profile conversions and platform appearances.  While this 
strategy undoubtedly paid deference to the cult of celebrity, it also evinced a corollary to 
the regenerational theory of social change.  If Graham assumed that social transformation 
would flow outward from the regenerated individual heart, then his crusade practices 
suggested that temporal change was also a top-down endeavor in which Christ-filled 
leadership would yield better citizens.  Ultimately, whatever his reservations about 
Cousins’ motivations for the crusade, Graham was willing to be employed—indeed, 
used—on behalf of Sunbelt boosterism.  He implicitly (and often explicitly) confirmed 
                                               
 
104
 Russell Dilday interview, 5 March 1980, BGCA, CN 141, 11-10.   
  274 
assertions that the South had somehow solved most of its racial problems.  Indeed, he 
readily spoke the language of boosterism in newspaper and national publications, and he 
eagerly connected the Nixon administration with persons such as Cousins.  At the same 
time, Graham affirmed an evangelical faith that, as attendance figures showed, resonated 
most effectively in the South.  At the start of the post-civil rights era and during a decade 
when evangelicalism entered the White House, such faith became an overall benefit to 
the region’s reputation—a distraction from race and, moreover, a means of presenting the 
South as worthy of emulation.105 
 In the end, Graham’s crusades in Birmingham and Atlanta (and, by extension, his 
contemporaneous visits to Baton Rouge, Charlotte, Raleigh, and Jackson) assisted in the 
creation of a nominally post-segregation South desiring to shake off images of racial 
oppressiveness.106  Graham’s use of New South discourse alongside his altar calls 
suggested that the region might do so without also shaking off its evangelical loyalties.  
As many of his critics within and outside of the region recognized, this newest New 
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South would not satisfy liberal hopes for a new class-based politics, nor would it please 
such civil rights veterans as Hosea Williams and Ralph Abernathy.  Visions of the South 
as a potential model shifted out of the hands of activists and into those of post-
segregation boosters, who cast the region as an entrepreneurial boon and a bastion of 
social decency, ignoring the wealth of evidence to the contrary.  This was the Sunbelt 
South, a region Graham publicly affirmed and that Nixon’s southern strategist Harry 
Dent envisioned as part of a new Republican majority.  This imagined South had solved 
its racial problems—had not only rejoined the nation, but could now make that nation 
better, modeling good faith, as well as good politics.  According to this viewpoint, the 
social problems of the nation were no longer racial in nature (or, if they were, remained 
limited to the North); only liberals and black activists, absorbed in their own crusades, 
still considered race a pressing matter.  The Atlanta crusade, of course, challenged this 
thesis and exposed the post-racial rhetoric of the Sunbelt as an attempt to whitewash 
reality.  Atlanta also revealed the extent to which Watergate was becoming a millstone 
for Graham.  When feasible, though, lack of discussion about race created space for a 
new set of social concerns.  In the words of the Birmingham News, “other issues” had 
emerged.  On these issues, as well as on Watergate, Graham had much to say.   
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CHAPTER VII 
 
“BEFORE THE WATERGATE” 
 
And all the people gathered as one man into the square before the Water Gate; and they 
told Ezra the scribe to bring the book of the law of Moses which the LORD had given to 
Israel. . . . And he read from it facing the square before the Water Gate from early 
morning until midday, in the presence of the men and the women and those who could 
understand; and the ears of all the people were attentive to the book of the law. 
 
Nehemiah Chapter 8, Verses 1 and 3 (Revised Standard Version) 
 
Actually, the seeds of my decision had been planted . . . by the Reverend Billy Graham.  
He visited my family for a summer weekend in Maine. . . . Over the course of that 
weekend, Reverend Graham planted a mustard seed in my soul, a seed that grew over the 
next year.  He led me to the path, and I began walking. . . . It was the beginning of a new 
walk where I would recommit my heart to Jesus Christ. 
 
George W. Bush1 
 
Despite tensions in Atlanta and elsewhere, the main domestic issue that dogged 
Graham by 1973 was not race, but the Watergate crisis, a matter the evangelist studiously 
avoided in the immediate aftermath of the 1972 presidential election.  While the Sunbelt 
image gained appeal, the politician who had done so much to facilitate that image—
Richard Nixon—resigned and left office in disgrace.  A host of galvanizing social issues, 
such as abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment, bubbled beneath the surface of 
Watergate and would gain momentum later in the decade.   
Graham finally went public regarding Watergate during the spring of 1973, when 
he accepted an invitation from New York Times publisher Arthur Sulzberger to author an 
                                               
1
 George W. Bush, A Charge to Keep (New York: William Morrow, 1999), 136.  Graham’s visit to 
Maine occurred in 1985. 
  277 
op-ed piece, titled “Watergate and Its Lessons of Morality.”  The cynicism evident in the 
transgressions of Watergate, Graham wrote, was “but a symptom of the deeper moral 
crisis that affects the nation.”  While Graham urged firm, but fair punishment for 
Watergate-related crimes (assuming Nixon had no part in them), his primary target was a 
nation that had “condoned amoral permissiveness that would make Sodom blush.”  
Preaching his standard brand of soft jeremiad, the evangelist appealed for a return to 
biblical norms.  He quoted a coincidental, yet seemingly appropriate passage from the 
Old Testament book of Nehemiah in which post-exilic Jews—having returned from the 
Babylonian captivity, the product of previous un-repentance—gathered “before the Water 
Gate” in Jerusalem to hear the scribe Ezra read from the law of Moses, a body of 
covenantal precepts Graham thought no less relevant to the Watergate scandal.2  
Graham’s use of scripture exemplified a phenomenon, which anthropologist Susan Friend 
Harding has observed in fundamentalist preaching (although it applies equally to the 
evangelical Graham), wherein scripture takes on a “generative quality” and is “at once a 
closed canon and an open book, still alive, a living Word.”3  Indeed, Graham’s sermons 
frequently absorbed contemporary catch phrases into established biblical concepts, 
folding newspaper headlines into scriptural timelines.  In the case of Watergate and 
“Water Gate,” however, growing numbers of commentators accused Graham of a reverse 
operation: employing biblical language for the secular end of defending Nixon by any 
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means—or analogy—necessary.  As the ramifications of Watergate intensified 
throughout 1973, Graham struggled to find a balance between protecting the president 
and interpreting the crisis for evangelistic purposes.  Initially, the tasks complemented 
one another; Watergate as synecdoche, or “symptom,” served to de-personalize the 
scandal and shift attention away from Nixon.  Defending Nixon proved more difficult, 
though, as investigators and the public increasingly linked the sins of Watergate with the 
president himself. 
The evangelist’s citation of Nehemiah 8 revealed two dynamics that would 
resonate within American political culture during the 1970s and beyond: his evangelical 
relativizing of the Watergate crisis and his concomitant appeal for a national return to 
biblical norms.  The two trends operated somewhat uncomfortably beside each other.  
Putting Watergate in perspective reflected a tragic, post-“Fall” reading of human society 
(i.e., one informed by the biblical story of the Garden of Eden), while using the crisis to 
evangelize evinced a moralistic, covenantal perspective subsequently associated with the 
Christian Right.  Yet Graham influenced both phenomena.  Although the Christian Right 
garnered more headlines, the evangelical social ethics evident in Graham’s explanation of 
Watergate suggested a somewhat more subtle, but equally enduring role for faith-
informed politics—one very much alive in the second Bush White House. 
Graham’s influence in the public sphere endured long after a presidential crisis 
from which he did not escape untainted.  It did so despite his largely successful, if 
somewhat misleading, effort to depoliticize himself in the years following Watergate.  
His evangelical explanations of Watergate—how he, as well as several former Nixon 
staffers, described the crisis in terms simultaneously universalistic and relative—revealed 
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one reason why this was so.  Another reason concerned the rapid emergence of the 
Christian Right during the latter half of the 1970s.  The evangelist exemplified a larger 
regional shift away from explicitly racial matters and toward a range of gender- and 
family-oriented social issues that influenced the growth of conservative Christian 
activism.  While Graham’s relationship to the Christian Right was ambiguous, his legacy 
in the aftermath of Watergate continued to inform the paramount position of 
evangelicalism in the political culture of the post-civil rights era South and, increasingly, 
the nation.  In short, Graham and Watergate created space for the evangelicalization of 
American politics.  More than a specific Christian social ideal, this trend entailed the 
triumph of evangelical discourse—a turn toward character and confessionalism 
coexistent, more often than not, with conservative politics. 
 
“There’s a little bit of Watergate in all of us.” 
 The Watergate crisis brought about the nadir of Graham’s public image, a fact 
relished by the many commentators who cast him as, at best, a lackey of the Nixon 
administration or, at worst, a dangerously influential reactionary.  His periodic proposal 
of the adage, “There’s a little bit of Watergate in all of us,” did little to dissuade his 
critics.  From September 1973 until Nixon resigned eleven months later, the evangelist 
uttered these words (or variations on them) on at least five occasions, including once to a 
national television audience.4  While the maxim conveyed an obvious amount of 
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evasiveness, it also reflected an evangelical social ethic that Graham continued to express 
throughout the Watergate crisis, as he reflexively and then awkwardly, defended his 
friend Nixon.  By personalizing Watergate, Graham also defined it as part of a more 
important, if also more general, crisis of individual hearts.  He emphasized the sinful 
proclivities of humanity (made all the more so by a permissive society), as opposed to 
focusing on the structural flaws of the political system or even the individual crimes 
within the Nixon administration.  In locating the meaning of Watergate in human 
sinfulness writ large and writ individual, rather than in the White House, the evangelist, 
along with a number of Watergate-era converts to evangelicalism, spoke a language of 
post-Fall universalism that cast the affair itself in relative terms.  Graham’s prescription 
for Watergate thus involved a double standard.  Spiritually, the crisis necessitated a 
universal mandate for repentance and revival; politically, it was but another sin, rather 
than a constitutional crisis. 
 Graham passed through three stages in his responses to Watergate.  These stages, 
while developmentally discrete, compounded into an awkward and muddled mixture of 
theology and partisanship.  At first, Graham simply denied the significance of the crisis.  
Later, he employed the scandal for devotional and prophetic purposes before, lastly, 
directing the language of conversion toward the inevitable embodiment of Watergate, 
Nixon himself.  Like most of the nation, Graham did not anticipate the tumult to come 
when news of the Watergate burglary and its possible links to the Nixon re-election effort 
first appeared during the summer and fall of 1972.  Days before the presidential election 
that year, Graham dismissed the alleged crimes as “shenanigans,” averred that he was 
“convinced that President Nixon knew nothing about it,” and criticized George 
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McGovern for accusing the Nixon administration of immoral practices.5  Privately, 
Graham told Nixon that he would emphasize the president’s “personal morality and 
integrity” at an upcoming press conference and expressed to Chief of Staff H. R. 
Haldeman consternation “that people who made a hero of [Daniel] Ellsberg for stealing 
the Pentagon Papers are so deeply concerned about the alleged escapade at Watergate.”  
The evangelist also volunteered to vouch for the characters of Haldeman and fellow aide 
Dwight Chapin, both of whom later saw prison time for Watergate-related crimes.6  As 
the crisis intensified during the winter of 1973, Graham attempted to frame his 
relationship to Nixon—alternately, as a pastor or friend—so as to minimize his 
responsibilities regarding the public discussion of Watergate.  “When a member of the 
congregation is hurt or in trouble, the heart of the pastor goes out to him and to his 
family,” Graham said of Nixon in a statement published on May 1, 1973, immediately 
following the forced resignations of Haldeman and fellow staffer John Ehrlichman, as 
well as the firing of White House Counsel John Dean.7  Still, Graham defended Nixon 
with the passion of a friend and the rationale of a true believer.  It was inconceivable to 
Graham that someone as ethically sound and politically intelligent as Nixon had any 
previous knowledge of the Watergate shenanigans. 
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 While Graham the political loyalist could not initially conceive of Watergate as 
anything other than a partisan attack on Nixon, Graham the evangelist eventually 
identified a certain devotional value in the crisis.8  The use of Watergate for evangelistic 
purposes did not, as Nixon initially feared, signify a retreat from his support for the 
administration.9  To the contrary, and to the benefit of Nixon, the meaning Graham found 
in Watergate remained within the framework of evangelical universalism, as Graham 
went to great lengths to keep the devotional and political elements of Watergate separate.  
His May 1 statement and New York Times op-ed represented the official line of the 
Graham team regarding Watergate: The bad apples behind the break-in should be 
punished, yet the proper national response to Watergate was not political retaliation, but a 
renewed focus on spiritual and moral slippage.  In the Times piece, Graham employed 
Watergate to call for a “national and pervasive awakening,” even while he urged readers 
to “put the Watergate affair in proper historical perspective.”10 
 Throughout the Watergate crisis, then, Graham turned the affair into a morality 
tale in which, to cite one example, Nixon apparatchik Jeb Magruder represented a kind of 
everyman, swept toward lawlessness by the secular gusts of American society.  “A nation 
confused for years by the teaching of situational ethics now finds itself dismayed by those 
in [g]overnment who apparently practiced it,” Graham declared, citing an ethical system 
Magruder had attributed to his moral lapses.  “We have lost our moral compass.  We 
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must get it back.”11  Moral reorientation would require spiritual repentance, as well as a 
renewed recognition of biblical authority—hence, the model from Nehemiah of Israelites 
turning to the Law of Moses during their time of trial.  Here, Graham found a 
compromise typology between his self-characterization as a New Testament evangelist 
and the repeated calls that he imitate the Micahs and Amoses of the Old Testament: John 
the Baptist, the New Testament’s lone prophet.  “All I can do,” he told a Chicago 
audience, “is be one voice in the wilderness crying out[,] Warning!  Judgment is 
coming.”12  Graham the qualified prophet spoke to the nation as a whole, not to the Nixon 
administration in particular.  In referring to situational ethics (and, elsewhere, to the ethos 
of civil disobedience perpetuated by the protest culture of the sixties), the evangelist cited 
the very type of “moral decadence” Nixon had campaigned against to explain the actions 
of the president’s aides.  Perhaps the ultimate example of Graham’s desire to extract a 
meaning from Watergate without also damaging the president was his employment of the 
word “crisis,” the tagline of Nixon’s 1968 inaugural address, to describe the moral 
context of the scandal.  The teleology of permissiveness, rather than the machinations of 
the Nixon White House, lent a certain inevitability to Watergate.  Graham’s proposed 
solution was no less inevitable.  While even Adam and Eve had tried to “cover up,” 
Graham said in terms reflective of Susan Friend Harding’s observation about preacherly 
rhetoric, the “greatest cover up of all was Calvary, where our Lord shed his blood to 
cover our sins and we’re all sinners.”13 
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 Thus, while Graham readily linked Watergate with moral declension, he did not 
describe this declension in terms readily translatable into a political or legal solution.  As 
a result of Watergate, he told a sympathetic group of southern newspaper publishers, the 
media had an opportunity to lead a “moral revolution,” an effort Graham did not believe 
required more investigative journalism.14  Watergate was but a “symbol of political 
corruption and evil [italics mine],” yet another expression of human frailty.  As he had 
done with the issue of racial strife during the Civil Rights Movement, Graham 
comfortably associated the Watergate affair with such international crisis spots as Cyprus 
and Vietnam.  Both moves—distinguishing between moral and political solutions, as well 
as turning Watergate into a symbol—downplayed the singularity of the crisis.  Even as 
Graham put greater public distance between himself and Nixon by the start of 1974, the 
evangelist’s characterization of Watergate still distracted attention from the specific 
culpability of the administration.  In a well-publicized interview with Christianity Today 
published in January 1974, Graham characterized allegations of his own implication in 
the crisis as McCarthy-style guilt by association.  At the same time, he infused Watergate 
with an element of tragedy.  During the 1972 campaign, he argued, Nixon staffers had 
employed an ends-justifies-the-means ethic because of their “magnificent obsession to 
change the country and the world”—an argument reminiscent of the testimony of John 
Mitchell, head of the 1972 reelection campaign.15  Hubris was a part of the human 
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condition, the Watergate in everyone; it transcended party identification.  “[T]he nation 
needs to repent—not just the Republicans, but my own party, the Democrats, as well,” 
Graham told an audience at Duke University.16  “What caused Watergate?” he asked a 
group of Southern Baptists two months before Nixon’s resignation.  “Sin.  And there is a 
little bit of Watergate in all of us.  So let’s not go around being so self-righteous.  I know 
bad people in both parties and all over the world.”17 
 Graham’s truncated moralization of Watergate conveniently allowed him to call 
for national repentance while expressing confidence that Nixon would survive in office 
and, even as late as June 1973, contending that it was “too early to make a moral 
judgment” on the political crisis.18  Again, Graham attempted to keep politics and 
evangelism in separate spheres.  This distinction often meant little more than the 
difference between a press conference and a sermon, however.  His evangelistic uses of 
Watergate initially did little to threaten or even qualify his unabashed support for Nixon, 
whom Graham continued to counsel and praise.  A month before Graham came out 
publicly for the punishment of Watergate wrong-doers, he wrote a supportive letter to 
Nixon likening the president’s predicament to the struggles of the Israelite King David, 
whom he quote from Psalms 35:11-12: “They accuse me of things I have never even 
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heard about.  I do them good but they return me harm.”19  Four days before the May 6 
Times op-ed appeared, the evangelist advised Nixon to seek out photo-ops with 
international dignitaries because, as aide Lawrence Higby summarized to Nixon, “[t]he 
American people need to be diverted from Watergate.”20  Graham did his part by 
nominating inflation as the most pressing problem for the nation.21  
 While many of Graham’s public and private defenses of Nixon were no doubt 
arguments of expediency, his overall interpretation of Watergate reflected the evangelical 
social ethic outlined throughout this project.  In popular memory, this social ethic 
manifested itself most acutely in his public reaction upon reading the initial transcripts of 
the Nixon White House recordings.22  The evangelist fixated on the matter of Nixon’s 
deleted expletives.23  Unlike Nixon advisor and former Jesuit priest John McLaughlin 
(who later hosted a popular public affairs program), Graham could not dismiss 
swearing—especially taking the Lord’s name in vain—as a form of stress release.24  Yet 
Graham’s focus on profanity in the midst of so many other damning abuses of power, 
whatever its value as an anecdote, should not distract from the larger significance of the 
social ethic of evangelical universalism that clearly informed his overall response to 
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Watergate.  As explicated earlier, evangelical universalism viewed the individual soul as 
the primary theological and political unit in society, prioritized relational over legislative 
solutions, and tended to acquiesce to the ultimately inscrutable realm of ordained 
authority.  All three elements were evident in Graham’s handling of Watergate. 
 Focusing on the individual soul and proffering relational (i.e., non-legal or non-
political) solutions worked complementarily.  Graham characterized Watergate as a call 
for national repentance, yet he ultimately described this call in individuated terms.  
Rather than specifically condemning Nixon or any other administration official, Graham 
focused on the generic sins of the generic individual, suggesting that the conversion of 
individuals would have a ripple effect on society.  This “regenerational” approach 
prioritized the devotional value of Watergate over any legal or political meanings the 
crisis might hold.  Appropriately, then, Graham called the Nixon tapes as “just a little 
foretaste of what is to come for all of us, when we have to sit before the Great Committee 
in Heaven and hear all of the tapes played of our own lives.”25  Still, Graham did not 
wholly abstract Watergate from temporal social relevance.  To the contrary, he 
unabashedly hoped that the crisis would contribute to the restoration of a national “moral 
consensus.”26  Graham’s description of this moral consensus, however, reflected a quality 
scholar Dennis P. Hollinger found in his study of evangelical social ethics: “a blurring 
together of personal and social dimensions of existence,” in which “[s]ocial problems are 
regularly viewed as magnified personal problems.”27  For Graham, the nation’s loss of 
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moral consensus boiled down to a breakdown in individual morality.  Indeed, he 
identified the potential “great illusion” of Watergate as the belief “that you can have 
public virtue without private morality.”28  Morality flowed outward from the individual.  
 Whatever the lessons of Watergate, Graham’s political defense of Nixon hinged 
not only on their friendship, but also on assumptions of Nixon’s inherent legitimacy and 
the special nature of the presidency.29  The evangelical focus on social transformation 
through the individual, which received healthy in-house critiques from Hollinger and a 
generation of “young evangelicals,” coexisted with equally significant appeals for social 
order and respect for authority.30  For Graham and other conservative Christians, 
legitimate authority tended to also mean ordained authority.31  In this perspective, which 
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Graham had invoked as a moderate during the Civil Rights Movement, law becomes 
something to obey, to be subject to, rather than to create or invoke for progressive ends.  
In his interview with Christianity Today, Graham stressed Christians’ “one primary duty 
to those in authority: to pray!”32  More tellingly, in a quote ridiculed by a Village Voice 
cartoonist, the evangelist wondered if “we as Christians failed to pray enough for Richard 
Nixon.”33  Such advice assigned to individual Christians a strikingly passive role vis-à-
vis ordained authority.  Indeed, for all of his obvious attraction to the wheeling and 
dealing of politics and for all of his savvy as an advisor to politicians, Graham at a 
fundamental level remained in willful (and, at times, uncomprehending) awe of the 
workings of high political office.  On a number of occasions during Watergate, Graham 
wondered if Americans expected too much out of their presidents.  “The presidency does 
so much to a man,” he said following Nixon’s resignation.  “The responsibility is almost 
too much.”  These lines—which might be read either as another Nixon apologia or as a 
faint echo of the influential “imperial presidency” thesis of historian Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr.—also indicated an important dynamic in Graham’s posture toward that political 
authority which he deemed ordained.34  If one accepts a modified covenantal theology 
(i.e., that God actively works through nations or peoples), as Graham did, and if one 
tends to define sin in individual and not structural terms, as Graham also did, then the 
mechanics of legitimate political power fall into a unique category, difficult to hold 
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accountable to standards of individual morality.  Power attains a degree of divine 
inscrutability, and something as nebulous as job difficulty can become a more plausible 
excuse for excessive use of that power.  Graham found transgressions that were clearly 
individual and conscious in nature, be they swearing or breaking and entering, easier to 
identify and denounce than the sins of state. 
 In addition to reflecting an evangelical posture, Graham’s support of Nixon was 
part of a regional phenomenon, an extension of Nixon’s appeal in much of the white 
South.  A number of observers at the time noted that the South remained the region 
seemingly most loyal to Nixon.35  Despite the fact that many southern Republicans paid a 
political price for their loyalty, they were among the most strident congressional 
defenders of Nixon, who often visited the region when seeking electoral solace.  Just after 
the resignations of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, Republican North Carolina Senator Jesse 
Helms, whom Nixon had supported during the 1972 campaign, told the president he had 
“a real friend there” in Graham.36  The broader southern support for Nixon had much to 
do with resentment against the presumably liberal media, a sign that Nixon’s southern 
strategy and invocations of the silent majority had yielded regional dividends.  A 
prominent journalist quoted a South Carolinian as saying, “We support and sympathize 
with the President because we Southerners have been on the receiving end so long 
ourselves.”37  Graham’s public opinions regarding media coverage of the South and the 
Civil Rights Movement, voiced as recently as his 1972 Birmingham crusade, certainly 
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paralleled these sentiments.  On a more intriguing note, his warning against self-
righteousness bore resemblance to a more famous Nixon apologia by the southern rock 
band Lynyrd Skynyrd, whose anthem of sectional pride, “Sweet Home Alabama,” feature 
the line, “Now Watergate does not bother me / Does your conscience bother you?”38  One 
historian has argued that these lyrics “captured a wide-spread belief that Nixon was under 
fire only because liberal arbiters of opinion hewed to a double standard.”39  While 
Graham certainly echoed this feeling (e.g., his references to the sinfulness of Democrats, 
as well as Republicans), the evangelist and the rock band had another thing in common: a 
desire to turn Watergate into something other than a political scandal with a political 
solution.  Through their obviously contrasting mediums, they called for self-reflection—
with a goal, for Lynyrd Skynyrd, of northern retreat, and for Graham, of national revival. 
 The upshot of Graham’s evangelical interpretation of Watergate was to present 
the crisis as a conversion opportunity not only for America, but also for the Watergate 
participants and for Nixon himself.  As the crisis extended into 1974, the evangelist 
entered the final stage of his handling of Watergate.  He urged Nixon to confess his own 
need for forgiveness.  Graham went so far as to propose remarks for Nixon to voice at 
what turned out to be the president’s final prayer breakfast:  
I hope I shall not be judged as hiding behind religion when I say that I 
have . . . been driven to my knees in prayer. . . .  [W]e are all in need of 
God’s forgiveness.  Not only for mistakes in judgment, but [for] our sins 
as well. . . .  I want to take this opportunity today to re-dedicate myself to 
the God that I first learned about at my mother’s knee. 
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Perhaps aware of the potential domino effect of even a qualified mea culpa, Nixon did 
not take up Graham’s proposal.40  The suggested remarks reflected the universalization-
relativization dynamic, as well as Graham’s hope that Nixon would contritely model an 
evangelical response to Watergate.  Graham wanted Nixon to act like the priest Ezra from 
the Book of Nehemiah, to declare publicly his faith in the Lord so that all might 
understand the true solution to the nation’s crisis.  In the eyes of an emerging majority of 
Americans, however, Nixon personified that very crisis. 
 Following that prayer breakfast, Graham urged Nixon to draw inspiration from 
Charles Colson.41  The Nixon hatchet man was one of a number of high-profile converts 
to evangelical Christianity during and following Watergate.  The conversions of 
convicted Watergate-related perpetrators Colson, Jeb Magruder and Harry Dent—or, 
more specifically, how they described their born-again experiences—echoed Graham’s 
simultaneous universalization and relativization of the crisis.  As loyalists who had 
suffered legal consequences because of Watergate, they were more willing than Graham 
to criticize Nixon as both a person and a leader.  Still, none of them joined Common 
Cause as a result of their experiences; they described the lessons of Watergate in 
spiritual, rather than political, terms.  They all moved on to careers in evangelical 
organizations directly or closely associated with the Billy Graham Evangelistic 
Association (BGEA).  Magruder, who had overseen the cover up of the Watergate 
burglary and who later took a position with the youth evangelism organization Young 
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Life, attributed his willingness to ignore the law during the 1972 campaign to the lax 
guidelines he had learned from a college ethics professor.42  Graham echoed Magruder’s 
assertion in his only sermonic reference to Watergate during the 1973 Atlanta crusade.43 
The conversion of Colson, which occurred while he remained a consultant to 
Nixon, garnered the most press and, understandably, its fair share of cynicism.  The dirty 
tricks specialist and contributor to the notorious “Enemies List” was led to Christ by Tom 
Phillips, head of the defense and electronics firm Raytheon, who himself had converted 
during a Graham crusade.  Colson’s post-conversion advice to Nixon paralleled that of 
Graham.  Colson proposed that the president declare April 30, 1974 (the anniversary of 
Lincoln’s 1863 National Fast Day) a national day of prayer.  Doing so might save 
Nixon’s political skin; but it would also turn Watergate into an ironic good.  “I believe 
that the country has to be lifted out of the doldrums of Watergate,” Colson wrote.  “Our 
best hope is to bring about a rebirth of faith and a renewed commitment to God.”44  In 
later reflections, while not glossing over the specific failings of Nixon, Colson parlayed 
Watergate into a critique of liberal humanism, the source of the hubris that had infected 
the White House.  “Were Mr. Nixon and his men more evil than any of their 
predecessors?” the founder of the Prison Fellowship ministry (who did not become 
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associated with the Christian Right until the presidency of George W. Bush) asked in 
language strikingly similar to Graham’s interpretation of Watergate. 
That they brought the nation Watergate is a truth.  But is it not only part of 
a larger truth—that all men have the capacity for both good and evil, and 
the darker side of man’s nature can always prevail in any human being?  If 
people believe that just because one bunch of rascals [is] run out of office 
all the ills which have beset a nation are over, then the real lesson of this 
ugly time will have been missed—and that delusion could be the greatest 
tragedy of all. . . .  Having seen through Watergate how vulnerable man 
can be, I no longer believe I am master of my destiny.  I need God; . . .45 
 
 Harry Dent’s path to born-again Christianity was the least dramatic of the three 
and technically represented a reaffirmation of faith (although he described it in terms of a 
conversion).  During his tenure as Nixon’s political coordinator, the architect of the 
southern strategy received much publicity as a Southern Baptist, a known teetotaler, and 
an organizer of the White House prayer breakfasts.46  Unlike Colson and Magruder, Dent 
saw no jail time and suffered minimal political damage for his Watergate-related 
conviction.  Nonetheless, Dent, who during the 1980s served as director of the Billy 
Graham Lay Center, traced his 1978 spiritual renewal to the fundamental questions 
Watergate had raised for him about “the nature of man.”  His devotional-style book on 
the matter, Cover Up: The Watergate in All of Us, invoked Graham’s own phraseology 
and offered perhaps the most extreme version of the Watergate-as-metaphor trope.  “The 
story of Watergate,” Dent wrote, “is a replay, thousands of years later, of the Garden of 
Eden.”  He defined a personal Watergate as “a sudden confrontation with an event or 
experience which contains the potential . . . for destruction of our personal honor, worth, 
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safety or well-being, or that of our family.”  According to this therapeutic schema, the 
day of judgment becomes the “ultimate Watergate,” and Hitler succumbed to his own 
Watergate by committing suicide.47         .      
 None of the above born-again experiences entailed a clear political upshot.  
Colson, Magruder, and Dent described their conversions almost wholly in spiritual terms 
and all three eventually ceased their political work.  At the same time, they did not appear 
to depart from the broader contours of conservative politics.  At a 1987 conference on the 
Nixon presidency, for example, Colson offered an explicitly biblical justification for the 
occasional lie of state.  His critique of liberal humanism would later resound in popular 
conservatism (and actually resembled Nixon’s own campaign language).48  Dent, like 
many Republicans throughout the South, softened his tone on race, yet he remained 
identified with his adopted party.49  Magruder, meanwhile, questioned the role 
government programs could play in solving national problems.50 
 In the end, Graham unsuccessfully attempted to fit Nixon into the conversion 
narrative modeled by Colson and Magruder, and later embraced by Dent.  The 
evangelist’s optimism regarding Nixon was, in a word, resilient.  Following an early post-
resignation meeting with Nixon, Graham declared that the former president had turned to 
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religion.51  The evangelist had expressed similar sentiments following Nixon’s final 
prayer breakfast.52  While Graham’s efforts toward this end were less than successful, his 
general approach to Watergate, including his invocation of an evangelical social ethic, 
has continued to resonate within American political culture in the years following the 
crisis.  It has resonated beyond the oft-cited “post-Watergate policing of character” (or 
the correlative “post-Watergate morality”), standards of public scrutiny Graham scarcely 
applied to Nixon.53  The value system of evangelical universalism helps explains not 
simply why Graham found Nixon’s profanity more problematic than his abuses of power; 
it also suggests why Colson and Dent, especially, could convert to evangelical 
Christianity without substantially altering (or even seriously questioning) their political 
orientations.  While Nixon himself did not pursue this route, a host of subsequent 
politicians (including George W. Bush and Tom DeLay) exchanged the profane bottle for 
the priestly garb of Ezra.54  Also, Graham’s approach to Watergate bears intriguing 
resemblance (if not, of course, a direct causational connection) to the strategies 
contemporary conservatives have employed to explain (away) political crises that have 
threatened their partisan commitments.  Just as Graham argued that decades of moral 
slippage had culminated in Watergate, conservative pundits contended in 2002 that the 
corporate scandals at Enron had grown out of the morally permissive environment of the 
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Clinton years.55  More recently, Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum, a conservative 
Roman Catholic, drew a connection between his Church’s sexual abuse scandal and 
“cultural liberalism.”56  In all three cases, the focus was on individual morality unleashed 
by society’s decadence, rather than on corruption enabled by the political or financial 
system.  In the cases of Watergate and Enron, the specific role of the sitting president 
(i.e., the seat of ordained authority) remained largely free from interrogation.       
  
Up from Watergate 
 In April 1974, four months before Nixon’s resignation and another month before 
the silver anniversary of Graham’s watershed Los Angeles crusade, evangelical historian 
Richard Pierard published an article pointedly titled, “Can Billy Graham Survive Richard 
Nixon?”57  The question was more than appropriate in light of the public beating Graham 
had taken over the Watergate scandal.  Many newspaper editorial boards focused 
specifically on the connection Graham drew between Watergate and a decline in national 
morality.  “The business of blaming a permissive society, a decadent people, and a 
population prone to sinfulness for high crimes and misdemeanors in the White House will 
get us nowhere,” editorialized the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot in response to his New York 
Times op-ed piece.  Graham’s “short-order sermon,” another paper snapped, possessed 
“the texture and appearance of a flat soufflé.”58  Such criticism gained particular 
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credence, first, as documents revealed attempts by Haldeman to derive political capital 
from protests at the Billy Graham Day celebration in Charlotte, and second, as former 
White House Counsel John Dean testified that Nixon sought to quash Internal Revenue 
Service inquiries about the tax status of the BGEA.59  In Christian circles, criticism of 
Graham’s response to Watergate was not confined to the predictable realm of liberal 
Protestantism.  The Presbyterian Church in the United States (Southern Presbyterian), no 
bastion of theological modernism, briefly considered a resolution imploring Graham to 
urge Nixon to come clean regarding the Watergate allegations.  The resolution failed, 
undoubtedly to the relief of the denomination’s outgoing moderator, Nelson Bell.60  
Additional criticism came from the normally friendly pen of conservative commentator 
and fellow evangelical Paul Harvey, who back in 1960 had urged Graham not to 
publicize his endorsement of Nixon in Life magazine.  Harvey imagined Graham’s 
response to the White House transcripts: “You are remembering that the President never 
once talked like that around you. . . . It hurts, Billy, but you asked for it.”61   
 Yet Graham did survive Watergate, as Pierard suspected he could.  The evangelist 
gradually sought to distance himself from Nixon, a process that began tentatively with a 
public statement, apparently recorded with the help of his friend and fellow Nixon 
intimate Charles Crutchfield for release on Thanksgiving Day 1973.  Graham said he did 
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“not always agree” with the administration’s actions, yet averred that the “tragic events of 
Watergate will probably make [Nixon] a stronger man and a better President.”62  He put 
additional public space between himself and Nixon following the late January 1974 
presidential prayer breakfast, his last public appearance with the sitting president.  
Returning from a major evangelism conference in Switzerland on the cusp of the 
president’s August 9 resignation, Graham placed several unsuccessful phone calls to 
Nixon.  The president may have been seeking to shelter him from the Watergate fallout.63  
During the intervening months, Graham had tellingly revised his description of their 
relationship.  The evangelist had claimed during the 1972 campaign to “know the 
President as well as anyone outside his immediate family.”64  Nearly two years later, 
however, Graham suggested that he was never an intimate of Nixon, “contrary to what 
people thought.”65  Graham again emphasized that he had spent more time in the White 
House with Lyndon Johnson than with the current president—a count that, while perhaps 
technically accurate, did not factor in campaign appearances and phone conversations.66  
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(Johnson likely would not have found time to call Graham from China, as Nixon did at 
the close of his path-breaking diplomatic visit there.)67  Interviews with Haldeman and 
Colson unsurprisingly revealed a much different assumption about the evangelist, whom 
Haldeman classified as “definitely in [Nixon’s] inner circle.”68  
By no means, however, did Graham depart from his general defensiveness about 
Nixon’s stature as a national leader and, more strikingly, Nixon’s ultimate culpability in 
the Watergate affair.69  Graham privately lobbied President Gerald Ford in favor of a 
presidential pardon and publicly expressed a sense that attempts “to further hurt [Nixon] 
would cause great division in the country.”70  Following the pardoning of Nixon, Graham 
released a statement in support of Ford’s action.71  During the twenty remaining years of 
Nixon’s life, Graham kept in regular touch with the beleaguered ex-president, on whom 
the evangelist lavished praise in private and then again in public on the occasion of 
Nixon’s 1994 funeral.  The details of their many conversations, most of which touched on 
foreign affairs, occasionally surfaced in the press in a manner reflecting favorably on 
Nixon.  While Graham did not abandon his desire to convert the former president to a 
more active brand of Christianity, he did little to counter sentiments among Nixon 
defenders that the media stood to blame for the Watergate crisis.72 
                                               
 
67
 Graham to Nixon, 3 April 1988, RNL, PPSP, 1-4; and 18 November 1981, RNL, PPSP, 1-6. 
 
68
 Quoted in Martin, Prophet, 393. 
 
69
 In a 1977 interview, Graham said he did not believe Nixon had “yet been totally proven guilty.”  
See Charlotte Observer, 8 February 1977. 
 
70
 Graham, Just As I Am, 468.  Atlanta Constitution, 10 August 1974, in BGCA, CN 360, R35. 
 
71
 Statement by Graham, 8 September 1974, BGCA, CN 345, 68-1. 
 
72
 Graham to Nixon, 17 August 1974 and 15 March 1975; and Albuquerque Tribune, 18 March 
1975; all in RNL, PPBG, 1-2.  Graham to John Pollock, 30 December 1986, RNL, PPSP, 1-4.  Graham, 
  301 
 In the years following Watergate, Graham liked to publicize his newfound 
distance from the world of politics.  He even conceded that his White House church 
services had been a mistake.73  Any assumption that Watergate led Graham to take a page 
from the Old Testament prophets Amos or Micah oversimplifies matters greatly, 
however.  In truth, the evangelist never completely forsook the political arena.74  While 
steering very clear of the excesses of the Nixon years, he continued to find his way into 
White House memos and, inevitably, onto the borderlands of campaign politics.   
Graham’s initial dealings with President Gerald Ford suggested that the evangelist 
initially failed, or chose not, to grasp one apparent lesson of Watergate: that proximity 
alone can imply partisanship.  The evangelist telephoned President Ford during his first 
day in the office and soon wrote to declare his “total and complete backing and support” 
and to make himself available as a prayer partner and “someone to talk to who won’t 
quote you.”  As if to ensure Ford’s awareness of the full menu of his services as national 
pastor, the evangelist also invited him to attend a crusade in Norfolk, Virginia.  Ford did 
not accept the offer, but he eventually followed Nixon’s footsteps to Charlotte, appearing 
with Graham at the bicentennial celebration of the Mecklenburg Declaration of 
Independence.  The two remained in regular contact.  Early in the election year of 1976, 
Graham open-endedly asked Ford to call him “if there is anything that I can do to help in 
the months ahead.”  As the election approached, presidential staffers kept on the lookout 
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for ways to connect their candidate with the evangelist.  That September, apparently at 
Ford’s behest, Graham invited the president to attend a crusade service in his home state 
of Michigan.  Graham stipulated, however, that he would also extend an invitation to 
Democratic challenger Jimmy Carter (just as the evangelist had invited Hubert Humphrey 
to the 1968 Pittsburgh crusade, which Nixon had attended).  Likewise, Ford would not be 
permitted to address the audience.75  Only Ford’s running mate, Bob Dole, ultimately 
traveled to Pontiac and his flight there via a campaign jet caught the attention of 
reporters.76  So did Graham’s visit to the White House soon thereafter.  Accepting an 
invitation from Ford, who had reason to believe he might still win over evangelical voters 
from the increasingly vulnerable Carter, Graham rode in the presidential limousine on the 
occasion of a reception hosted by Liberian President William Tolbert, a Baptist and a 
friend of the evangelist.77 
 The ambiguity of Graham’s relationship with Jimmy Carter provides strong 
evidence that the evangelist remained a Republican in all but registration.  “Graham’s 
partisanship,” wrote a critical biographer wrote as far back as 1960, “has been 
camouflaged by a professed apoliticalism.”78  Scholars have been surprisingly hesitant to 
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look past these persistent professions and identify Graham as a Republican partisan, 
rather than simply as an Eisenhower and Nixon backer, or someone who tended to 
support GOP leaders and policies.79  On the other hand, journalists during the Nixon era 
often assumed that Graham was a Republican, or listed his Democratic registration as a 
non sequitur.  In explaining the lack of intimacy between Carter and the evangelist, 
another Graham biographer rightly cited both the evangelist’s post-Watergate hesitancy 
to involve himself in high-profile political activity and, more importantly, Carter’s 
assumption that Graham might not offer him support.80  At the time, columnists Rowland 
Evans and Robert Novak contended that Carter initially shunned the evangelist because 
he feared alienating his liberal supporters.81  Much more than his fellow parishioner Billy 
Graham, furthermore, Carter maintained a traditional Baptist belief in a firm separation 
between church and state—a reality that contradicted his media-driven image as a 
politician who wore his religion on his cardigan.82 
                                                                                                                                            
78
 William G. McLoughlin, Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age (New York: The Ronald 
Press, 1960), 93. 
 
79
 Martin described Graham’s politics as Republican-leaning, but did not identify Graham as even 
a de facto Republican.  See Martin, Prophet, 462-464 and passim.  Paddon drew a similar conclusion.  See 
Paddon, “Mordecai,” 80.  Martin E. Marty more directly termed Graham “a moderate Republican.”  See 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 31 May 1993.   
 
80
 Another reason cited to explain Graham’s lack of closeness with Carter was a widely-
publicized, if surprisingly short-lived financial scandal centering on the World Evangelism and Christian 
Education Fund (WECEF), a private foundation based in Dallas and supported largely by donations 
funneled through the BGEA.  Although WECEF was legal and funded causes in keeping with its name, its 
secretive existence (which Graham said was intended to limit the number of requests, while retaining the 
BGEA’s access to smaller donors), its whopping assets ($22.9 million), and the connection of Graham 
relatives and peers to real estate purchased by WECEF raised momentary questions about the evangelist’s 
financial propriety.  See Martin, Prophet, 464-471; and Graham, “Billy Graham On Financing 
Evangelism,” Christianity Today, 26 August 1977, 18-20.  The WECEF scandal broke during the summer 
of 1977, however—just before Carter’s first publicized overtures to Graham.  See below. 
 
81
 Washington Post, 8 December 1977.    
 
82
 Garry Wills, “Jimmy Carter & the Culture of Death,” New York Review of Books, 9 February 
2006, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18670 (accessed 20 February 2006). 
  304 
Yet there were legitimate reasons to suspect that Graham might offer at least tacit 
support for his fellow southerner.  In the immediate aftermath of Watergate, Graham 
made every effort to accentuate his nominal party affiliation, going so far as to tape a 
message for a Democratic Party fundraising telethon urging Americans to support the 
party of their choosing.  (His friend, Republican George H. W. Bush, had earlier done the 
same thing.)83  Moreover, Carter—a moderate, avowedly Southern Baptist Democrat 
whom one South Carolina paper cited as the very fulfillment of Graham’s prophecy that 
the South would solve its racial problems ahead of the North—seemingly more than 
satisfied the office-holding ideals the evangelist had been touting for the last quarter of a 
century.84  (To be sure, the Episcopalian Ford also possessed a number of evangelical 
credentials, including the fact that his son had attended Gordon-Conwell Theological 
Seminary, on whose board Graham served.)85  The evangelist and Carter also had a 
history.  In the mid-1960s, Carter had overseen a desegregated showing of a BGEA film 
in Americus, Georgia, and as governor he had assisted Graham’s efforts to attract a larger 
African-American audience for the 1973 Atlanta crusade.86  Lastly, Graham had much 
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earlier nominated a Carter-style candidate, Ruben Askew, the governor of Florida and an 
outspoken Christian, as an ideal Democratic presidential candidate.87   
When the presidential campaign season arrived, however, Graham made several 
moves that gave little indication he was behind the peanut farmer from Plains.  The 
evangelist had pledged that year to stay “a million miles away from politics” in 1976.88  
One of his election-season comments traveled nearly as far.  “I would rather have a man 
in office who is highly qualified to be President,” Graham told the Los Angeles Times, 
“who didn’t make much of a religious profession than to have a man who had no 
qualifications but who made a religious profession.”89  The statement, which emphasized 
the primary vulnerability of Carter at the expense of his perceived advantage, inspired a 
retort from one of the candidate’s sons that Graham had purchase his “Doctor of 
Religion” degree through the postal system.  The Ford team took notice of the quip.90  
Graham’s words also garnered a Washington Post political cartoon showing the 
evangelist thumping a bumpkin-clad Carter with a Ten Commandments tablet.  The same 
paper noted that Graham’s visit with Ford during the Tolbert banquet had followed the 
publication of a controversial interview Carter had given to Playboy magazine.91 
During Carter’s term in office, though, he did seek out Graham on a number of 
occasions.  The president invited Graham to the inauguration (which he did not attend 
because of illness), requested his advice on Middle East policy, and attempted 
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unsuccessfully to gain his public endorsement of the SALT treaty and the Equal Rights 
Amendment.  Graham and the president maintained a friendly correspondence, and the 
evangelist spent at least one night at the Carter White House.92  Yet Graham was far from 
an ally of this avowedly evangelical president.  Indeed, Graham saw fit to declare that 
Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) members need not feel compelled to endorse all of 
the policies of their fellow congregant.93   
In the end, then, Graham never relinquished his deep interest in politics (as well 
as his equally deep attraction to politicians), but rather lowered the profile of his role as a 
political and a ministerial counselor.  While Graham would never regain the degree of 
influence he possessed during the Nixon years (and probably did not aspire to such 
heights), the evangelist returned to a somewhat more visible role in the White House 
during the Reagan and first Bush administrations.94  During the presidential primary 
season of 1980, Graham met with Reagan and campaign aide Ed Meese for a publicized 
breakfast in Indianapolis, where the evangelist was holding a crusade.95  There, Graham 
turned down a casual request from the GOP candidate to put in a good word for him in 
the state of North Carolina.96  Following Reagan’s electoral triumph, Graham appears to 
have privately voiced support for Alexander Haig, whose Watergate ties threatened his 
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nomination as secretary of state.97  Graham kept in close contact with George H. W. Bush 
during his vice presidency and presidency, privately and publicly blessing the 1991 
Persian Gulf War.98  Although Graham maintained friendly and supportive relations with 
Arkansas Democrat Bill Clinton during the 1990s (to the chagrin of anti-abortion activists 
and impeachment supporters), he publicly backed Republican George W. Bush two days 
before the 2000 election.99  “I don’t endorse candidates,” an aging Graham told reporters 
while posing for photographs with George and Laura Bush, along with the evangelist’s 
then lesser-known heir, Franklin Graham.  “But I’ve come as close to it, I guess, now as 
any time in my life, because I think it’s extremely important.”  He spoke these words on a 
Sunday morning when he shared a private prayer breakfast with the Bushes.  The location 
was Jacksonville, Florida, a state where the evangelist was wrapping up a crusade and 
where Bush, fending off the recent disclosure of a 1976 arrest for drunk driving, had 
staked his electoral prospects.  After the breakfast, Bush briefly recalled his life-changing 
1985 meeting with the evangelist in Kennebunkport, Maine, where Graham had spent his 
customary summer weekend with the George H. W. and Barbara Bush family.  Graham, 
who had prayed at George W. Bush’s first gubernatorial inauguration in Texas, affirmed 
the presidential candidate’s “integrity” in a manner resembling his praise for Nixon two 
decades earlier.  Also reminiscent was Graham’s insinuation that he had cast an absentee 
ballot for this Republican, as well.  “I’ll just let you guess who I voted for,” said the 
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evangelist, who made sure to reiterate his status as a registered Democrat.100  Most of 
these details (the timing of the arrest story excepted) received prominent play in a 2004 
book celebrating Bush’s spiritual strength.101 
 
The Other Water Gate 
 As Graham began to downgrade his involvement in politics, a growing number of 
conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists moved into that world.  The latter process 
had commenced during the years of the temporal Watergate scandal, when a number of 
social issues began to provide additional reasons for a summons to the biblical Water 
Gate.  To some extent, these issues—abortion, homosexuality, and women’s liberation, to 
name several of the more visible ones—comprised the broader crisis that allowed 
Graham to describe the specific crimes of the Nixon administration in relative terms.  
Indeed, Graham paralleled a larger transition among conservatives toward focusing on 
gender- and family-related concerns, in contrast to the more general themes of individual 
morality, anti-permissiveness, and law and order.  This trend would climax with the birth 
of the Christian Right, a movement Graham helped to facilitate, even though he 
voluntarily remained outside of its inner sanctum.102 
                                               
 
100
 Atlanta Constitution, 6 November 2000.  See also Florida Times-Union, 6 November 2000.  
Graham to Nixon, 18 August 1986, RNL, PPSP, 1-5.  Graham, Just As I Am, 589-591.   
 
101
 Paul Kengor, God and George W. Bush: A Spiritual Life (New York: ReganBooks, 2004), 21-
24, 31, 78-79. 
 
102
 The term “Christian Right” is employed here because it entails a greater degree of sociological 
specificity than another commonly used term, “Religious Right,” and has proven unique and enduring 
enough not to require the modifier “New.”  A helpful definition comes from political scientist Clyde 
Wilcox, who defines the Christian Right as “a social movement that attempts to mobilize evangelical 
Protestants and other orthodox Christians into conservative political action.”  See Clyde Wilcox, Onward 
Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 
5.  Christian Right is used in reference to such efforts from the late 1970s to the present, with due 
  309 
 Recently, a number of historians of the American South have argued that the 
1970s featured the start of a shift among many southern whites away from racial concerns 
and toward gender politics.  Following the thrust of arguments put forth by Dan T. Carter, 
these historians have not stressed the abandonment of racial matters, but rather the 
identification of a new, related target.103  In their rendering, gender politics encompasses 
a wide range of issues—including parental authority, sex education, and abortion—that 
ties into a broader discourse on sexuality and the family.  Glenn Feldman states this thesis 
in perhaps the strongest terms, arguing passionately that a “New Racism,” focused on 
character and morality, rather than skin color, came to replace overt race-baiting as the 
dominant trope of southern political culture.  “Moral chauvinism, even moral 
authoritarianism,” he writes, “has filled the void left by the delegitimization of white 
supremacy as a vehicle of politics.”104  Historians Marjorie Julian Spruill and Paul 
Harvey respectively have documented transitions among their subjects away from race 
and toward gender.  Spruill identifies this trend among opponents of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) in Mississippi and elsewhere.  This finding leads her to highlight “the 
potential of gender issues as a replacement for racial issues in public discourse as socially 
acceptable rallying points for social conservatives believing in divinely inspired, innate 
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differences and hierarchies.”105  Harvey applies a similar observation to southern religion.  
In an overview of conservative white southern Christianity in the post-civil rights era, he 
marshals such evidence as the SBC’s patriarchal stance on marriage to argue that the 
“terrain of battle in the southern culture wars had shifted, in effect, from race to gender.”  
One type of hierarchy had replaced another.  This final “transformation of southern 
religious conservatism in the twentieth century”—a trend Spruill also detects among 
slightly more secular actors—helped to enable the emergence of the Christian Right.106 
 The race-to-gender thesis does have a few qualifiers.  In a study of the SBC and 
race, historian Mark Newman provided a kind of pre-emptive caution against 
assumptions (or implications) that the broader social conservatism of many Southern 
Baptists merely represented the displacement of previous commitments to racial 
hierarchy.  By the latter half of the 1970s, Newman argues, the majority of SBC 
conservatives had sincerely abandoned segregation and conscious racism, even while 
they retained their social traditionalism.  “It would be mistaken,” he wrote, “to assume 
that fundamentalist support for the family and law and order and opposition to welfare 
were necessarily code words for racism.”107  Proponents of the race-to-gender thesis 
themselves differ on the extent to which the new political discourse of gender employed 
coded language.  Another historian, David L. Chappell, has made a related contention 
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that the Civil Rights Movement taught white southerners to see religion as a more 
effective mechanism than race for political mobilization.108 
 The example of Billy Graham supports the argument that gender and family 
issues took on a new salience during the 1970s.  More than suggesting an intentionally 
concealed continuity with racial prejudice, though, their prevalence revealed the 
superficial nature of many southerners’ departures from the ethos of Jim Crow.  
Politically, they were quick to get their minds off of race and onto other social issues.  
The decline of the race issue in the eyes of many southern whites removed a lingering 
barrier between them and Graham.  The evangelist clearly shared their concerns about 
declining American values.  He theorized a forty-year period of moral decline (perhaps a 
conscious invocation of the Israelites’ years of wandering before entering the Promised 
Land) that had coincided with four decades of liberal rule.  This timeline, which Graham 
initially marshaled as an argument for electing conservative and moderate politicians 
during the 1970 elections, subsequently became the interpretive property of the New 
Right and its faith-based counterparts—and, eventually, of the Reagan revolution.109 
 Graham paralleled the evolution of social issues within popular American 
conservatism.  During the late 1960s and early 1970s, he had served as both a sanctioning 
and a sanctifying spokesperson for the silent majority.  The range of topics he addressed 
in this capacity reflected the “Social Issue” famously described in Benjamin J. 
Wattenberg and Richard Scammon’s 1970 study of the American electorate, The Real 
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Majority.  The salient electoral issues they identified concerned such matters as crime, 
youthful protesters, school prayer, pornography, and the pace of integration (in spite of an 
overall liberalization of racial views), all matters that Graham regularly addressed in 
press conferences and other venues.110  During the 1960s, Graham had periodically made 
such declarations as, “We ruled prayer out of the schools and put sex in.”  He was 
particularly critical of Supreme Court rulings on criminal rights and branded as 
“diabolical” the 1970 report of the President’s Commission on Pornography and 
Obscenity (which Johnson had commissioned).111       
 During the following decade, however, a set of issues emerged on the right that 
differed in telling ways from those Wattenberg and Scammon had delineated.  The 
rhetorical silent majority gave way to the grassroots New Right as the bellwether of 
modern popular conservatism.  A number of scholars have noted this transition.  
Sociologist Jerome L. Himmelstein has written, “The emphasis shifted substantially from 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the important social issues focused on blacks (racial 
inequality, civil unrest, civil rights, busing, affirmative action) and youth (premarital sex, 
marijuana use, political dissent), to the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the issues of 
gender, the family, education, and the relationship between the church and the state rose 
to prominence.”112  Political analyst Kevin Phillips similarly identified a “second-issue 
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wave” of “religious, moral and sexual controversies” as having emerged by 1980.113  The 
point here is neither to discount the foundational role of Goldwater- and Nixon-style 
critiques of liberal excess nor to ignore the persistence of race-baiting in southern 
politics, but rather to highlight the role of gender and family issues in sparking the 
Christian Right. 
 Graham’s responses to three second-wave social issues—women’s liberation, 
homosexuality, and abortion—slightly preceded the timelines of Himmelstein and 
Phillips.  A more seasoned Graham had learned to modify some of his more controversial 
public stances by the close of the 1960s (e.g., his previous support for a constitutional 
amendment to protect prayer in public schools).114  Still, in 1972, he accused public 
schools of promoting secularism and voiced support for a Southern Baptist proposal to 
launch an integrated private school network.  He made the latter comment a mere month 
after he had produced television spots supporting public education in the South.115  On 
the matter of women’s liberation, Graham was likewise unsuccessful in striking a 
moderate pose.  In a 1970 article in Ladies’ Home Journal that earned him no allies 
among feminists, he declined a position on the ERA, yet raised a number of possibilities 
soon to become shibboleths for the “Antis,” including unisex bathrooms and women in 
combat.  His dismissiveness was palpable.  “‘The Problem That Has No Name’ is 
boredom,” he wrote in a particularly obtuse reference to Betty Friedan’s The Feminine 
                                               
 
113
 Kevin Phillips, Post-Conservative America: People, Politics and Ideology in a Time of Crisis 
(New York: Random House, 1982), 23. 
 
114
 Historian Richard Pierard viewed Graham’s hesitancy to commit himself on particular issues as 
a sign of his growing “political maturation” during the mid- and late-1960s.  See Pierard, “Billy Graham 
and Vietnam: From Cold Warrior to Peacemaker,” Christian Scholar’s Review 10 (1980): 37-51. 
 
115
 Charlotte press conference transcript, 14 April 1972, BGCA, CN 24, 1-36.  Black Mountain, 
NC, press conference transcript, 13 October 1970, BGCA, CN 74, 1-26.  On the spots, see Chapter V. 
  314 
Mystique.116  Graham never took a formal stance on the ERA, although a Carter aide 
somewhat naively asked him to come out in favor of it.117  While the evangelist professed 
to believe in gender equality and remained more welcoming of women as church leaders 
than most of his Southern Baptist peers (in spite of a conception of gender roles informed 
by a typology of Adam as breadwinner and Eve as child bearer), his most consistent 
response to women’s liberation was to assert that true liberation came only through 
Christ.118  Beyond the recourse of theology, though, his comments tended to abet 
conservative opinions.  “I haven’t taken a direct stand [on the ERA],” he told the 
Washington Post in 1979, “because I am in favor of women having all the rights. . . . You 
have to recognize that they are different physiologically and psychologically.”119 
 Homosexuality and abortion seemingly contained less room for either ideological 
or theological flexibility than did women’s liberation.  During a 1975 press conference, 
Graham claimed to have never knowingly met a homosexual person.120  He conceded to 
the Charlotte Observer that a gay person “can perhaps be a Christian,” even though 
homosexual practices were incontestable sins.121  Elsewhere, he expressed admiration for 
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gospel singer and beauty queen Anita Bryant’s crusade to overturn a gay-rights ordinance 
in Miami-Dade County.  Bryant had performed at previous Graham services.122   
The evangelist gave the abortion issue much more consideration.  In contrast to 
the visible involvement of evangelicals in the pro-life movement during the Reagan years 
and beyond, conservative Protestants were relatively slow to mobilize against abortion in 
the immediate aftermath of the Roe v. Wade decision of 1973.123  Graham had been on 
record as opposing the legalization of abortion-on-demand since the late 1960s.  His 
elaboration of this stance paralleled the position of many mainstream evangelicals, 
including Carl C. H. Henry.124  “I have stated my position on a number of occasions that I 
am against all abortion except for such things as rape,” repeated Graham in 1972, “or 
where it’s going to interfere with the health of the mother or where two or three doctors 
confer and agree with the (case of) the mother.”125  Although he admittedly did most of 
his thinking on the issue well after Roe, his position remained as stated at least into the 
1980s and looked moderate compared to later militant groups, such as Operation Rescue, 
or even to an organization that he helped to found in 1975, the Christian Action Council 
(CAC).  Moderation aside, Graham directly assisted this early manifestation of the 
Protestant anti-abortion movement.  Along with theologian Harold O. J. Brown, 
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evangelical intellectual Francis Schaeffer, and future Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, 
the evangelist convened a 1975 meeting in Montreat, North Carolina, from which 
emerged the CAC.  The organization, for which Ruth Graham (although not Billy 
himself) served as an official sponsor, lobbied Congress in favor of de-legalizing or 
restricting abortion and gained initial support from civil rights leader Jesse Jackson.126 
 Graham’s early ties to the anti-abortion cause and his periodic outspokenness on 
other gender and family matters beg the question of his exact relationship to the Christian 
Right.  This question is trickier than it might appear.  Clearly, the evangelist had 
contributed mightily to the post-World War II neo-evangelical shift away from separatist 
fundamentalism toward a greater emphasis on social and political engagement.  
Moreover, his repeated calls for alternative Christian “demonstrations” implied on 
openness to forming a Christian-based political movement.  Graham also possessed a 
long track record of urging Christians to run for political office and of selectively 
supporting politicians who met this qualification.  The Watergate affair only reinforced 
his belief “that we need more devoted Christians who are living the Christian life in every 
area of their lives in the political arena.”127  In words reminiscent of Atlanta crusade 
booster Tom Cousins, Graham hoped that his 1975 Jackson crusade would result in 
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“spiritual growth in the political arena.  We want to see the finest people entering politics 
at the local, state and national level.”128   
At the same time, Graham’s politics and his political tone differed significantly 
from those of the Christian Right to come.  Many practical incentives no doubt existed 
for Graham to keep his evangelistic enterprise publicly removed from a controversial 
figure such as Jerry Falwell.  More importantly, though, Graham drew an important 
distinction, common among evangelicals and Southern Baptists, between the unassailable 
good of Christians in office and the more ambiguous status of Christianity as a political 
movement.  He would have affirmed the 1958 sentiment of his friend, Texas Governor 
Price Daniel.  “We believe in separation of Church and State in this land,” Daniel wrote 
in Christianity Today, “but never have we believed in separation of Church and 
statesmen.”129  To assume a smooth or reflexive linkage between Graham and the 
Christian Right, then, would be to greatly oversimplify the nature of his social ethic, the 
difference between Christians in politics and Christianity as politics.  Graham clearly 
facilitated the institutional coalescence of the Christian Right and his stature and 
popularity alone modeled the type of conservative ecumenism to which much of the 
Christian Right eventually aspired.  Yet his role in the nascent movement was that of a 
shadow presence.  When Graham did go public, he did so largely as a critic.             
 Any exploration of Graham’s relationship to the institutional apparatus of the 
Christian Right must factor in his support for Richard Nixon, especially during the 1972 
election.  Writing about that campaign, biographer William Martin observed a “close 
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collaboration between Billy Graham and the White House that not only helped reelect 
Richard Nixon, but contributed importantly to the emergence, eight years later and under 
different leadership, of the [Christian Right].”  This argument led Martin to title the 
opening chapter of his history of the Christian Right, “Billy Graham—Geared to the 
Times.”130  Such a narrative, however, may slightly overstate the case.  As part of 
Nixon’s effort to create a new majority, the president and Graham collaborated to solidify 
and expand his evangelical base.  Noting the electoral significance of this effort, 
however, is a different project than explaining what led the Christian Right to coalesce as 
a self-conscious political movement attempting to usurp the very GOP establishment 
Nixon had come to epitomize. 
The electoral politics of Richard Nixon partly explains why the Christian Right 
eventually chose to align with the Republican Party and why certain mainstream 
Republicans courted the movement.  The policies of the Carter administration played an 
even larger role.  However, the emergence of gender and family issues, as well as the rise 
of the New Right as a source of patronage and logistical support, best clarifies why the 
movement formed in the first place.131  During a 1974 crusade in Virginia, Graham was 
asked to comment on the growing right-wing activism among the state’s independent 
Baptists—one of whom, Jerry Falwell, went on to found the Moral Majority.  At that 
point, Graham could truthfully say that he had only read about this relatively small 
group.132  As Graham’s advice to both Nixon and Carter indicated, though, the evangelist 
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was more than aware of the political potential of mobilized conservative Christians.133  A 
number of the persons whom Graham connected with Nixon (Bill Bright and W. A. 
Criswell, for example) later assumed major roles within the burgeoning Christian Right.  
Yet most evangelical leaders did not affiliate with those Christian Right leaders, largely 
of a fundamentalist bent, who made much noise during the run-up to the 1980 election.  
Following a brief period of support for Jimmy Carter, many conservative evangelicals 
settled into a less conspicuous position as part of the Reagan coalition.134 
Accurately situating Graham in relation to the Christian Right, then, requires 
contextualizing his precise relationship with those persons who did eventually carry the 
mantle of the movement.  The evangelist possessed obvious and close ties with many 
persons who became charter members of the Christian Right.  Bright, whose interest in 
political work grew during the mid-1970s, had known the evangelist intimately since the 
early 1950s, and the two had since collaborated on a number of projects.  When visiting 
Washington, DC, Graham sometimes stayed at the Christian Embassy, an evangelical 
outreach to capital politicos that Bright had helped to found.135  The evangelist 
maintained a cordial, if not collaborative, relationship with the leading senatorial liaison 
to the New Right, Jesse Helms, whose influential political action committee received 
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support from BGEA associate Grady Wilson.136  Graham also remained close to several 
of the high-profile ministers who marshaled their evangelistic empires in support of 
Christian Right causes.  This list included James Kennedy of Coral Ridge Presbyterian in 
Florida, which Nixon had visited during his presidency, and James Robison of Dallas-
Forth Worth, a televangelist who had earlier caught the eye of oil man and Graham-
admirer H. L. Hunt.  Graham spoke at the opening service in Kennedy’s new church 
building, as he also did for the dedication of the headquarters of Pat Robertson’s 
Christian Broadcasting Network.137 
 These many ties aside, the Christian Right, along with the New Right as a whole, 
entailed a labyrinthine world of organizations and entities to which the evangelist had 
less enduring links.  Moreover, Graham was unwilling to associate publicly with the 
social or political campaigns of these groups.  He related most comfortably to Christian 
Right luminaries in a capacity, such as a dedication ceremony, that he could safely 
delineate as ministerial.  On a number of well-publicized occasions, he sought to 
distinguish himself from the ambitions of the new generation of fundamentalist and 
evangelical political activism.  The first such effort came in 1976, when he criticized 
Bright’s early forays into politics and declared himself “opposed to organizing Christians 
into a political bloc.”  Noting that Bright had been “using me and my name for twenty 
years,” Graham said he was “concerned about the political direction he seems to be 
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taking.”138  Following the 1980 election, Graham told People magazine that the Moral 
Majority was not his “cup of tea,” adding that he did not “intend to use what little moral 
influence I may have on secular, nonmoral issues like the Panama Canal,” which the New 
Right strongly opposed abdicating.139 
Much of Graham’s public hand-washing resulted from his desire to revise his 
political identity in the aftermath of Watergate—a move he understood and explained in 
terms of his regeneration-centered theology and evangelistic priorities.  The Nixon era, he 
claimed, had taught him the perils of playing God.  “I learned my lesson the hard way,” 
he said of his experiences.140  Elsewhere, the evangelist referred to a time when he had 
“almost identified Americanism with Christianity.”  Now, he said, “I no longer think we 
are a Christian nation.”141  Nor was Graham willing to actively join the forces seeking to 
renew this status.  As was true during the Civil Rights Movement (although much less so 
during the Nixon years), Graham sought to protect his evangelistic identity.  His 
constituency had long since expanded beyond the realm of independent fundamentalist 
churches, the primary base for the Moral Majority, and his ambivalence about the 
Christian Right paralleled the response of many mainstream evangelicals (and more than 
a few Bob Jones-style purists) to their peers who had abandoned religious separatism for 
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political activism.142  As a result, Graham’s rhetoric on social concerns differed tellingly 
from that of Jerry Falwell.  While Falwell addressed a platform-driven “moral agenda,” 
Graham used the less activist language of “moral renewal.”143  Graham’s regenerative 
approach to social concern lent itself to support for Christian-friendly leaders, such as 
Nixon or George W. Bush, but it did not translate comfortably into a political 
movement—either in Washington, DC, or even, as his middle-ground response to the 
fundamentalist takeover of the SBC indicated, on a denominational level.144  Nixon 
advised Graham to steer clear of the Christian Right, and Vice President George H. W. 
Bush privately distinguished Graham’s kind of religious conservative from the 
“flamboyant money-mad, teary temple builders.”145 
 Yet Graham undoubtedly had helped to construct the political and religious 
culture that made the Christian Right possible.  Graham’s suggestion that Nixon and 
Carter heed the potential influence of galvanized Christians represented sound political 
advice, but also grew out of a long-voiced desire for greater evangelical influence on 
policy making.  Moreover, the evangelist kept his fingers near the pulse of the Christian 
Right and sympathized with the thrust of much of its agenda.  His criticism of Bright and 
the leaders of the Moral Majority derived from personal, if largely behind-the-scenes, 
associations with their world.  Indeed, Graham attended what turned out to be one of the 
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foundational meetings of the Christian Right, a two-day prayer and strategy session in 
1979 to address the nation’s moral slippage.  Present at the Dallas meeting were such 
future Christian Right luminaries as Robison, Bright, and Robertson—along with 
Graham.  Robison recalled that Graham declared himself in sympathy with the attendees, 
but stressed that his past experiences with political activity and his evangelistic priorities 
precluded any public association with their efforts.  One year later, in August 1980, 
Graham explicitly absented himself from a more famous Dallas meeting, the National 
Affairs Briefing, where presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, following a brief 
introduction by W. A. Criswell, delivered an endorsement of the Christian Right.146  
Earlier that year, the evangelist had offered only token support for another Christian 
Right milestone, the Washington For Jesus rally.147 
 The disjuncture between Graham’s public warnings against playing God and his 
private associations with the very targets of his criticism represented an incongruity 
analogous to his simultaneous friendships with King and Criswell during the civil rights 
era.  Indeed, as students of Graham have observed, the evangelist ultimately served as 
something of a conscience figure vis-à-vis the Christian Right.148  To label him even a de 
facto member of that movement would be mistaken, however.  Graham deviated in 
important respects from the style and also the platform of the emerging conservative 
movement, just as he had earlier differed from his many right-wing peers on issues 
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ranging from desegregation to the War on Poverty.  On abortion and homosexuality, the 
evangelist remained largely in tune with Falwell and his supporters—in substance, but 
rarely in tone.  In a 1978 sermon attacking the “gay movement” and praising Anita 
Bryant, the firebrand James Robison acknowledged the significance of this distinction.  
Robison declared that he was addressing an issue his “friend,” Graham, had “chosen not 
to speak on.”149  In other areas, though, the evangelist and the Christian Right differed in 
both substance and tone. 
More than any other set of issues, Graham’s perspective on foreign policy matters 
distinguished him from his bellicose peers in the Christian Right.  During the mid- and 
late-1970s, he rekindled a tradition of moderate leanings that stretched back to the 
Johnson years and, on racial matters at least, to the Eisenhower administration.  On 
domestic policy, Graham had already modified his position on capital punishment.150  He 
next converted to the cause of arms control, a stance the former anticommunist militant 
accurately called “a rather later conviction of mine.”151  In 1979, just before the Moral 
Majority became a household name, Graham called Harry Truman’s decision to drop the 
first atomic bomb a “mistake. . . . I wish we’d never developed [the Bomb].”152  In the 
pages of a left-leaning evangelical magazine, Graham called for “SALT X . . . . Total 
destruction of nuclear arms.”153  He stressed, however, that he was neither a pacifist nor a 
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unilateralist.154  In a “Dear Jerry” letter released after the 1980 election, Graham politely, 
but firmly admonished Falwell for failing to address arms control and other social-justice 
issues.155  Having held crusades throughout the Eastern Bloc by the mid-1980s, he 
described nuclear disarmament as “my No. 1 social concern.”156  Such comments drew 
praise from unexpected sources (including peace activist Colman McCarthy and rebel 
Southern Baptist minister Will D. Campbell) and angered members of his home 
congregation in Dallas.157 
By the mid-1980s, Graham had accomplished a notable public relations feat: 
disassociating himself in the popular imagination from his own political biases.  He chose 
to emphasize an eschatological optimism that, while perhaps understandable coming 
from someone safely removed from the trials of Watergate and entering the final chapter 
of a successful career, remained markedly out of step with the polemics emanating from 
Lynchburg and Virginia Beach.158  The result was a virtual watershed in how non-
evangelicals interpreted Graham, despite the occasional surfacing of his political 
leanings.  A 1984 analysis of popular evangelicalism, for example, dedicated several 
pages to detailing Graham’s self-described “pilgrimage” toward a more internationalist, 
holistic understanding of the relationship between faith and social action.159      
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A Pulpit Setter 
 In his simultaneously partisan and theologically sincere attempts to parlay 
Watergate into Water Gate, Graham seemingly set the pulpit for a coming generation of 
conservative Christian activists and politicians.  He was present at their conception, but 
not their fruition.  Attempts to construct a less polarizing image of himself aside, post-
Watergate Graham was in fact a mellower, more patient version of the former southern 
strategist and anticommunist zealot.  Just as Graham had facilitated the southern strategy, 
yet had not indulged in its excesses, so he highlighted the new social concerns of the 
1970s, but did not bless the apparent results of his repeated calls for a Christian march 
upon Washington.  As in the previous case, his strategic distancing act also reflected his 
personal beliefs and priorities.  His conservatism was ultimately of a less movemental 
stripe.  To use a contemporary term, Graham was not a culture warrior at heart.  He put 
his faith in Christian political leaders, of whom he mistakenly considered Nixon an ideal. 
 Indeed, Graham’s emphasis on Christian statesmanship offers a window into what 
might comprise his most palpable influence on national politics—not as a progenitor, 
however ambiguously, of the Christian Right, but rather as an eminent evangelist whose 
Watergate apologetics and political work for Nixon foreshadowed a more diffuse chapter 
of the larger evangelicalization of American politics.  In Graham’s home region, a clear 
affinity existed between his evangelical discourse and the construction of an imagined, 
yet salable Sunbelt South.  A similar posture drove the symbolic politics that Graham 
assisted during the 1972 campaign and that later resounded in his responses to Watergate.  
This approach manifested itself in converted politicians without converted politics, 
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individuated and spiritualized interpretations of political crises, and a selective reticence 
to fault ordained authority.  What also emerged was a politics of soul-gazing—more 
attached to projections of piety than wedded to platforms—that has operated as a friendly 
cousin, rather than a loving partner, of the more conspicuous culture wars.  Graham 
influenced this political style even as it immediately transcended him and his attachment 
to Nixon.  This style has worked most effectively in the solidly Republican South and, 
more recently, in the presidency of George W. Bush.  Vastly more comfortable behind 
the pulpit than was Nixon, Bush enhanced his political prospects when he accepted 
Graham’s counsel that weekend in Kennebunkport two decades ago—or, rather, when he 
later recalled having done so.         
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION:  
THE NEW SOUTH OF BILLY GRAHAM 
 
He is the kind of man Rudyard Kipling had in mind when he wrote, “You can talk with 
crowds and keep your virtue, / Or walk with Kings—nor lose the common touch.” 
 
John Connally on Billy Graham1 
 
My father had a red clay farm that he hardly earned a living on when I was a boy.  But 
some of the best part of Charlotte moved on top of it—banks, IBM, Esso headquarters for 
the Southeast. 
 
Billy Graham2 
 
 During the decades since the civil rights era came to a close, two theses have 
dominated portraits of the modern South that Billy Graham helped to create.  Some 
observers have cast the South as a dynamic region of economic vitality and demographic 
relevance (the foil of the Rustbelt North).3  Others, in contrast, have seen the region as 
the motherland of a popular conservative ascendancy traversing both faith and politics 
(the foil of the bicoastal liberal elite).4  These images were, and remain, contradictory and 
confused in relation to each other.  The banking center of Charlotte, North Carolina, and 
                                               
1
 “John 3:16,” Hour of Decision broadcast, 21 November 1965, Billy Graham Center Archives 
(BGCA), CN 191, T828c.  The quotation is taken, somewhat inexactly, from the Rudyard Kipling’s “If.”   
 
2
 Atlanta Journal and Constitution Magazine, 9 October 1977. 
 
3
 See, for example, “Special Section: The South Today,” Time, 27 September 1976, 28-99; and 
Peter Applebome, Dixie Rising: How the South is Shaping American Values, Politics, and Culture (New 
York: Random House, 1996). 
 
4
 See, for example, Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New 
Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics, 2nd edition (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University, 2000); and Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press [Princeton], 2005). 
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the fundamentalist bastion of Bob Jones University, one-hundred miles down Interstate 
85 in Greenville, South Carolina, symbolized modernity and reaction, respectively.  On a 
different note, Newt Gingrich’s booming, tax-loathing Cobb County, Georgia, and the 
colossal, cross-shaped headquarters of Pat Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network 
(CBN) in Virginia Beach blended elements of both.  These variegated regional snapshots 
have attached themselves to an equally diverse range of political signifiers: Richard 
Nixon’s and Ronald Reagan’s southern outreach, Jimmy Carter’s and Bill Clinton’s New 
South personas, and George W. Bush’s celebrated electoral “base.”  All of the above 
images also intersected in some way with the life and career of Billy Graham.  The 
evangelist was born in 1918 in what became a thriving section of Charlotte, briefly 
attended Bob Jones College in 1936, operated an office in the Atlanta suburbs from 1964 
to 1976, and dedicated the CBN building in 1979. 
From the vantage point of the soft twilight of Graham’s remarkable sixty-year run 
as an evangelist and pastor to kings and commoners alike, such intersections might seem 
like coincidences or asides in a career that has taken place mostly outside of the South.  
They might also be viewed as mere manifestations of the larger historical forces that, 
through the blessings of time and place, Graham traveled toward the sunset of fame and 
influence.  After all, the evangelist has not resided in his hometown since the mid-1930s, 
lasted less than one semester under the rule of Bob Jones, Sr., maintained his 
organization’s official headquarters in Minneapolis until the present century, and moved 
comfortably among political figures as liberal as Sargent Shriver and as conservative as 
Strom Thurmond.  Many Americans, regardless of their theological and political 
leanings, see Graham as a national and international icon—and, in an era of culture wars 
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and intense partisanship, as a beacon of stability and decency.  He has, indeed, become 
all of these things.  It would be unfortunate for the historical legacy of Graham, though, if 
the haze and glow of his final moments led scholars to reify a familiar, somewhat static 
narrative of an evangelist whose familiarity and overall consistency threaten to belie his 
complexity.  In considering Graham’s influence on his native South, this project has 
sought to prevent such a development and, in the process, to shed interpretive light on the 
coexistent and seemingly contradictory images of the modern South.  Graham was a 
southerner by birth and remained one by choice; analyzing his role as such enables a 
better understanding of both him and his times. 
The epigraphs from John Connally and Graham himself imply that the evangelist 
can be seen as either a mover or a metaphor.  Likewise, he can be viewed alternately as a 
symbol of, or an agent in, the creation of the post-civil rights era South.  Weighing one 
form of significance against the other entails evaluating the status of Graham as a public 
figure.  Put more starkly, was the evangelist “an innocent tool of complex dynamics 
which he may little understand or appreciate,” as one observer argued in the early 1970s, 
or did he at some level consciously shape the nature of his influence in the South, serving 
as a type of regional leader?5  This project has considered Graham from both 
perspectives—as an actor in the South and as a window into regional change—because 
both viewpoints enrich our understanding of the newest New South. 
 The boosterism of the Sunbelt South has always tended to prioritize image over 
evidence, salesmanship over substance.  Well into the 1980s, for example, Graham’s 
home state of North Carolina, routinely celebrated as the most progressive part of the 
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former Confederacy, ranked at or near the bottom nationwide in industrial wages and per 
capita income.6  Beginning in 1958, when Graham traveled to Clinton, Tennessee, two 
months after the bombing of its desegregated high school, his racially-mixed services 
contributed to this southern booster tradition, updated for an era of tense social transition.  
His southern interventions assisted regional change in two primary ways.  First, they 
modeled, or were purported to model, a racially harmonious region, one that was too 
busy to hate because it was even busier worshipping (or constructing stadiums and 
sanctuaries in which to worship).  Secondly, the evangelist’s visits to southern cities, 
especially such trouble spots as Birmingham, served as a means of mediating and 
exerting some level of constraint over the course of what many southern whites saw as a 
social and economic revolution dictated by alien federal and judicial forces.  Most 
southern whites ultimately supported Graham’s visits (even if, in the cases of Orval 
Faubus and George Wallace, they did so grudgingly).  For many of them, the Billy 
Graham Evangelistic Association represented a significantly more welcome form of 
intervention, foreign only in the sense that Graham possessed national and international 
bona fides, in addition to regional ones.  While Graham hardly drove the region’s most 
dramatic changes—which were the combined products of civil rights activism, federal 
policies, judicial rulings, and economic forces—his desegregated services and the 
positive publicity that surrounded them supplied an acceptable path upon which many 
southern whites could commence transitioning away from the racial status quo.  He 
offered a safe, if incomplete, way out of unyielding support for Jim Crow, as well as a 
means toward some level of interracial cooperation.  This fact was particularly striking, 
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especially to moderate southern whites and certain blacks, during Graham’s 1964-1965 
visits to Alabama.  As the Atlanta crusade of 1973 revealed, though, it was significantly 
less impressive for black activists and white liberals amid the more racially moderate, but 
arguably more complex, environment of the early 1970s. 
Graham, who discussed racial matters with political and religious leaders of both 
races in the South, never lost cognizance of his potential influence there.  Nor did he 
voice anything but confidence in his home region.  Even as he publicly distanced himself 
from any motivations not explicitly religious in nature, he rarely passed up an opportunity 
to hype the South’s prospects, voicing from the early 1950s on a belief that the region 
possessed the social and spiritual tools to one day surpass the sneering North in the 
quality of its race relations.  His hopefulness echoed the words, spoken for wildly varying 
and largely incompatible reasons, of southern civil rights activists, conservative defenders 
of regional folkways, and Sunbelt boosters alike.  Beginning in the mid-1960s, his tone 
came to correlate most directly with the last of these groups.  That correlation possessed 
profound political implications for the post-civil rights era South. 
In his roles as desegregating evangelist and spokesperson for southern progress, 
Graham functioned as what political scientist Paul Luebke has called a “modernizer.”  
Applied historically, modernizers were proponents of regional change and growth, 
whether the issue was bringing Jim Crow to a peaceful close, supporting public 
education, attracting industry, increasing interstate highway funding, or constructing civic 
centers.  While obviously critical of reactionary politics in their region, they did not hew 
to national liberalism either in its New Deal or post-McGovern forms.  They generally 
opposed an expanded welfare state or any type of cultural liberalism.  In Luebke’s 
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schema, most modernizers were Democrats (particularly in North Carolina, the focus of 
his study).7  Beginning in the mid-1950s, Graham carried the banner of modernization in 
the statements he made, the company he kept, and the image he projected.  His crusades 
gave southern cities another opportunity to sell themselves—as pious, to be sure, but also 
as progressive and relevant. 
Despite his nominal and, eventually, strategic status as a registered Democrat, 
Graham ultimately maintained his most intimate political relationships with members or 
supporters of the Republican Party.  His overall bias toward Republicans (and, hence, 
toward members of a party that benefited from the electoral residue of massive 
resistance) appears to rest in tension with his role as a modernizing figure.  With the 
exception of his early friendships with a number of Cold War stalwarts, though, a clear 
tendency toward modernizing ran across the southern political actors to whom Graham 
remained particularly close—those whom he offered not only pastoral comfort, but also 
political support and occasional advice.  Richard Nixon, John Connally, Frank Clement, 
and Lyndon Johnson stood out as the most prominent examples.  The first two politicians 
from this list were (or became) Republicans.  Along with Alabamian Winton Blount and 
nouveau Texan George H. W. Bush, two other Republicans and Graham intimates, they 
represented an oft-forgotten booster or Sunbelt style within the postwar southern GOP.  
By the 1970s, the race-baiting and race-coding techniques of Strom Thurmond and Jesse 
Helms had justifiably come to dominate impressions of southern Republicanism.  In 
response to the electoral threat of George Wallace, Nixon himself embraced this type of 
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southern strategy.  Republicans in the South turned rightward, allowing a generation of 
1970s moderate Democrats to serve as spokespersons for the New South and delaying the 
full ascendance of the southern GOP until the Reagan years or even the mid-1990s.  
The Sunbelt strand of southern Republicanism survived, though, in the flagship 
lands of the post-civil rights era South.  Indeed, Nixon achieved his greatest southern 
appeal in those expanding middle-class suburbs experiencing economic vibrancy 
alongside white flight from the urban core.8  Starting during the Nixon years, many such 
white southerners came to achieve a tacit, if rarely vocalized, rapprochement with the 
civil rights landmarks of the previous two decades.  In the eyes of such southerners, these 
laws and rulings by themselves had adequately redressed Jim Crow by proscribing 
legalized segregation and upholding equality before the law.  By implication, the lessons 
of the civil rights era applied only to the South of the recent, but vanquished past, to the 
South of Bull Conner or Jim Clark.  The Civil Rights Movement, so this view went, had 
nothing constructive to offer the modern metropolises of the region, even though many of 
those areas remained no less (or more) residentially segregated than Jim Crow 
Birmingham or Selma.  Nixon presented a version of this argument as early as 1968, 
when he spoke in Graham’s hometown of Charlotte against forced busing as a solution to 
school segregation.  Graham had come to embrace this same argument by his conscious 
associations—and by his own words, which echoed the Nixonian themes of forgotten 
Americans and silent majorities.  In this context, the evangelist’s efforts to depoliticize 
the race issue—to speak of it primarily in moral or spiritual terms and, hence, to 
downplay the effectiveness of legal solutions—led him to further politicize himself. 
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Ever hesitant to pronounce the white South guilty even during the height of 
massive resistance, Graham helped a portion of the region to subsequently declare itself 
racially absolved.  As early as 1966, before such terms as southern strategy or busing had 
entered household parlance, the novelist Walker Percy wrote of a white South that, after 
so many decades of defeat, had emerged “happy, victorious, rich, patriotic, and 
Republican.”9  More prophetic than accurate at the time, these modifiers (along with 
“Christian”) aptly describe the New South of Billy Graham, the image of the region he 
implicitly celebrated.  This was a land of newfound “racial innocence,” a land (and, in 
many respects, a nation) where many whites tried to disassociate themselves from the 
region’s racial past.10  By extension, they also attempted to excuse their opposition to any 
further remedies for the legacy of Jim Crow, turning instead to seemingly more important 
(and seemingly more color-blind) issues—be they abortion or, more likely, taxes.  
Graham characteristically avoided taking specific stances on most of these watershed 
issues of post-Jim Crow southern conservatism.  Yet he had facilitated the conditions for 
their emergence.  From the mid-1950s on, he had internalized and voiced an early version 
of the narrative of racial innocence, to the point where his evangelical prescriptions for 
racial prejudice tended to conflate guiltlessness and forgiveness.  His blended celebration 
of piety and growth—of individual salvation and individual striving, of golf courses and 
family values—continues to inform today’s GOP, particularly its southern wing.  Such 
talk is an indication of conservative continuity, for many southerners, and newfound 
prosperity, for a smaller, more fortunate group. 
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 If Graham’s political leanings appear somewhat obvious in retrospect, they often 
came across much less pointedly or controversially to the many American who 
encountered him primarily through his radio shows, television specials, and newspaper 
columns.  Herein lies a key to understanding his broad-ranging appeal.  John Connally 
was correct to quote poet Rudyard Kipling when introducing Graham at the 1965 
Houston crusade.  The evangelist gained, and rarely lost, the ears of multiple publics.  A 
sensitive consideration of his full political cultural significance thus offers something of a 
challenge, in part because most of his supporters rightly interpreted him as first and 
foremost an evangelist, but also because the specter of the subsequent Christian Right 
looms over almost any treatment of evangelical faith and politics during the preceding 
decades.  For many Americans, southerners and non-southerners alike, Graham 
reaffirmed and reinvigorated their basic assumptions about faith, family, and country—
the composite beliefs that formed what one literary scholar has called the “Transparent 
American Subject.”11  His service in this capacity was especially salient (and, hence, 
particularly contentious) during the Nixon administration, when he appeared at numerous 
public celebrations of Middle America and the silent majority.  Some of Graham’s 
rhetoric during this time paralleled the later themes of the Christian Right, which since 
the late 1970s has sought to restore a vision of America that the evangelist, for the most 
part, had always considered normative. 
Despite the jeremiadic quality of Graham’s persistent calls for national revival, 
though, he was something other than a culture warrior.  That is, he did not politicize 
common sense—or “normal” values—to the same extent his peers in the Christian Right 
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later would.  He occasionally and infamously wielded such language for partisan ends—
particularly in the service of Nixon’s presidential ambitions—yet he never went so far as 
to state definitively that one could not be a good Christian and American and still affirm, 
say, the rights of criminals or, on the opposite end of the political spectrum, the 
usefulness of racial segregation (two positions the evangelist generally opposed).  This 
distinction had a difference.  When pressed to comment on the above positions, the 
evangelist would routinely state his skepticism about them and occasionally add or imply 
that they lacked biblical justification.  While Graham wanted Christians to vote for 
morally sound and faith-affirming candidates, he did not desire the creation of a sectarian 
political movement dedicated to a specific platform.  The reasons for this were many: his 
evangelistic priorities, his abiding faith in the existing American political process (a 
confidence not all of his fundamentalist peers shared), the reality that he did not always 
employ religious reasoning in voicing his political opinions, and the fact that he 
moderated a number of his views starting in the late 1970s.  By the mid-1950s, Graham 
operated independent of the social networks and rhetorical postures of American 
fundamentalism, even though he retained close theological and personal ties to parts of 
that world.  His persistent popularity was in no small part the product of his flexibility 
and relative inclusiveness.  With several important exceptions, the Nixon years being the 
most obvious one, Graham largely evaded extended criticism, even among most religious 
and political liberals.  His astounding run of appearances on the Gallup poll’s “Most 
Admired” list (forty-eight times from 1948 to 2004) comprised a recent clue on the 
television quiz show Jeopardy!12 
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 This is not to say that Graham made no enemies.  Indeed, another important, if 
qualified, exception to the evangelist’s popularity involved criticism from diehard 
segregationists (and, with them, many fundamentalists) in the South.  These groups 
especially disparaged Graham during the years from 1956, when he heeded Dwight 
Eisenhower’s request to play a more direct role in southern race relations, through 1965, 
when he visited strife-torn Alabama at the urging of Lyndon Johnson.  For certain 
defenders of Jim Crow, Graham stood as a regional traitor, a political prostitute, and even 
a “nigger lover.”  Yet the southern right remained split in its responses to Graham, who 
kept the attention of many other segregationists.  His ability to retain this audience 
derived from his asserted identity as a southerner, his privileged position as an evangelist, 
and his social ethic of evangelical universalism, which (unlike liberal or prophetic 
Christianity) remained resistant to charges of secularism or radicalism, and hesitant to 
single out Jim Crow for unique condemnation.  Graham could question certain southern 
shibboleths by way of affirming other ones. 
Expressed in terms of evangelical universalism, Graham’s desegregated services, 
along with his other efforts to confront white racial prejudice, evinced an approach to 
race relations that would assume particular relevance in the post-civil rights era South.  
His racial views made him a moderate until the sit-ins and Freedom Rides of the early 
1960s, when his sharp criticism of non-violent civil disobedience further distinguished 
him from most racial liberals.  The racial continuum altered again during the Nixon years 
and beyond, as many liberals and others on the left started to advocate policies of 
affirmative action and notions of racial particularism.  Meanwhile, as the urban tensions 
of the late 1960s came to an end and as policy debates evolved to consider the means of 
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desegregation, rather than the legal status of segregation, many political and religious 
conservatives came to embrace a soft brand racial universalism.13  For quite a few 
conservatives in the South, this move represented a strategic response to the national 
discrediting of racial discrimination; for others, though, the shift entailed a legitimate, if 
often less than complete, departure from regional mores.  Both phenomena were nowhere 
more evident than in the near-disappearance of the theological segregationism Graham 
had attacked since the early 1950s.  The evangelist had long argued that Christians should 
not allow the secular world to set the pace for racial progress.  By the 1970s, the white 
church had begun catching up, in part because the larger political culture had already 
slowed down. 
 What emerged during that decade was something Graham’s post-segregation 
language had portended since the 1950s: a conservative rhetoric of color-blindness.  
Scholars have linked color-blindness (or its intellectual corollary, “racial realism”) with 
such things as the anti-busing movement, neoconservative and New Right critiques of 
affirmative action, and even the original intentions of the Brown court.14  Yet its religious 
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roots have not received due attention.  The brand of faith and the social ethic voiced by 
Graham in his visits to southern crisis spots—as well as in his numerous articles, books, 
addresses, and statements on the subject of race—suggested an additional, evangelical 
route to color-blindness.  While many white southerners did not follow the path of color-
blindness away from Jim Crow, those who did could consult directions formulated in a 
familiar evangelical language.  They could hear a message that God does not think in 
terms of race, even if His creation features persons of different colors.  They could hear 
that race becomes irrelevant in the lives of truly regenerated humans, and that Christian 
love—rather than laws, which still require obedience—remains the most effective 
solution for ending existing racial tensions.  This path operated alongside the parallel 
post-civil rights era narratives of white backlash, black political advances, and ascendant 
regional confidence.  Two of the most prominent poles of the modern South, the 
Christian Right and the Sunbelt sensibility, came to fruition only after their 
spokespersons had abandoned (whether willingly or under duress) theological racism and 
legalized Jim Crow, respectively, for versions of the social ethic and public posture 
Graham had already modeled: evangelical universalism and the politics of decency.  Such 
a dynamic helps to explain how Graham, a racial moderate who abetted Nixon’s southern 
strategy, could contribute to the end of two Solid Souths: Jim Crow segregation and 
Democratic Party dominance. 
 What, finally, does this story—a tale of the intersection of evangelicalism, race, 
politics, and modernity—tell us about Graham and his South?  Someone in his position, 
who possessed both the common touch and the support of kings, was peculiarly well-
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positioned to help shepherd his region, however ambiguously, into a new era.  Moving 
comfortably in many spheres, Graham’s role was often indirect and sometimes symbolic.  
In many cases, though, it was also intentional.  His influence derived from his seeming 
authenticity and his established identity, allowing him to gracefully change particular 
positions and to artfully avoid specifics about more controversial subjects in a manner 
elected politicians might have envied.  He was a desegregationist who later criticized 
Martin Luther King, Jr., a southern strategist who had earlier supported Lyndon Johnson.  
Yet he retained a degree of consistency that has proven persistently frustrating to almost 
all of his critics and deceptively straightforward to many of his other interpreters.  His 
central theme never altered; he preached Christ crucified and resurrected, with salvation 
through Christ available to all who would invite Him into their hearts.  The message 
remained familiar, even while its context shifted dramatically.  Thus, the transformation 
of Graham’s Charlotte homestead into an IBM officeplex offers only a partial metaphor 
for a region that has demonstrated its own forms of continuity amid change.  In the post-
civil rights era South, skyscrapers, sports arenas, and megachurches have arisen.  Racial 
traditions have waned and political loyalties have switched.  Many faiths, however, have 
remained steadfast.
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